Associate Professor
@SAISHopkins
. Former industrial policy economist for Biden White House. Studying climate as an economic policy issue. Views my own. 🏳️🌈
Today is my first day as a senior economist at the
@WhiteHouseCEA
. I’m excited to learn from this talented group of people and can’t wait to get to work on America’s industrial strategy and the clean energy transition.
Does the
@nytimes
even realize what an embarrassment this is. Let’s doubt and undermine the work of thousands of experts who have devoted their careers to this, because is it even real if you can’t see it with your own eyes?
FT claiming today that "Biden's industrial policy legacy is marked with factory delays and pauses." That is not how I read this graph! Delays in manufacturing construction projects of this scale are not unusual, especially when everyone is doing it at the same time. 1/
Today was my last day at
@WhiteHouseCEA
. I spent a year tackling the nation’s industrial policy challenges with the smartest, kindest, and funniest economists and am energized to continue that work from the other side. Now some sleep, and then full force behind team
@KamalaHarris
In a new piece for
@thewirechina
,
@JohnHelveston
,
@pstAsiatech
and I examine whether there really is "overcapacity" in China's automotive sector. We find little evidence of excess production capacity for electric vehicles. 1/
Columbia University president Shafik has resigned, and says will go back… to the UK House of Lords.
“I have been asked by the UK’s Foreign Secretary to chair a review of the government’s approach to international development… Enables me to return to the House of Lords…”
The EU perspective seems to be that the US finally got around to climate policy, but did it by blowing up the system. The EU is structurally unable to match the subsidies without undermining the very union itself -- few places have the fiscal firepower to keep up.
@DanielaGabor
Hi Daniela this is the piece that puzzles me. I’m unaware of political reasons for thinking we US progressives could have done better than we did. For example original BBB included CEPP, a true mix of carrots and sticks. Manchin swiftly killed it.
The Clean Energy Marshall Plan proposed
@BrianCDeese
in Foreign Affairs has the laudable goal for making the energy transition work for the Global South. But I'm not sure that primarily viewing other economies as export markets for U.S. technologies can work, for two reasons. 1/
Why are some states better at overcoming interest group opposition to climate policy than others? In a new paper with
@jonasmeckling
now out in
@cps_journal
we introduce the notion of
#strategicstatecapacity
to explain this variation. 1/6
This graph illustrates what the United States is up against, and why the Inflation Reduction Act is not just about climate change but also about the competitiveness of the American economy.
Today, the White House released the 2024 Economic Report of the President, which includes a chapter on accelerating the energy transition by removing obstacles to structural change. 1/
Sweden discovers the biggest rare earth deposit in Europe but expects it'll take 15 years for the raw materials to hit the market. Reminder that we can't reshore supply chains over night and that the clean energy transition will take a global effort.
Rather than viewing the world as export production locations and markets that consume those products, we should conceive of the energy transition in terms of an international division of labor, where everyone gets a piece of the growing clean energy manufacturing pie. 6/
There's little indication that China is vastly overproducing EVs (yet). Most excess production capacity on the ICE side, which is not surprising given that more than 50 percent of sales are now EVs. Cyclical excess capacity as a result of technological change (and policy!).
GM is discussing capacity cuts in China with its JV partner SAIC in the face of declining market share, according to Bloomberg.
There’s a lot of talk about China trying to export ICE overcapacity. Instead, I expect China’s ICE capacity to get cut over time with the shift to EVs.
China is driving consolidation in the battery industry and curbing additional capacity investments that have also led Chinese battery makers to cancel overseas investment plans.
One reason that a domestic auto sector was long an econ development objective was that if you knew how to make a car, you could make anything. That remains true, but now means software is key (and the complex mechanics of the combustion engine less so.)
Ultimately, I think there is not yet an appreciation in the EU for the things Europe does better than the US -- including all the institutional investments in financing and vocational training that are not part of the IRA but will be required to make it work.
I would expect that share to grow, now that both IRA incentives and 301 tariff protections are anchored. Not every project is going to work out, and that's normal. Let's finally ditch the Solyndra trauma and agree that failure is part of trying new things. 4/
Banning any Chinese involvement in US clean tech manufacturing projects will make it harder to meet IRA local content requirements and scale up a domestic clean energy industry.
