Senior Research Fellow, National Defense University; adjunct prof., Georgetown. Columbia Ph.D. Studying Chinese military/foreign affairs. Retweets≠endorsement.
#Xi
Jinping commands the PLA, but who advises him on military matters? What kinds of officers sit atop the pyramid? How do their careers unfold? What leadership challenges would they face in a war? I address in a new
@NDU_EDU
monograph
Thread 1/11
PLA soldiers sent onto Hong Kong streets for first time since protests began . FWIW, these are not ordinary PLA troops, but rather appear to be from an army special forces brigade subordinate to the Western Theater Command
What is
#China
’s military strategy for Taiwan? What problems are the
#PLA
still facing? What can
#Taiwan
do?
Just as another CODEL visits Taipei,
@ndu_press
releases “Crossing the Strait: China’s Military Prepares for War with Taiwan”
Short thread (1/16)
Why are
#China
's generals disappearing and what does it imply for party-army relations under
#Xi
Jinping?
I address in a new
@ForeignAffairs
piece
Short thread (1/6)
What's new for
#China
's armed forces in the 20th Party Congress Work Report? Several items offer clues on
#Xi
Jinping's priorities & direction for the PLA over the next 5 years. Thread 1/n
New book alert: _The PLA Beyond Borders_ from
@ndupress
covers
#China
’s military ops in the
#Indo
-Pacific and expanding overseas reach
Clink link for a free full-text PDF --
Some highlights and shout-outs to the authors below
THREAD (1/16)
THREAD: How much of a threat does China’s
#PLA
pose to Taiwan? We mostly focus on the military balance and challenges for U.S. intervention, but another angle needs more exploring—competing demands on PLA attention and resources. 1/9
The Indo-Pacific
#Quad
has made new strides but how does
#China
see it? I've been tracking Chinese lit on this since 2018 and have a few thoughts, most recently in
@WarOnTheRocks
(1/7)
Have more
#China
Central Military Commission members gone missing? MinDef Li Shengmin out since Aug. 29 -- but also missing since Aug. 29 is CMC vice chairman Zhang Youxia. CMC member Liu Zhenli absent since July 31. 1/4
How has
#China
’s military strategy changed under
#Xi
Jinping? In a new
@jststs
article,
@fravel
and I take a look at the latest (ca. 2019) military strategic guidelines. Short thread. 1/8
How is
#China
’s national security state evolving under
#Xi
Jinping? In China Brief, I look at the evolving system of National Security Commissions (NSCs) within the CCP organizational structure. A few thoughts 1/6
In August 2020, the PLA released an updated version of its core strategy textbook for senior officers – the Science of Military Strategy. What’s new in this book? I took a look and offer some findings in
@CHinaBriefJT
THREAD (1/7)
New
@INSSatNDU
paper: What is
#China
’s military taking away from Russia’s war with Ukraine? And how could this influence PLA operations against
#Taiwan
?
Thread (1/10)
#China
’s new military logistics system was on display in the Wuhan outbreak last year. This was a debut for a capable new force but also raised questions about how
#PLA
logistics will handle a war. I address in a new journal article
Some highlights 1/8
What can
#China
's recent party congress tell us about
#Xi
's military plans?
@ChinaPowerCSIS
's Bonny Lin and I see current weaknesses driving future strength, as explained in a new
@ForeignAffairs
article
In a strategic competition w/ China, US thus has opportunities to retain “intellectual overmatch” but must continue necessary reforms to PME and talent management, build jointness at all stages of careers, and encourage diversity in leadership.
11/11
It’s long been assumed that
#China
’s leaders believe the US will intervene in a Taiwan conflict. But will this be true as the PLA builds its “strong system of strategic deterrence,” as Xi calls it? I address in a new
@ForeignAffairs
essay
Thread (1/8)
How prepared is
#China
to respond to a domestic emergency? What is the role of the People’s Armed Police? How in control of the internal security forces is
#Xi
Jinping? I address in a new
@chinaquarterly
article
Short Thread 1/8
Xi references the need to "build a strong strategic deterrent force system" (打造强大战略威慑力量体系). Absent from previous speeches. Evokes China's ongoing nuclear expansion and diversification.
