Joel Wuthnow
@jwuthnow
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Senior Research Fellow, National Defense University; adjunct prof., Georgetown. Columbia Ph.D. Studying Chinese military/foreign affairs. Retweets≠endorsement.
Washington, DC
Joined May 2012
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PLA soldiers sent onto Hong Kong streets for first time since protests began . FWIW, these are not ordinary PLA troops, but rather appear to be from an army special forces brigade subordinate to the Western Theater Command
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What is
#China
’s military strategy for Taiwan? What problems are the
#PLA
still facing? What can
#Taiwan
do?
Just as another CODEL visits Taipei,
@ndu_press
releases “Crossing the Strait: China’s Military Prepares for War with Taiwan”
Short thread (1/16)
7
131
336
Why are
#China
's generals disappearing and what does it imply for party-army relations under
#Xi
Jinping?
I address in a new
@ForeignAffairs
piece
Short thread (1/6)
17
121
342
The Indo-Pacific
#Quad
has made new strides but how does
#China
see it? I've been tracking Chinese lit on this since 2018 and have a few thoughts, most recently in
@WarOnTheRocks
(1/7)
2
54
104
In August 2020, the PLA released an updated version of its core strategy textbook for senior officers – the Science of Military Strategy. What’s new in this book? I took a look and offer some findings in
@CHinaBriefJT
THREAD (1/7)
2
45
94
New
@INSSatNDU
paper: What is
#China
’s military taking away from Russia’s war with Ukraine? And how could this influence PLA operations against
#Taiwan
?
Thread (1/10)
3
49
73
Very pleased to contribute a piece on
#China
’s long term threats to Taiwan in
@WarOnTheRocks
authored with
@ChinaPowerCSIS
Bonny Lin
2
28
66
What can
#China
's recent party congress tell us about
#Xi
's military plans?
@ChinaPowerCSIS
's Bonny Lin and I see current weaknesses driving future strength, as explained in a new
@ForeignAffairs
article
2
20
52
In a strategic competition w/ China, US thus has opportunities to retain “intellectual overmatch” but must continue necessary reforms to PME and talent management, build jointness at all stages of careers, and encourage diversity in leadership.
11/11
3
7
41
It’s long been assumed that
#China
’s leaders believe the US will intervene in a Taiwan conflict. But will this be true as the PLA builds its “strong system of strategic deterrence,” as Xi calls it? I address in a new
@ForeignAffairs
essay
Thread (1/8)
3
14
46
How prepared is
#China
to respond to a domestic emergency? What is the role of the People’s Armed Police? How in control of the internal security forces is
#Xi
Jinping? I address in a new
@chinaquarterly
article
Short Thread 1/8
2
18
45
Xi references the need to "build a strong strategic deterrent force system" (打造强大战略威慑力量体系). Absent from previous speeches. Evokes China's ongoing nuclear expansion and diversification.
1
14
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Research assessed biographies of ~300 of China’s top military officers in two batches – 2015 and 2021 – giving a sense of continuity and change before and after Xi’s military reforms. For context, see an earlier work in this series
3/11
1
11
40
Recent plans to increase Taiwan defense spending by 13% next year are a good start but not enough. Unlike Ukraine, Taiwan might not have the “luxury” of a 2014 Crimea incursion to prompt it to get more serious about defense. Now is the time. (10/10)
2
14
41
#PLA
studies news:
@ArmyWarCollege
has published a volume from the 2022
@SSInow
#China
PLA conference, focused on logistics and sustainment. Timely given focus on log in UKR and in the TW Strait. My chapter looks at joint logistics support to theaters. 1/2
1
14
37
Adding back in “local wars" (打赢局部战争). The 19th PC work report only mentioned "fighting and winning wars". Xi clearly focused on regional contingencies such as Taiwan. 3/n
1
6
34
Long unit history/description here: basically a rapid reaction unit, has some advanced equipment incl night vision and uavs
1
16
29
The PLA leadership remains homogenous – entirely male and almost entirely (99%) Han Chinese. One must slowly climb the ladder over 40+ years; very few fast burners. Thus
#Xi
did not look to a younger generation of officers to fill key leadership. The Old Guard remains.