US manufacturing construction spending is way way up. Of course that's going to make it harder (and likely more expensive) for everyone to build. There are other issues, like environmental permitting, that can cause delays even in the best of times. 2/
.
@NKupzok
and I have a new paper out in
@PoPpublicsphere
that argues that climate politics is increasingly driven by the decarbonizable sector: industries that are part of the fossil fuel coalition but that can in principle decarbonize their business model. 1/
What's more interesting in the FT figure is the *small* share of pauses and cancellations. That's huge, especially since we are building entirely new industries. 3/
I am very happy to share that my book on green industrial policy, Collaborative Advantage, has won the
@isanet
Award for Best Book in International Political Economy.
I am grateful for all the support I had in making this project happen!
Open access:
German firms double down on R&D in China, to compete locally but also to cut product development times for global markets. Chinese EV makers have product development timelines of 18 months, compared to 36-48 months for German firms.
On the heels of the Draghi report, the German federation of industry
@Der_BDI
released its own study on the future of German competitiveness. The report calls for €1.4 trillion add. investment by 2030 for industrial transformation, incl. €500 billion in public funds. 1/
One more thing on the
@BrianCDeese
Clean Energy Marshal Plan proposal: I completely agree and support the idea of developing a (green) alternative to the Belt and Road Initiative. 1/
The Clean Energy Marshall Plan proposed
@BrianCDeese
in Foreign Affairs has the laudable goal for making the energy transition work for the Global South. But I'm not sure that primarily viewing other economies as export markets for U.S. technologies can work, for two reasons. 1/
Interesting study on the positive economic impact of electric vehicle chargers on nearby businesses. Another reminder that we think too narrowly about the energy transition if we focus solely on manufacturing jobs.
While the US of course couldn't have done better given the constraints of the system, there is also some truth to the fact that governments everywhere promised growth in return for climate policy, and competitive subsidization undermines that argument elsewhere.
They are generally less than 300 bucks, come with an inverter and are ready to plug into a standard socket. You can’t sell excess power — it just gets “donated” to the grid. But even without a battery, it can power to things that run all the time, like a fridge.
@JesseJenkins
In Germany over 500000 homes have installed 'balconey PV' with max. 800W and no permitting. Plug in to normal socket. Purchased at Home Depot, Lowes, Bauhaus, IKEA, etc. Cheapest possible PV.
In June, China's MIIT finalized rules designed to drive consolidation in the battery sector. Firms have to spend a minimum of 3% of revenue on R&D, have capacity utilization of 50% or more, and meet minimum energy density and cycle life requirements.
First, U.S. clean energy technologies are (not yet) competitive on global markets. We talk a lot about industrial strategy, but not enough about industrial competitiveness. U.S. solar panels are three times more expensive than panels from elsewhere. 2/
Another interpretation is that the Germans knew the tariffs would pass and voting no saves face and opens pathway to negotiate with China on treatment of German automakers in China’s domestic market?
The German Nein on EV tariffs is a powerful exhibit that Draghi's diagnosis is right: If not even the Commission and the largest auto manufacturer see eye-to-eye on how to deal with 🇪🇺's car industry, then the EU has no consistent industrial strategy. And that has to change.
The clean energy transition is under way, creating an innovative U.S. economy powered by cheap, reliable, and secure clean energy. This transition will address the climate crisis and provide new sources of economic growth, employment, and prosperity. 1/
As EV demand grows less quickly than in previous years, demand for stationary storage is picking up and taking advantage of falling battery prices. Majority of storage installations now used to shift energy demand, integrate renewables.
But it's also not clear that the Global South wants to be a clean energy technology importer. The same political reasons that prompted the IRA-- growing the economic coalition around climate--are also at work elsewhere. 4/
A new senior job (Associate/Full) at Johns Hopkins SAIS Bologna campus, joint with the JHU Agora Institute. The focus is on Europe, democracy and challenges to democracy. Both empirical scholars and political theorists are welcome to apply. Spread the word
Watching Europe’s energy transition in real time — the North Sea dotted with offshore wind turbines as I head back to DC after an incredible workshop on EU industrial policy at
@EUI_EU
organized by the amazing
@ProfKMcNamara
. Grazie!