Research assessed biographies of ~300 of China’s top military officers in two batches – 2015 and 2021 – giving a sense of continuity and change before and after Xi’s military reforms. For context, see an earlier work in this series
3/11
Recent plans to increase Taiwan defense spending by 13% next year are a good start but not enough. Unlike Ukraine, Taiwan might not have the “luxury” of a 2014 Crimea incursion to prompt it to get more serious about defense. Now is the time. (10/10)
#China
has attained a military advantage across the Taiwan Strait, but continues to face complex challenges across its vast periphery. Can this dilemma be harnessed to improve Taiwan's defenses? I discuss in the latest
@ndupress
Joint Force Quarterly.
Implications for
#China
’s military effectiveness aren’t great.
#China
isn’t making use of total talent. Senior cdrs w/o joint perspectives + broad expertise will find it hard to lead a Joint Force. Failures of Russian leadership in Ukraine spring to mind as a parallel.
9/11
#PLA
studies news:
@ArmyWarCollege
has published a volume from the 2022
@SSInow
#China
PLA conference, focused on logistics and sustainment. Timely given focus on log in UKR and in the TW Strait. My chapter looks at joint logistics support to theaters. 1/2
Adding back in “local wars" (打赢局部战争). The 19th PC work report only mentioned "fighting and winning wars". Xi clearly focused on regional contingencies such as Taiwan. 3/n
The PLA leadership remains homogenous – entirely male and almost entirely (99%) Han Chinese. One must slowly climb the ladder over 40+ years; very few fast burners. Thus
#Xi
did not look to a younger generation of officers to fill key leadership. The Old Guard remains.
5/11
Immediate relevance is the upcoming 20th Party Congress, which will select a new Central Military Commission. Picks will indicate types of expertise Xi values. But new CMC will be drawn from a larger pool of senior leaders. This project characterizes that pool.
2/11
PLA careers are service-centric and stove-piped. Joint experience is extremely limited – no de facto copying of US Goldwater-Nichols joint qualification system. Success is within one’s service. Careers are also narrow – operational cdrs rarely have logistics tours, etc.
6/11
.
@NUSingapore
EAI has released an excellent volume on the future of the Chinese Communist Party ed. Frank Pieke and
@berthofmanecon
- good to have for next month's 20th Party Congress. I have a chapter looking at Xi's security concepts and orgs
Full text:
The most senior 20 or so PLA officers concurrently hold important CCP positions. But at the next level down rates of officers in the Central Committee or Party Congresses are much lower. Success means loyalty to the party & Xi but not necessarily active political roles.
8/11
Officers atop the pyramid come from all the theaters and all the group armies. There is no particular “cradle of generals” in the PLA. Overlapping with Xi career not esp strong predictor. Xi seems to want diverse perspectives & keeps faith with institutional interests.
7/11
#China
’s military operates mostly within Asia today, but what can we predict about its global reach by the middle of the next decade? Phillip Saunders,
@IBMcCaslin
, and I address in a new
@NDU_EDU
Strategic Forum
Thread 1/6
Some change is likely in future cohorts – different generational experiences, more technical literacy, more exposure to joint training. But PLA is likely to remain a conservative institution that provides narrow opportunities and spends much time on political work.
10/11
The PLA’s senior military leadership has shrunk by more than 10% since 2015 with fewer billets available. In a bid towards
#jointness
, the ground force’s dominance of senior ranks has diminished – but the army still holds the
#1
position by a fairly wide margin.
4/11
#China
has established a semi-permanent presence of more than 2,000 troops in the Red Sea region -- more than anywhere outside the Indo-Pacific. Why, and what does this mean for U.S. interests? I address in a new NDU Strategic Forum --
#China
has recently announced several changes to the
#PLA
officer system to attract, cultivate, and manage the talent it needs to become a world-class military.
@INSSatNDU
's Phillip Saunders and I discuss in the latest
@ChinaBriefJT
What role would PLA special forces play in an amphibious invasion of
#Taiwan
?
