Excited to present my job market paper!
Exploiting a unique microdatabase, I estimate that education accounts for:
1⃣ 50% of global economic growth since 1980
2⃣ 70% of growth for the world’s poorest 20%
3⃣ 50% of global gender inequality reduction
🔗
Global poverty is commonly measured by counting the number of people whose consumption falls below a given threshold.
This approach overlooks an enormous component of people’s economic well-being: public goods. 🧵
So happy to see our article forthcoming at AEJ: Applied 🥳 This was the very first paper I ever worked on, quite a journey since we started collecting data in 2017 with
@thomas_blncht
and
@lucas_chancel
!
Here are five facts that we uncover about income inequality in 🇪🇺 and 🇺🇸: 👇
Hugely excited to announce the publication of our article in
@QJEHarvard
!🤩 This paper is the outcome of a massive data collection effort that we started with
@cmtneztt
and
@PikettyLeMonde
in 2017.
A few takeaways on the evolution of political divides in Western democracies 👇
🇫🇷 About 7% of French citizens trust political parties.
This is the second lowest in Europe after Greece 🇬🇷.
The corresponding figure in Germany 🇩🇪 is... 32%.
Following up on a few requests, I am happy to make available four datasets I have been assembling over the years. I will probably add more datasets to this page in the future. 👇
3/ The US tax system is MORE progressive than European countries'.
This is because the personal income tax is about as progressive in the US as in Western Europe (and much more progressive than in Eastern Europe), while indirect taxes are much lower.
Excited to announce I will be joining the
@WorldBank
Development Research Group this September in Washington DC. Incredibly grateful to all of you who accompanied me during the past few years and looking forward to this new part of life!
4/ As a result, despite lower transfers, the US tax-and-transfer system is MORE redistributive than that of any European country.
About 6% of the national income is transferred to the bottom 50% in the US, versus 4% in Sweden and 0% in Serbia.
In a new paper, I construct the first measures of global poverty that incorporate the consumption of public goods.
Combining multiple sources, I build a historical database on the value and progressivity of public services received worldwide since 1980.
3 key findings.
👨🎓 Congratulations to
@amorygethin
(
@PSEinfo
@EHESS_fr
) who defended his thesis entitled "Essays on the Political Economy of Global Inequality" yesterday under the supervision of Thomas Piketty 🍀
5/ Although the US tax-and-transfer system is more progressive, it is not progressive enough to close the huge inequality gap between the two regions.
Predistribution, not redistribution, explains why Europe is less unequal than the US today, both in pretax and posttax terms.
Voting for the far right by population density, income, and education in France, 1995-2022
1) Dramatic rise of the rural-urban divide
2) Dramatic rise of the educational divide
3) Income does NOT play a significant role 👇
Very happy to announce that our article "Wealth inequality in South Africa, 1993-2017" has been accepted for publication in the World Bank Economic Review! 🧵👇
Working paper here
#EconTwitter
:
First, it biases our knowledge of national differences in poverty.
5% of Indians are poor because of private health expenditure, compared to 0% of South Africans, largely thanks to public healthcare!
Yet South African public healthcare is valued in existing poverty stats as… 0.
Today, Political Cleavages and Social Inequalities is finally out!! 📚🥳
In this collective volume co-edited with
@cmtneztt
and
@PikettyLeMonde
, we map the long-run evolution of electoral divides and their interaction with economic and identity-based conflicts around the world 👇
Second, it biases our vision of global poverty reduction. Worldwide public spending on education, healthcare, and other public goods has been multiplied by two since 1980.
Existing poverty statistics treat these rising transfers as... 0.
1⃣ There have been considerable improvements in public goods received by the global poor.
The value of public services received by the world’s poorest 20% was multiplied by 2 as a share of global GDP.
2⃣ The consumption of public goods accounts for 20% of global poverty reduction.
Total government redistribution, including cash and in-kind transfers, accounts for 30%.