This likely means helping them integrate in higher-value-added segments of clean energy supply chains, and moving beyond the extraction of raw materials the advanced economies need for their industrialization goals. 5/
Perhaps the best moment of 2022 was watching the eruption of Mauna Loa on Hawaii, husband in tow. We live on a beautiful planet. Let’s take care of it, and take care of each other. Happy New Year.
“While reinforcing my belief that markets, not governments, are the cure.” It’s all virgin forest to the opinionators of the New York Times. Clearly nobody else has ever thought about this.
Talking about my book "Collaborative Advantage" at
@Harvard
's
@FairbankCenter
tomorrow. Registration and live cast link below. Good time to think about climate, energy, and (threat of) decoupling: Xi & Biden just announced new climate talks today.
Leading Chinese EV manufacturers are operating at near-full capacity with healthy profit margins, and are enjoying production cost advantages as a result of production efficiencies, tech innovation, and vertically integrated business models. 6/
I've gone through the financials for automakers representing ~70% of China's NEV production.
Contrary to popular belief, NEVs are profitable in aggregate, with the lionshare of the gross margin and profits concentrated with BYD and CATL.
And yet, they are not the main source of China's growing EV exports: the majority of EV exports come from foreign brands, which increasingly use their production base in China to serve export markets in Europe. 7/
But if it focuses too much on selling others our stuff it risks repeating the Belt and Road mistakes rather than improve on it. A vision where the Global South participates in some clean energy supply chain segments is likely more attractive. 2/
And so it begins, the great subsidy race of the green transition. It’s nonetheless unlikely that any of these supply chain can be onshored in their entirety, so setting up trade conflict could cause more harm than help.
US conversations about EU complaining often miss that just as there is a lot of performative politics in the US, EU leaders will make points to appeal to domestic audiences, not because they think their demands are realistic. It's not all technocratic politics in Europe either.
Evergreen tweet 👇🏾
US-EU discussions devolve into the Americans wishing Europe just had a proper federal government w/ fiscal union, and the Europeans wishing the US could pass strong regulations rather than giving business tax credits. But they don't, and can't.
1/Here's something I've been wondering about recently: How did the U.S. miss the battery revolution?
With every other technological revolution, we anticipated it well in advance, and as a result we were the first -- or one of the first -- to take advantage of it.
We wrote a nice piece at
@WhiteHouseCEA
on central bank independence earlier this year, showing why preventing political interference is key to controlling inflation and using monetary policy effectively. Not surprisingly, terrible proposal from Trump.
Trump on the Federal Reserve:
"I feel the president should have at least say [on rates] in there ... I think I have a better instinct than, in many cases, people that would be on the Federal Reserve or the chairman"
And China is selling EVs for USD 10k, a fraction of the cheapest models available here. It strikes me that the Clean Energy Marshall Plan is a good opportunity to figure out a path to competitiveness for U.S. industries. Including by learning from China. 3/
“Future prosperity and security will depend less on preventing adversaries from acquiring U.S. technologies and more on strengthening the country’s educational and research capacity and mobilizing emerging technologies to serve the national interest.”
Seriously,
@GermanyDiplo
, if you feel you must comment on a foreign election campaign, the last thing you should do is to brag about the German energy system. People may come to think it‘s not merely style you are lacking.
The IRA is essentially the opening move in a process of catch-up development for the United States. That’s exciting and ambitious, but also a novel test for domestic institutions that are not set up for this purpose. Some thoughts in
@techreview
.
.
@SecYellen
at
@SAISHopkins
: “We do not seek to decouple our economy from China’s” adding that such decoupling would be devastating for both countries. “Healthy economic competition can benefit both countries over time.”
German automakers invest in Chinese production base amidst heavy competition in the EV transition. However, whether diversification happens or not depends more on investments elsewhere and ability to build up new markets.
@robinsonmeyer
Worth noting that even with record fossil production clean energy is rapidly becoming the cheapest source of energy. So doing one doesn’t necessarily mean the other won’t win on economics.
Nonetheless, China's highly competitive EV sector poses an existential challenge to global automakers, which have been struggling to match Chinese competitors on tech, price, and production scale. They are also rapidly losing market share in China. 8/
It’s probably also more realistic economically: we won’t be competitive in all supply chain segments for all sectors. Some division of labor will likely remain, and mean more diversification and resilience for all. 3/3
Yet accusations of overcapacity and the resulting protectionist measures are unlikely to solve this problem in the West. High tariffs can remove pressure for Western automakers to innovate, to find ways to lower prices and improve their technology. 9/
At
@SAISHopkins
,
@SecYellen
lays out three principles of US approach to China economic relationship: 1. Secure national security interests, human rights. 2. An economic relationship that seeks growth, innovation in both countries. 3. Cooperation on global challenges like climate.
