✨ new from me &
@jenjpan
in
@PNASNews
. We find that "January 6 arrests and media coverage do not remobilize conservatives on social media," suggesting we need more work to understand under what circumstances social media can _sustain_ movements
📰 personal update: I'm so happy to say I've accepted a tenure-track assistant professorship at
@UWMadison
@uw_sjmc
for next year. To return home to my alma mater is a privilege and a dream.
When people post misinformation and it's tagged as misinfo by a single person, they retreat into echo chambers, but when the post receive a collective tag (e.g., community notes), they are less likely to retreat, finds
@JunsolK
@gxin_ling
@profjamesevans
People share misinformation because they think their audience will like it and anticipate a positive reaction from their followers, finds
@A_Marie_sci
@M_B_Petersen
using experimental and observational data
Populist politicians are successful because voters agree with their policy positions, not because of their populist rhetoric, even when voters hold populist attitudes, finds
@yaoyao_dai
&
@akoustov
in a great conjoint experiment
Increased social endorsement of misinformation, in the form of social media "likes," increases belief in the piece of misinformation, finds
@lucy_h_butler
@Nicolas_Fay
@UlliEcker
Happy (American) Thanksgiving! Thanksgiving dinners with people from opposite-partisan-voting precincts are 30-50 minutes shorter than dinners with just same-party dinners, finds
@MKeithChen
@rarohla
using smartphone-location data in
@ScienceAdvances
People trust "community notes" more than flags to warn against misinformation because of the additional context rather than source trust, with results holding across partisanship, finds
@chrdrlsbch
Solovev
@NicProllochs
in
@PNASNexus
Opting into online surveys is itself a political behavior: respondents have high rates of voter turnout, campaign donations, and attending rallies, finds
@dhopkins1776
& Gorton
Misinformation interventions reduce belief in false information, however, they can also have a "backfire effect" of reducing belief in factual information across three continents, finds
@EmmaHoes93
@JingwenZhang
@mwojcieszak
et al.
Removing Confederate monuments decreased racial resentment, increased support of affirmative action, and decreased anti-Blake hate crime, with effects strongest in communities closest geographically to removal, finds
@RoxanneRahnama
My first ever publication is finally out! This project with
@RyanMooreComm
and
@jeffhancock
began before I even started grad school.
During the 2020 election, compared to 2016, we find that misinformation website exposure and engagement is down
🚨📬 New paper out in
@NatureHumBehav
w/
@RyanMooreComm
and
@Ross_Dahlke
How many Americans were exposed to misinformation during the 2020 election?
We find that 26.2% of Americans were exposed in 2020 compared to 44.3% during the 2016 election.
🧵👇
Deplatforming far-right misinformation and extremist accounts on YouTube was effective in minimizing their reach, despite these accounts finding a home on alt-tech platforms, finds
@OuzhouAdi
@JonasKaiser
Deplatforming is effective: Although deplatforming increases short-term attention to the targeted influencer, permanent and temporary deplatforming both decrease long-term attention, finds
@manoelribeiro
@shagunjhaver
@cervisiarius
& colleagues
Contrary to conventional wisdom about the agenda setting power of the media, new analysis from
@CBWlezien
suggests that historically public opinion precedes coverage (and coverage does not necessarily precede opinion) in
@The_JOP
How effective are protests? Protests appear to generate significant internet activity but have a limited effect on attitudes and electoral outcomes, finds
@amorygethin
@VinPons
🚨New from me
@_kumarde
Durumeric
@jeffhancock
. We use web-browsing data (N = 21M) to quantify the (in)accessibility of misinformation and news visits, finding that conservative misinformation is most likely to be inaccessible to researchers via scraping
Repeated political defeats diminishes the perceived legitimacy of the process with every loss; after three defeats, people's perceived legitimacy of the political system drops, finds
@anna_a_kern
@_SofieMarien
@LalaHMur
in
@EPSRjournal
Face-to-face conversations about divisive political issues between out-partisans can reduce affective polarization while conversations between in-partisans can cause more extreme political views, finds
@fang_ximeng
et al. in an impressive field experiment
Chancellor Blank asked us all to take a selfie and post it on Twitter with
#UWGrad
. These two guys next to me asked to be in my photo since they don’t have a Twitter
#OnWisconsin
News coverage of social media increasingly emphasizes negative uses (e.g., misinformation) and its remedies (e.g., regulation), while increasingly using using anxious, angry, and moral language, finds
@Dan_S_Lane
@Hannah_Overbye
@gagrcin
in
@ica_jcmc
There's been a lot of discussion on the effect of social media.