1/ Income inequality has risen faster in Eastern Europe than in Western/Northern Europe, but in no European country have top incomes boomed quite as fast as in the US.
C'est avec une certaine émotion que je vois paraître aujourd'hui Clivages politiques et inégalités sociales.
Un immense merci à vous toutes et tous, qui avez participé de près ou de loin à la réalisation de ce beau projet !
Site web :
English coming soon!
3⃣ Huge cross-country variations in public goods provision persist.
The poorest 50% receive less than 5% of national income in Bangladesh and Nigeria, versus 11-12% in Western Europe and the US.
Existing measures of global poverty (e.g., World Bank) are based on household consumption = market value of all goods and services purchased by households.
These measures exclude public goods, since these goods are not bought on a market.
This has two implications.
How does redistribution vary over the course of development?
Has there been a convergence in tax-and-transfer systems?
We Matt Fisher-Post, we paint the first global picture of government redistribution since 1980.
5 stylized facts: 🧵
@voxeu
@BaldwinRE
1/ The disconnection of income & educational divides. In the 1950s, left-wing parties were supported by both low-income & lower-educated voters. There has been a striking reversal of educational divides, leading to a separation between a "Brahmin left" and a "Merchant right".
📢Please share! I am looking for a research assistant to work on a project evaluating the role of education in reducing poverty and inequality worldwide since the 1950s.
Start date, duration, and modalities are very flexible.
More info:
@econ_ra
2/ This fact holds across nearly all Western democracies, but with a few exceptions.
In 🇵🇹 and 🇮🇪, left-wing parties continue to be more "class-based"➡️no reversal of education cleavage.
In 🇺🇸, the Democratic Party does not find greater support among low-income voters anymore.
2/ This holds when looking not only at European countries, but also at the European continent as a whole. Within-state inequality explains 97% of ineq in the US, while within-country inequality explains 83% of ineq in Europe today.
3/ In multi-party systems, this process has come with a gradual fragmentation of the political space. Communist parties have nearly disappeared, while green and anti-immigration parties capture a growing share of the vote.
This paper is part of a broader project on the evolution of political conflict in 50 democracies: check out our website at !
All figures, microdata, codes, and additional papers are available, together with an interface where you can explore the data.
6/ The divergence of income and educational divides is strongest in countries where polarization over sociocultural issues is strong (Switzerland 🇨🇭, Netherlands 🇳🇱).
It is weakest in countries where economic issues continue to dominate party politics (Portugal 🇵🇹, Ireland 🇮🇪).
4/ Green and anti-immigration parties distinguish themselves primarily in terms of the relative support they get from higher- and lower-educated voters.
Yet the reversal of educational divides has ALSO happened within traditional left-wing and right-parties.
✈️ Very happy to announce that I will be a visiting fellow at
@Harvard
from September 2021 to January 2022! Looking forward to integrating a new stimulating research environment!
You can also visit our (slightly long) appendix, where we provide additional figures and detailed results on inequality and redistribution in the 38 European countries covered by the paper:
7/ The reversal of the educational cleavage has a strong generational component.
Today's divides are NOT about "young" vs. "old".
They primarily oppose more or less educated voters WITHIN new generations.
5/ The reversal of educational divides is strongly linked to the growing salience of "sociocultural" issues (environment, immigration, etc.).
The correlation between parties' sociocultural positions and their support by education has skyrocketed, from 0 in 1960s to 0.4 in 2010s.
Takeaway: the rise of new issues is increasingly dividing the electorates of Western democracies into multiple dimensions of inequality (income, education, wealth).
However, this process is not deterministic: there are countries where this has happened faster than in others.
This is new.
From 1997 to 2010, German and French trust levels were not very dissimilar.
Trust in parties collapsed in France after 2012, while it grew substantially in Germany.