5/11
1
8
30
Looking forward to testifying on
#China
CCP decision-making
@USCC_GOV
Thursday, Jan. 27. Panel also includes all-stars
@jmulvenon
,
@Stimson_EAsia
Sun Yun, and
@CASI_Research
@roderick_s_lee
1
3
33
Thanks to
@ChinaPowerCSIS
and Bonny Lin for the chance to offer thoughts on PLA leadership and reform after the 20th Party Congress, in a new Podcast
0
9
34
Immediate relevance is the upcoming 20th Party Congress, which will select a new Central Military Commission. Picks will indicate types of expertise Xi values. But new CMC will be drawn from a larger pool of senior leaders. This project characterizes that pool.
2/11
1
7
31
Job ad: NDU Institute for National Strategic Studies is seeking a Sr Research Fellow for Northeast Asia (China job coming soon too!). Please share
2
24
36
Pleased to speak earlier today at a
@CarnegieEndow
panel on
#China
lessons from
#Ukraine
along with
@LTG_CHooper
,
@ChinaPowerCSIS
Bonny Lin, and
@EvanFeigenbaum
. A full recording of the event can be found here:
2
8
35
PLA careers are service-centric and stove-piped. Joint experience is extremely limited – no de facto copying of US Goldwater-Nichols joint qualification system. Success is within one’s service. Careers are also narrow – operational cdrs rarely have logistics tours, etc.
6/11
1
7
30
.
@NUSingapore
EAI has released an excellent volume on the future of the Chinese Communist Party ed. Frank Pieke and
@berthofmanecon
- good to have for next month's 20th Party Congress. I have a chapter looking at Xi's security concepts and orgs
Full text:
1
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The most senior 20 or so PLA officers concurrently hold important CCP positions. But at the next level down rates of officers in the Central Committee or Party Congresses are much lower. Success means loyalty to the party & Xi but not necessarily active political roles.
8/11
1
6
29
Officers atop the pyramid come from all the theaters and all the group armies. There is no particular “cradle of generals” in the PLA. Overlapping with Xi career not esp strong predictor. Xi seems to want diverse perspectives & keeps faith with institutional interests.
7/11
1
8
30
#China
’s military operates mostly within Asia today, but what can we predict about its global reach by the middle of the next decade? Phillip Saunders,
@IBMcCaslin
, and I address in a new
@NDU_EDU
Strategic Forum
Thread 1/6
2
9
31
Why has China's
#PLA
claimed *zero* covid-19 infections despite a strong role on the frontlines in
#Wuhan
? I explore in
@ForeignPolicy
--
3
21
28
Some change is likely in future cohorts – different generational experiences, more technical literacy, more exposure to joint training. But PLA is likely to remain a conservative institution that provides narrow opportunities and spends much time on political work.
10/11
2
6
29
The PLA’s senior military leadership has shrunk by more than 10% since 2015 with fewer billets available. In a bid towards
#jointness
, the ground force’s dominance of senior ranks has diminished – but the army still holds the
#1
position by a fairly wide margin.
4/11
1
7
29
#China
has established a semi-permanent presence of more than 2,000 troops in the Red Sea region -- more than anywhere outside the Indo-Pacific. Why, and what does this mean for U.S. interests? I address in a new NDU Strategic Forum --
0
22
29
#China
has recently announced several changes to the
#PLA
officer system to attract, cultivate, and manage the talent it needs to become a world-class military.
@INSSatNDU
's Phillip Saunders and I discuss in the latest
@ChinaBriefJT
0
11
31
What role would PLA special forces play in an amphibious invasion of
#Taiwan
?
@SOSi_CIRA
’s John Chen and I address in a new
@ChinaMaritime
#China
Maritime Report. Short thread. (1/6)
2
15
29
The new CMC also lacks representation from the SSF, Rocket Force, PLAN, or AF. It’s really all Army. So a return to the ways things were before 2004. (7/n)
2
3
30
The 2022
@DeptofDefense
#China
Military Power Report has been released. A thread on notable developments in this year’s report. (1/16)
1
13
29
The 20th PC report also references the 14th Five Year Plan for army building (2021-2025). Updated list of reform items includes military academies, military logistics, resource management. More detailed discussion of military training (confrontation training, S&T training). 7/n
3
5
25
What this tells us is that connections to Xi are important (3 have them, but 3 don’t) and that broad expertise, not just TW expertise (which 4 of the 6 lack) matters too. Recent
@mattinglee
article sheds some light on this (8/end)
1
2
26
Latest wake-up call from
@tshugart3
-- use of civilian shipping could mean
#China
PLA's ability to invade
#Taiwan
could be "sooner than many would like to think". TW requires much higher investments in anti-ship missiles & mines. From
@WarOnTheRocks
3
10
26
Some of these themes came to light in the 2020 update to the PLA NDU's Science of Military Strategy. Some discussion can be found in an earlier
@ChinaBriefJT
article 6/n
1
10
25
.