@sumervaid1
et al. find the relationship between social media and wellbeing varies across people (i.e., psychological disposition) and contexts (e.g., in social places, around family members)
Affective polarization (dislike of opposing partisans) is driven more by substantive policy disagreements, not necessarily partisan identity or loyalty, finds Orr, Fowler & Huber in
@AJPS_Editor
Fascinating look at "The Use and Operationalization of 'Misinformation' and 'Disinformation' by Wikipedia Editors" by Schafer & Zachry in
@wikiworkshop
#WikiWorkshop2024
, showing how these buzzwords become ingrained in language and knowledge
Across 19 countries, preexisting conspiratorial worldviews, more than media diet, predict belief in Russia's justification for invading Ukraine, illuminating the mechanisms by which authoritarian disinformation may impact beliefs, finds
@janzilinsky
et al. in
@polcommjournal
In predicting which interventions will strengthen democratic values, practitioners were better at predicting the best interventions; academics were better at predicting the worst ones, finds
@jgvoelkel
@suji_kang_
@DG_Rand
@RobbWiller
et al in
@PNASNews
🖥️ New from me and
@yinizhang2011
in
@ica_jcmc
. We find that after Trump's defeat, only his female supporters lowered their levels of political expression on Twitter, with the effect being greater for those who expressed a gendered identity in their bio
Receiving no or few likes on social media posts causes negative emotions, stress, and lowers self-esteem, but many likes reduces loneliness, finds
@angelina_vmo
@JurgenPfeffer
et al. using a simulated Facebook environment for a week
Not only can generative AI create political advertisements tailored to the personalities of individuals, but these microtargetting ads can be more effective than non-tailored ads, finds
@almogsi
Edwards
@STWorg
in
@PNASNexus
Despite concerns about the ability of the media to sway public opinion, the media largely plays a reflective role in politics, reflecting policies and preferences, finds
@CBWlezien
&
@s_soroka
in
@apsrjournal
So happy to be joining
@StanfordData
as a Stanford Data Science Scholar.
I will spend the next two years in this community continuing to build my data capture and digital ecosystem experimentation software and participating in the Stanford DS community
Online hate speech may not change group perception but counter speech is polarizing finds
@SvenjaSchaefer
@Isabella_Reb
@BoyerMing
@AMPlanitzer
, suggesting that more consideration should be given to unintended consequences of well-meaning deliberation
Anti-Muslim and anti-Jewish hate online stems from the same fringe, white supremacist communities who target both groups interchangeably, finds
@willrhobbs
@NazitaLajevardi
, Li &
@calebjlucas
, suggesting we need to consider hate against both in tandem
When politicians spread flagrant misinformation, their supporters do not necessarily believe it to be "fact" but instead provide a moral justification of it revealing a deeper "truth," finds
@minjaekim22
@ewzucker
et al.
Algorithms influence our online lives, but who thinks about them? And how do they feel about them?
@anneohirsch
&
@g_neubaum
in
@ica_jcmc
find that younger users, those with more education, and those who use social media more are more aware of algorithms
Had a great time last night at the
@KnightHennessy
completion ceremony, marking three years since I started KHS at Stanford. It’s been the honor of a lifetime being a member of such a smart, passionate, and caring community.