✈️Excited to be a visiting fellow at
@MITEcon
this semester! If you're based in Boston and work on any topic related to political conflict, poverty and/or inequality, feel free to reach out
#EconTwitter
#PoliticalScience
Excited to see that our paper with
@thomas_blncht
and
@lucas_chancel
is now published! Short thread I wrote some time ago summarizing our main findings 👇
So happy to see our article forthcoming at AEJ: Applied 🥳 This was the very first paper I ever worked on, quite a journey since we started collecting data in 2017 with
@thomas_blncht
and
@lucas_chancel
!
Here are five facts that we uncover about income inequality in 🇪🇺 and 🇺🇸: 👇
📈In the 1950s, left-wing parties were much more popular among lower-educated than higher-educated voters. The complete opposite is true today.
Discover our new interactive interface, allowing you to plot the evolution of political divides over time: 👇
Three facts on inequality in Africa, from our paper just published in World Development.
1 - By some measures, inequality across Africa is higher than in any other world region. This is mainly due to a larger share of people with extremely low incomes.
Happy to announce the release of our paper on wealth
#inequality
in 🇿🇦 with
@aroopc82
@Leo_Czajka
.
📝Extreme inequality, with no sign of decrease since 1993.
📊The top 1% own 55% of private wealth; the bottom 50% are net debtors (their debts > assets).
Recent social movements stand out by their spontaneous nature and lack of leadership, in a world where social media have opened new opportunities for mobilization.
This raises an important question: have recent protest waves convinced citizens and voters of their claims? ⬇️
Why study inequality at the very top, beyond quintiles or deciles? Well, the top 20% in South Africa own... 100% of wealth. The top 0.01% alone hold more wealth than the entire poorest 90%.
@Rowaida_Moshrif
on measurement of ineq in emerging countries
Can redistributive policies successfully foster inclusive growth in emerging economies?
With
@aroopc82
and
@Leo_Czajka
, we shed new light on this question by studying the case of South Africa, one of the most unequal countries in the world.🧵👇
🔗
🇧🇷 Which divides will likely play out in the coming Brazilian election?
Some suggestive figures we pulled out with
@Marc_Morgan_
updating our prior work:
1) Continued rise of extreme economic-class divides
2) Persistence of religious divides
3) Decline of other divides 1/ 🧵
🚨Switzerland, often cited as the paradise of direct democracy, is also the European country where identity politics (far right vs. greens) have most deeply reshuffled party politics.
👉New paper on political conflict in🇨🇭🇳🇱🇦🇹🇧🇪 with
@cmtneztt
& C. Durrer
In this
@voxeu
column, we present some of our recent research:
➡️Wealth concentration is higher in 🇿🇦 than anywhere else in the world.
➡️It has remained very stable since the end of apartheid.
➡️A progressive wealth tax could collect 1.5-3.5% GDP.
🇳🇱 Dutch elections reveal the coexistence and class & identity conflicts similar to most Western democracies, yet the exceptional fragmentation of the Dutch party system materializes them in a particularly clear way.
📑Working paper:
Takeaways:
1/ Protests generate significant but short-lived online activity (Google searches + tweets).
2/ Protests have no effect on political opinions and attitudes.
3/ The exception is Black Lives Matter, which might have affected political views and voting behavior.
🎥Thanks to
@esaagar
and
@krystalball
for hosting me on Breaking Points to discuss class politics and the evolution of political divides in Western democracies this morning! Full interview here 👇
"The party of Nelson Mandela promised a better life for all. So far it has delivered a much better life for a few."
Great summary of our research on the evolution of inequality in South Africa since the end of apartheid published in today's
@TheEconomist
.
I am very excited to share our new NBER WP with
@ikuziemko
and
@snaidunl
: “Compensate the Losers”: Economic Policy and Partisan Realignment in the U.S.
A short summary of the paper below.