EVs now make up half of auto sales in China, a car market twice the size of the US. Aside from the emissions win, this is a huge competitive advantage for Chinese firms, which now have plenty of space to perfect and advance their technologies at home.
Full paper here. A huge shoutout to
@NKupzok
, who is a brilliant thinker with a sharp intuition on climate politics, an incredibly hard worker, and an absolute joy to work with. 🙏
@adam_tooze
From interviews I’ve done, companies explicitly make political choices and place new plants in red states to make the legislation durable across administrations. They are fully aware of their own political weight.
“labor intensity has increased at U.S. vehicle assembly plants that have fully transitioned to assembling battery electric vehicles […] labor intensity and total employment remained three times higher after a decade of electric vehicle production.”
Devising policy solutions in this make-or-break moment for the auto industry will require a nuanced understanding of the sources of Chinese competitiveness. Policy intervention can explain structural overcapacity in some sectors of the Chinese economy, but less so in EVs. 12/
Key take-away from the Draghi report is the emphasis on sectoral policy responses to Europe's competitiveness problem and China. The report categorizes industries into four different groups -- coherent articulation of a small yard/high fence approach.
While some reprieve is necessary to buy time for firms to catch up, a more productive long-term strategy would be to create incentives for firms to learn from and compete with Chinese EV producers. 10/
It would be a mistake to write off Volkswagen. The carmaker is investing its abundant revenues in electric vehicles supply chain and learning from Chinese firms to improve cost competitiveness
Robinson is right and I should be more careful with recognising that there are some significant (potential) concessions to a non-derisking approach in the IRA
Today at
@rooseveltinst
,
@jennifermharris
on green industrial policy: “Market access is a privilege not a right” and we need to use that tool to advance climate goals.
One way to understand overcapacity is a situation when production capacity is under-utilized, resulting in excess supply that puts downward pressure on prices. 2/
Getting this right is essential for the survival of Western automakers. It's also critical for managing the global EV transition, and solving the climate challenge in the transportation sector. 14/14
Returning to the U.S. after a week of research meetings in Germany I feel like I’ve spent half of my time managing cookie settings on various websites.
Already, some automakers are doubling down on for-now-profitable ICE sales, even if a competitive EV portfolio will be critical for their long-term survival. Tariffs have bought time, but there's a risk it's not being used wisely. 11/
OPINION: We need offshore wind turbines— and we need a lot of them.
We need them to reach our climate goals, and to rid ourselves of Russian gas, ensuring a more secure and independent Europe.
Yes, but largely using imported cells and wafers, and at a huge cost: solar prices in the U.S. are nearly three times what they are in the rest of the world.
Avoiding a China shock in the global auto sector requires engagement with the sources of China's competitiveness in EVs, especially those that can be emulated elsewhere. Catching up is hard, especially for firms (& economies) long used to being the leads. 13/
Such overcapacity can be cyclical, for instance when exogenous shocks temporarily depress demand. Technological change can be one of those shocks: the rapid transition to EVs has created excess production capacity for ICE vehicles in China, which are now being exported. 3/
While institutional sources of state capacity are often hard to build,
#strategicstatecapacity
leaves room for learning and imitation. That should be good news for climate policy. 6/6
Fabby talk this Friday with the fabby
@jonasnahm
talking about his fabby book Collaborative Advantage. Want to know how to think about which countries can actually execute a green transition and who can't? Tune in for more:
Great piece by
@MaryGao
in
@WPReview
on the flip side of overcapacity: China's low levels of domestic consumption. Inequality, an inadequate social safety net, demographic change, and lacking education reforms make it rational to save at high rates.
We need the IRA for decarbonization. But we also need a climate politics that plays politically in other parts of the world. Right now too much of climate politics on both sides on the Atlantic rests on economic promises that undermine these political arguments elsewhere.
EU is challenging the Inflation Reduction Act. And they are doing it during COP27. Delicate timing and it is a very direct document. A quick thread. HT
@toddntucker
(1/6)