For most people, Twitter is a non-political, moderate information environment (although more political than the open web), finds
@dfreelon
@MeredithPruden
@Qunfang5
@Xiayp
@DanielAppUNC
& colleagues using a novel and impressive user-centric approach
"Polarizing content warnings" on news and social media that reading news about political polarization drives further polarization reduces affective polarization via perceptions of polarization, finds
@emily_kubin
@CvSikorski
, building on inoculation theory
99.5% of people following misinformation spreaders continue to follow them (every month), with liberals more likely than conservatives to unfollow, finds
@JoshAshkinaze
@eegilbert
@cerenbudak
@JoelLeForestier
Here is my go-to. For students who may be reading a research paper for the first time, I’ll even have them fill out table answering the questions
All major changes in hostility on Twitter during the 2020 U.S. Election were driven by offline events, particularly by users within politically hostile networks and ideological echo chambers, finds
@stighebbelstrup
&
@M_B_Petersen
in
@PNASNexus
People perceive information as more credible based on message quality, source credibility, and message fluency, with personal topic knowledge not playing a significant role, illuminating mechanisms of misinformation spread, finds Ou & Ho in
@jmcquarterly
When misinformation is covered on mainstream broadcast news, it is largely covered through the lens of platform policy and party politics, finds
@TheJianingLi
@prowag
. Important work in the conceptualization of misinformation among the press and public
"Avoiding the News" examines who avoids news and why they avoid it. It's a great, modern journalism studies book that situates people as center of inquiry by
@BenjaminToff
@ruthiepalmer
@rasmus_kleis
(also a great pool-side read!)
Honored to the first winner (along with
@floriankeusch
!) of Social Science Computer Review's Peer Reviewer Award 🙌 Grateful to
@DeanaRohlinger1
and everyone else at the journal!
Help me congratulate Soc Sci Computer Reviews's first winners of the Peer Reviewer Award (August to December 2023). Thank you to
@floriankeusch
and
@Ross_Dahlke
for contributing to our interdisciplinary community. Reviewing among some of the most important work we do!
Really cool network analysis on the development of the global fact checking movement by Lauer &
@gravesmatter
identifies "elite" fact checking orgs that shape the development of the field
Communication is fast-growing but sometimes is criticized for being both too inward looking and too dependent on other disciplines.
@jiaying_huuu
Oktavianus &
@cityu_jzhu
tackle this debate with a great citation network analysis in
@Journal_Of_Comm
Public policy is more responsive to men's policy preferences than women's, highlighting inequalities in democratic policy making, finds
@rubenbmathisen
Perceptions of more anonymity as a platform affordance is associated with higher levels of participation in uncivil discussion, but it also correlates with perceptions of reduced polarization, finds
@makkafaimacau
@mengyuli_lmy
@uatiff
in
@SocialMedia_Soc
Disabling smartphone notifications did not change smartphone behavior (checking frequency and screen time), nor did it change perceived control, productivity, or smartphone-related distractions, finds Dekker Baumgartner
@sindysumter
@dscheykopp
Arguments about electability are driven by ideological preferences, not actual electability evaluations. Voters also see women and minorities as less electable but ideologically extreme candidates as more electable, finds
@hjghassell
@NeilBigBusiness
When people receive political campaign text messages from female-named volunteers, they are more offensive and silencing, but they are more likely to respond and agree to the ask, finds
@al_yan1
@RIBernhard
in a great field experiment in
@apsrjournal
Nonpolitical people receive a plurality of political Twitter content from peers, not traditional sources. But partisans receive political content from a more balanced set of traditional info sources, finds Shamir
@jennifer_oser
@grinbergnir
✨New from me and my amazing coauthors on audio-as-data🎙️ For both speech-to-text and computational phonology tools, we find that results across tools are generally similar, but some subtle preprocessing differences can materially change the output
Who falls for misinformation around the globe? Individuals with high analytic cognitive style, accuracy motivations, and valuing of democracy are better at discerning misinformation from true claims.
Really fascinating paper that looks at 16 countries across 6 continents.