Je débattrai des principaux résultats de notre livre Clivages politiques et inégalités sociales, en compagnie de
@PikettyLeMonde
et
@cmtneztt
, lundi prochain (12 avril) à 18h, dans le cadre des Débats de l'égalité du
@WIL_inequality
.
Inscription 👇
Migrants are massively over-represented at the top of the UK income distribution. These high incomes are concentrated in only a handful of industries, predominantly finance. 85% (!!) of recent growth in top 1% income share can be attributed to migration.
🇫🇷 The emergence of the French Brahmin left, 1956-2017 by
@PikettyLeMonde
📊In the 1950s, left-wing parties were the parties of the working class. They have now become the parties of intellectual elites.
#Elections
#Elitisme
#PoliticalCleavages
🔗More on
💵Is wealth inequality high in South Africa? Well... the top 1% own 55% of wealth; the bottom 90% own 14%. New summary of our research with
@Leo_Czajka
@aroopc82
:
💸What can we do about it? Here's one idea
#WealthTax
Why is Europe more unequal than the US? Is it because of "predistribution" or "redistribution"? Here are a few answers, summarized in this figure, from our paper with
@lucas_chancel
and T. Blanchet. 1/
🇩🇪 The Greens in Germany, as in nearly all Western democracies, have mostly concentrated the votes of the higher-educated electorate since their emergence in the 1980s.
🔗Figure:
📄Working paper by
@FabianKosse
:
🇩🇪 As the day of Germany's next election approaches,
@FabianKosse
's work on the evolution of voting behaviors since 1949 is particularly insightful to understand the key divides at play.🧵👇
🔗Data and charts:
📃Working paper:
🇧🇷 Who voted for Jair Bolsonaro in 2018? How have political cleavages evolved in Brazil since 1989?
Very excited to release this new paper with
@Marc_Morgan_
on the politicization of inequality since the democratic transition!
🇯🇵 New paper on political cleavages in Japan, 1953-2017
💡I analyze the long-run decline of the Liberal Democratic Party, associated w/:
👉Chaotic party system
👉Persistence of conflicts over remilitarization / art. 9
👉Striking decline of class cleavages
🇿🇦 A WEALTH TAX FOR SOUTH AFRICA
💡In this new paper, we estimate with
@Leo_Czajka
and
@aroopc82
that a moderate wealth tax on the top 1% could raise as much as 134 billion Rand, or 2.75% of GDP. A short thread. 1/13
As political systems have come to represent two kinds of elites, the well-educated and the rich, they have left little space for the most disadvantaged citizens. Our column in
@guardianopinion
with
@cmtneztt
&
@PikettyLeMonde
👇
Population density: in 1995, the FN was not more or less popular in rural areas than in cities.
In 2022, moving from the biggest to the smallest city increases its vote share by 18 percentage points.
Robust to controlling for municipal income and education.
Happy to present my poster on the long-run evolution of political divides in Western democracies at the
#ASSA
conference 👇
Virtual conference:
Poster PDF:
Full paper:
TOMORROW (20 October) on Applied Young Economist Webinar
Join us at 3pm BST (1am AEDT Thurs) to listen to
@amorygethin
(
@PSEinfo
)
Sign up for Zoom details:
📈Regional inequalities in Thailand are among the highest in the world. They triggered the rise of deep class conflicts in the 2000s, which have persisted until today.
📜Our new working paper with
@mjenmana
on political cleavages in 🇹🇭🇵🇭🇲🇾🇮🇩, 1992-2019
The comeback of r > g: wealthy households in Norway enjoy higher rates of return relative to growth, while the opposite is true for poorer households and the lower-middle-income class.
Inequality is higher in 🇺🇸 than in 🇪🇺.
But contrary to common beliefs, redistribution is higher in 🇺🇸 than in 🇪🇺.
👉US and EU can learn from each others' inequality-reducing policies.
Our article with
@thomas_blncht
@lucas_chancel
@WIL_inequality
:
Looking forward to presenting our preliminary work on wealth inequality in South Africa - jointly with
@Leo_Czajka
and Aroop Chatterjee.