@CSIS_Interpret
has a new set of translations of PRC academic articles on crisis management and short analyses by
@amanda_hsiao
,
@sungminchohi
, and myself -- timely given recent events in U.S.-
#China
mil-mil relations where more progress is needed.
1
7
25
Western TC covers roughly western third of China, presumably this unit’s primary contingencies were Uighur and/or Tibetan unrest
2
8
20
What has the PLA learned from recent exercises near
#Taiwan
? Nice
@FinancialTimes
article offers insights with quotes from
@CASI_Research
's
@roderick_s_lee
1
11
25
More content on advanced tech and concepts, focused on "intelligentization," e.g. "speed up the development of unmanned intelligent systems" 加快无人智能作战力量发 展. Not fundamentally new but goes farther than 19th PC work report. 5/n
3
5
22
Good reporting
@nakashimae
on the MinDef Li situation. Correct that the investigation targets corruption from Oct 2017 when Li became equipment czar. Doesn’t cover prior era when Xi ally Zhang Youxia held that role - maybe some tigers too big to be hunted
1
7
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Ultimately for any decision on the use of force, Xi needs to have a high degree of trust in his people (& the equipment they purchased).
Hard to do this when he loses confidence in those in even the most sensitive posts. And hard to see how he gets things back on track.
(6/6)
1
5
22
What to make of the new PLA Rocket Force leadership?
@washingtonpost
offers some clues, with quotes from
@LyleJMorris
,
@dex_eve
, Nan Li,
@YINGYULIN0415
, and me
0
10
22
Result is a PLA that to quote Andrew Scobell remains somewhat "roguish" - unlikely to mount a coup, but poorly supervised.
So we get continued scandals and things like 2017 Doklam incident and 2022 spy balloon debacle that took leadership off guard.
(5/6)
1
3
21
Thanks to
@ChinaBriefJT
for the chance to contribute a piece on
#PLA
modernization under the next Central Military Commission - part of a special issue on
#China
's governance after the 20th Party Congress
0
3
21
China's premier paramilitary force -- the People's Armed Police -- is undergoing its most profound change since 1982. What's happening, why, and what does it mean? I discuss in the latest
@INSSatNDU
#China
Strategic Perspectives
0
21
19
In a conflict, a focus of US targeting should be on the tissue that holds the PLA structure together – C2 and logistics nodes, as well as fissures in Chinese civil-military relations. Cyber, EW, and info ops need more attention. 8/9
1
1
18
How do
#Chinese
strategists think about the U.S.
#IndoPacific
strategy? In a new
@NDU_EDU
Strategic Forum, I canvass Chinese perspectives on the Trump administration's approach since 2017
1
7
19
The book is the latest product of an annual conference on the PLA sponsored by
@RANDCorporation
,
@NDU_EDU
, and Taiwan’s Council on Advanced Policy Studies. Contributors are top PLA scholars from the U.S, Taiwan, and Europe (2/16)
1
6
19
He Weidong as VC sends a signal that Xi is serious about 2027 modernization timeline, which includes a goal to prepare for a TW conflict. But this isn’t a war council. (4/n)
1
4
21
Proud of my fmr
@GeorgetownCSS
students
@RyanFedasiuk
and
@emily_sw1
for their continuing great work in this area
2
8
19
ICYMI --
@INSSatNDU
discussion on Party-Army relations in
#China
with Phillip Saunders, Chen Yali,
@usip
Andrew Scobell, and me; video is available on YouTube
0
7
19
Less surprising in context of China's unique party-army relations. Since 1980s, PLA has been mostly self-contained, overseeing its own affairs. No external checks and balances + rising budgets creates conditions for mismanagement.
(3/6)
1
1
19
.
@elyratner
nominated for Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs. Good choice.