Affective polarization (dislike of out-partisans) does not necessarily spur new voters but does help sustain existing levels of voting, suggesting that affective polarization mainly serves to exacerbate participatory inequalities, finds
@polpsychjoe
Conversations with chat-based generative AI can durably reduce conspiratorial beliefs and worldview, finds
@tomstello_
@GordPennycook
@DG_Rand
, suggesting that AI is a scalable potential solution to some deep social issue
Most misinformation media literacy interventions are only short-term, but long-term real-world high school courses may increase students' ability to determine the reliability of mainstream news (but not necessarily untrustworthy news), finds
@EmmaHoes93
High and low levels of affective polarization (dislike of out-partisans) is connected to low support for democracy, but moderate amounts of it relate to high levels of democratic support, suggesting it may not be all bad, finds
@lisajnssn
@turkenburgemma
Compared to a chronological timeline, X's algorithmic timeline shows people less news, but the news it does show is more ideologically diverse to the user, less extreme, and higher quality, finds
@stephanietwang
@Saarahuang
@alvinyxz
@DrMetaxa
Alarmist media coverage of disinformation has negative downstream consequences, including increasing support for heavily restrictive speech regulation, finds
@ajungherr
&
@OuzhouAdi
in
@PolBehavior
New from my wonderful colleagues
@angelaylee374
@RyanMooreComm
: Digital media literacy interventions designed for communities of color improved literacy skills, but only those recruited via community outreach improved their ability to detect misinformation
Simply platforming right-wing activists via interviews can increase public support for right-wing views and perceptions of the popularity of such views. Really cool use of audio as a stimulus by
@dianebolet
&
@FlorianFoos
Younger adults are more tolerant of undemocratic behavior (violations of free and fair elections, civil liberties, checks and balances), compared to older adults, suggesting young people may contribute more to democratic backsliding, finds
@kristianvsf
Civic education videos (e.g., about civic rights, separation of power) increases support for democracy across 33 countries w/ 40k participant, with effects lasting at least two weeks, finds
@AnjaNeundorf
@aykut_ozturk_
Finkel &
@ericka_rascon
When people disagree with us, we just assume others are bad listeners instead of considering that we may simply be incorrect or that others can hold differing views, finds Ren & Schaumberg
Americans support censoring political opponents because they feel their opponents are likely to share harmful/untrue information, including content that _feels_ harmful/untrue even if it may not actually be, finds
@emily_kubin
@CvSikorski
@kurtjgray
Current events and social movements change parenting and socialization processes, for example, with the Black Lives Matter movement changing parenting priorities, finds Anoll
@_amengel
@DrMackIT
in
@apsrjournal
LLM's quality of answers to political questions varies based on party affiliation of the question asker, with answer quality and question topic correlating, finds
@rmichaelalvarez
@Jacob_Morrier
When Weibo started displaying users' geolocation, incivility rose as geolocation can cue ideological affiliation, with a smaller audience increasing the effect, finds
@YufanGuoKuoKwok
@li_yuhannn
@tianyangyt
in a great natural experiment
Fact checking labels from professional fact checkers are perceived as the most effective, with user-labeled fact checks as least effective. Dems perceived the effectiveness of all types higher than Reps, finds
@JiaChenyan
@taeyoungatut
in
@MisinfoReview
If you're interested in reading more about "pink slime" journalism, check out this pre-print from me
@RyanMooreComm
and colleagues that was just accepted at
#ICA24
!
It’s National News Literacy Week!
Do you know about “pink slime” journalism? Biased or partisan organizations set up websites that appear to be legitimate news sources to spread misinformation about important issues, events, and legislation online. Ew!
Selective news avoidance is not only a between-person construct, it also fluctuates within-person over time as people respond to individual and contextual changes, finds
@kimandersen88
Shehata
@Mo_Skovsgaard
@JesperStromback
in Communication Research
Not even a newly-broken ankle could stop me from presenting my poster at the first annual polarization research lab meeting. Congrats to
@ylelkes
@seanjwestwood
and
@HooverInst
for a great event!
When Facebook users deactivated their accounts for 6 weeks before the 2020 U.S. election, it reduced political participation and possibly votes for Trump. It did not reduce political knowledge, polarization, or turnout, finds
@HuntAllcott
et al.
Targeted health misinformation interventions can help increase skepticism of inaccurate information, but it also may cause backfire effect, with people being unduly skeptical of accurate news, finds
@ba_lyons
et al.
Partisan blocking counter-partisans drives polarization on Twitter, with Democrats more likely to block Republicans than vice versa because Dems want to block accounts that post low-quality information, finds
@Cameron_Martel_
@_mohsen_m
@DG_Rand
et al.
Economic austerity increases support for populist parties in Europe, however, this support is found primarily in economically vulnerable regions, finds
@LeoBaccini
@SattlersThomas