Main conclusions: extreme concentration of wealth, with no sign of decrease since the end of apartheid.
@WIL_inequality
@Wits_SCIS
There will be a SALDRU lunchtime seminar tomorrow, Wednesday 4 March 2020, on "Estimating the Distribution of Household Wealth in South Africa", presented by Amory Gethin of the World Inequality Lab and the Paris School of Economics. For more information:
🇿🇦 Extreme Inequality and the Structure of Political Cleavages in South Africa, 1994-2019
📝In this paper, I study the interplay of inequalities and racial cleavages since democratization
👇A number of interesting results 1/
The Zemmour vote is very different from the FN vote. It has been highest in cities with highest levels of income and education.
Population density does not seem to matter much.
But... 👇
@amorygethin
What about Zemmour? He seems to have attracted many more wealthy voters from areas where Le Pen was doing rather poorly until now (West of Paris, Versailles, etc.).
🇧🇷 Which divides will likely play out in the coming Brazilian election?
Some suggestive figures we pulled out with
@Marc_Morgan_
updating our prior work:
1) Continued rise of extreme economic-class divides
2) Persistence of religious divides
3) Decline of other divides 1/ 🧵
French political polarization in comparative perspective.
France is one of the Western countries where affective polarization (the extent to which citizens feel negatively toward other political parties) has risen most in past decades.
The contrast with Germany is startling. 👇
💡Good summary of our research on the extreme and persistent concentration of wealth in South Africa, made possible by a unique collaboration between
@WIL_inequality
and
@Wits_SCIS
"Changing party systems and nationalism in Northern Europe" 🇩🇰🇫🇮🇳🇴🇸🇪🇮🇸 , by
@cmtneztt
@AliceSodano
➡️ Decline of historical class cleavages
➡️ Rise of multi-elite party systems (high-educated "left" vs top-income "right")
➡️ Rise of far-right nationalism
♀⚖
#GenderEquality
, 2020
Women’s share of labor income is below 50% (parity level) in all regions, with significant variations among them.
Countries should
🔸 facilitate women's access to the labor market
🔹 address the pay gap
👉
#InequalityReport
We find unparalleled levels of wealth concentration. The top 1% own 55% of wealth, while the total wealth of the poorest half of the population is negative (their debts exceed their assets). The top 0.01% (3,500 individuals) own more than the bottom 90% (32 million) as a whole.
Great thread on generational divides in Western democracies using data 👇
Millenials are decisively more progressive than other generations in the English-speaking world, but elsewhere trajectories are more heterogeneous.
English-speaking Millennials are reversing an age-old trend, becoming more progressive instead of conservative as they age.
But in the non-Anglophone West, Millennials look more or less like everyone else.
Individual microdata on voting behavior in 51 countries, covering vote choice, turnout, and the main sociodemographic of voters, from our book Political Cleavages and Social Inequalities. We are regularly updating and expanding the database.
Very interesting work
@tabouchadi
!🙂With T. Piketty and
@cmtneztt
, we have now extended our work to 21 West. dem. and will soon publish a book + paper in which we explore some points you mention. Here are already some of our working papers I hope you might find interesting 👇
As part of a fantastic special issue in the
@BJSociology
on Capital and Ideology,
@simonjhix
and I investigate Piketty’s arguments about a Brahmin Left that now supposedly represents the educational elite and because of this focuses less on redistribution
Income: the FN has become slightly more popular in poorer cities.
However, this is entirely due to its higher vote share in less educated cities and rural areas.
After controlling for pop size and education, poorer cities are actually slightly LESS likely to vote FN/RN.
The starting point is a new microdatabase representative of 95% of the world’s population, which I assemble by harmonizing surveys fielded in 150 countries around 2019. It provides comprehensive information on education, individual incomes, and other sociodemographics.