0
5
18
Incoming Joint Staff Department chief Liu Zhenli has almost zero joint experience and stayed in or near Beijing for most of his career. (5/n)
1
1
20
Valuable new comprehensive overview of the PLA, with implications for Congress, from
@CampbellCE
2
10
20
Delighted to contribute a chapter on Chinese joint operations (w/ Phillip Saunders) for the latest
@NBRnews
volume on the PLA. Other contributors include
@AndrewSErickson
,
@RollandNadege
,
@TiffanyMa2
, et al. Check it out (full text):
0
6
19
Xi broke norms to keep old friend Zhang Youxia and skip He Weidong a grade to vice chair. But these are weak norms. There have been older officers before (Liu Huaqing) and others have skipped grades (3/n)
1
1
19
It was a pleasure to review
@AGhiselliChina
's excellent book "Protecting China's Overseas Interests" (Oxford University Press, 2021) for an
@NBRnews
Asia Policy roundtable, alongside
@USIP
Andrew Scobell,
@jonathandfulton
, and
@ZongyuanZoeLiu
1
4
19
Thanks to
@ChinaPowerCSIS
for the chance to take part in a discussion on
#China
PLA logistics earlier this week. Full recording available at the link below.
How well prepared is China’s People’s Liberation Army for a protracted conflict with Taiwan? Listen to this discussion with top experts on China’s military logistics and capabilities:
0
5
16
1
4
17
#China
has seen an explosion of new private think tanks in recent years. What's behind this development and how does it contribute to Chinese policy? I explore these questions in a new article in the Journal of Chinese Political Science with
@ChenDingding
0
9
18
Li Shangfu, like Wei Fenghe, comes from an insular part of the PLA to the MinDef post having worked mostly in space launch. He’ll have a learning curve. He’s also been under U.S. CAATSA sanctions since 2018. (6/n)
1
1
18
Xi needed PLA buy-in to consolidate his power and push through major reforms.
Phil Saunders and I discussed Xi's courting of the PLA in our chapter "Large and in Charge" in 2019 book on PLA reform.
(4/6)
1
1
16
2
9
16
Overall, contributors saw an increasingly dangerous situation in the strait – as we’ve all observed since Speaker Pelosi’s visit – but also lingering PLA weaknesses and options for improving Taiwan’s defenses. (3/16)
1
4
14
Overall, I see more consistency than change. Same size, composition, and three of the same members (50%) plus Xi returning for another tour. (2/n)
1
2
17
Nice
@ChuBailiang
article on China’s lessons from Ukraine, w/ quotes from
@lylegoldstein
@ChinaPowerCSIS
Bonny Lin and me
1
13
15
Chinese strategists understand the dilemma and discourage over-concentrating on a single contingency. In their parlance, the PLA has to be prepared for war in ALL “strategic directions,” not just the “main strategic direction” (the southeast). 3/9
1
0
15
It was a pleasure to participate in a
@MeetThePress
#Taiwan
war game organized by
@CNASdc
and hosted by
@chucktodd
— demonstrated the real escalation risks of a US-
#China
conflict in the future, and the need for stronger deterrence now
1
3
14
Best guess: intentional signaling targeted at protesters. But remember that in 1989 PLA brought in units from far away with fewer compunctions about using force than nearby troops.
1
5
10
Great to speak with
@jordanschnyc
and Nicholas Welch at ChinaTalk about
#Xi
's latest military purges and Party-Army relations in
#China
today.
0
1
13
Zhang Youxia handled equipment before Li Shangfu, although one source indicated the anti-graft campaign extended only to Oct. 2017. Liu Zhenli handled purchases as Army service chief. Are they under scrutiny? 3/4
1
2
13
CMC vice chair He Weidong, and CMC members Miao Hua and Zhang Shengmin attended a meeting on Xi Jinping Thought in Beijing on Sept. 15. Why wouldn't 3 other CMC members attend such an event? 2/4
1
2
14
New
@ndupress
book on
#China
's military under
#Xi
Jinping features work from top PLA scholars, incl.
@AndrewSErickson
,
@McReynoldsJoe
,
@IBMcCaslin
,
@CostelloJK
,
@NathanMBM
,
@davidclogan
& many others. Pre-order a complimentary copy today:
0
11
14
Obviously shifted from a division 旅 to a brigade 营 at some point like most other PLA ground force divisions
1
1
12