@SOSi_CIRA
’s John Chen and I address in a new
@ChinaMaritime
#China
Maritime Report. Short thread. (1/6)
The new CMC also lacks representation from the SSF, Rocket Force, PLAN, or AF. It’s really all Army. So a return to the ways things were before 2004. (7/n)
The 20th PC report also references the 14th Five Year Plan for army building (2021-2025). Updated list of reform items includes military academies, military logistics, resource management. More detailed discussion of military training (confrontation training, S&T training). 7/n
What this tells us is that connections to Xi are important (3 have them, but 3 don’t) and that broad expertise, not just TW expertise (which 4 of the 6 lack) matters too. Recent
@mattinglee
article sheds some light on this (8/end)
Latest wake-up call from
@tshugart3
-- use of civilian shipping could mean
#China
PLA's ability to invade
#Taiwan
could be "sooner than many would like to think". TW requires much higher investments in anti-ship missiles & mines. From
@WarOnTheRocks
Some of these themes came to light in the 2020 update to the PLA NDU's Science of Military Strategy. Some discussion can be found in an earlier
@ChinaBriefJT
article 6/n
.
@CSIS_Interpret
has a new set of translations of PRC academic articles on crisis management and short analyses by
@amanda_hsiao
,
@sungminchohi
, and myself -- timely given recent events in U.S.-
#China
mil-mil relations where more progress is needed.
More content on advanced tech and concepts, focused on "intelligentization," e.g. "speed up the development of unmanned intelligent systems" 加快无人智能作战力量发 展. Not fundamentally new but goes farther than 19th PC work report. 5/n
Good reporting
@nakashimae
on the MinDef Li situation. Correct that the investigation targets corruption from Oct 2017 when Li became equipment czar. Doesn’t cover prior era when Xi ally Zhang Youxia held that role - maybe some tigers too big to be hunted
Ultimately for any decision on the use of force, Xi needs to have a high degree of trust in his people (& the equipment they purchased).
Hard to do this when he loses confidence in those in even the most sensitive posts. And hard to see how he gets things back on track.
(6/6)
Result is a PLA that to quote Andrew Scobell remains somewhat "roguish" - unlikely to mount a coup, but poorly supervised.
So we get continued scandals and things like 2017 Doklam incident and 2022 spy balloon debacle that took leadership off guard.
(5/6)
Thanks to
@ChinaBriefJT
for the chance to contribute a piece on
#PLA
modernization under the next Central Military Commission - part of a special issue on
#China
's governance after the 20th Party Congress
China's premier paramilitary force -- the People's Armed Police -- is undergoing its most profound change since 1982. What's happening, why, and what does it mean? I discuss in the latest
@INSSatNDU
#China
Strategic Perspectives
In a conflict, a focus of US targeting should be on the tissue that holds the PLA structure together – C2 and logistics nodes, as well as fissures in Chinese civil-military relations. Cyber, EW, and info ops need more attention. 8/9
How do
#Chinese
strategists think about the U.S.
#IndoPacific
strategy? In a new
@NDU_EDU
Strategic Forum, I canvass Chinese perspectives on the Trump administration's approach since 2017
The book is the latest product of an annual conference on the PLA sponsored by
@RANDCorporation
,
@NDU_EDU
, and Taiwan’s Council on Advanced Policy Studies. Contributors are top PLA scholars from the U.S, Taiwan, and Europe (2/16)
He Weidong as VC sends a signal that Xi is serious about 2027 modernization timeline, which includes a goal to prepare for a TW conflict. But this isn’t a war council. (4/n)
This dilemma provides some options for Washington to think differently about Taiwan’s defense. A competitive strategy would try to ramp up operational headaches in
#China
’s other border regions to minimize resources allocated toward the Taiwan Strait. 6/9
These are just a few ideas. The goal is to move the competition away from areas where
#China
has advantages – and to leverage one of its major weaknesses, a disfavorable geostrategic environment, to help promote Taiwan’s defense, alongside arms sales. 9/9
ICYMI --
@INSSatNDU
discussion on Party-Army relations in
#China
with Phillip Saunders, Chen Yali,
@usip
Andrew Scobell, and me; video is available on YouTube
Less surprising in context of China's unique party-army relations. Since 1980s, PLA has been mostly self-contained, overseeing its own affairs. No external checks and balances + rising budgets creates conditions for mismanagement.
(3/6)
#Xi
Jinping picked a new slate of top military leaders at the 20th Party Congress in October. Can this selection tell us anything about his plans for
#Taiwan
? In a new China Leadership Monitor article, I offer some thoughts.
Short thread (1/7)
Delighted to contribute a chapter on Chinese joint operations (w/ Phillip Saunders) for the latest
@NBRnews
volume on the PLA. Other contributors include
@AndrewSErickson
,
@RollandNadege
,
@TiffanyMa2
, et al. Check it out (full text):
Xi broke norms to keep old friend Zhang Youxia and skip He Weidong a grade to vice chair. But these are weak norms. There have been older officers before (Liu Huaqing) and others have skipped grades (3/n)
Thanks to
@ChinaPowerCSIS
for the chance to take part in a discussion on
#China
PLA logistics earlier this week. Full recording available at the link below.
How well prepared is China’s People’s Liberation Army for a protracted conflict with Taiwan? Listen to this discussion with top experts on China’s military logistics and capabilities:
.
@SecDef
and
#China
Defense Minister Wei Fenghe have met in Cambodia. Per U.S. official, expectation is that there will be "some restart" of currently frozen U.S.-China military exchange mechanisms.
#China
has seen an explosion of new private think tanks in recent years. What's behind this development and how does it contribute to Chinese policy? I explore these questions in a new article in the Journal of Chinese Political Science with
@ChenDingding
Li Shangfu, like Wei Fenghe, comes from an insular part of the PLA to the MinDef post having worked mostly in space launch. He’ll have a learning curve. He’s also been under U.S. CAATSA sanctions since 2018. (6/n)
Xi needed PLA buy-in to consolidate his power and push through major reforms.
Phil Saunders and I discussed Xi's courting of the PLA in our chapter "Large and in Charge" in 2019 book on PLA reform.
(4/6)
The PLA has to prepare for a war with
#Taiwan
while also handling a growing array of other missions, with finite resources. The
#Ladakh
crisis is an example. Worries about conflicts in the west tie up a quarter of China’s ground forces. 2/9
Overall, contributors saw an increasingly dangerous situation in the strait – as we’ve all observed since Speaker Pelosi’s visit – but also lingering PLA weaknesses and options for improving Taiwan’s defenses. (3/16)
This coincides with the
#Indo
-Pacific strategy’s focus on security cooperation, with a stronger focus on higher-end assets that tie up PLA capabilities. Recipients like Vietnam and India are critical. 7/9
Chinese strategists understand the dilemma and discourage over-concentrating on a single contingency. In their parlance, the PLA has to be prepared for war in ALL “strategic directions,” not just the “main strategic direction” (the southeast). 3/9
It was a pleasure to participate in a
@MeetThePress
#Taiwan
war game organized by
@CNASdc
and hosted by
@chucktodd
— demonstrated the real escalation risks of a US-
#China
conflict in the future, and the need for stronger deterrence now
Pillsbury's "100 Yr Marathon" raises imp question: how can we best use open sources to assess
#China
's strategic intentions? In
@asaninst
Asan Forum, I consider three types of evidence - what they say, build, and do - & associated analytic pitfalls
Best guess: intentional signaling targeted at protesters. But remember that in 1989 PLA brought in units from far away with fewer compunctions about using force than nearby troops.
Zhang Youxia handled equipment before Li Shangfu, although one source indicated the anti-graft campaign extended only to Oct. 2017. Liu Zhenli handled purchases as Army service chief. Are they under scrutiny? 3/4
CMC vice chair He Weidong, and CMC members Miao Hua and Zhang Shengmin attended a meeting on Xi Jinping Thought in Beijing on Sept. 15. Why wouldn't 3 other CMC members attend such an event? 2/4