<THREAD>And here it is..
"A ReSTART for U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arms Control" by
@pranayrvaddi
and me.
It's our proposal for a follow-on to New START. Here are the big ideas. (1/N)
Short thread on the dangers of the fire at Zaporizhzhya NPP.
As of 8am this morning, according to Ukraine's regulator, three of six reactors were connected to the grid; the other three were offline. However, ALL the units will need cooling if they have any fuel inside. (1/n)
NEW: Russian attacks have set off a fire at Ukraine's Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, the largest in Europe, according to a Telegram post by the mayor of a nearby town.
Russia must stop all operations in the vicinity of the plant (say within 50 km) immediately and allow Ukrainian operators and emergency services to deal with the situation. No ifs no buts. (7/n)
This quote is even worse than it looks. Of course Ryan knows the rules for postal voting in CA and understands nothing is amiss. What he’s doing is deliberately undermining public confidence in elections that his side lost.
Paul Ryan: "California just defies logic to me... We were only down 26 seats the night of the election & 3 weeks later, we lost basically every contested CA race. This election system they have - I can’t begin to understand what ‘ballot harvesting’ is."
Without cooling, there will be a meltdown--precisely what happened at Fukushima in 2011. The meltdown there was accompanied by explosions in three units (IIRC) caused by hydrogen (produced by water being split as the fuel cladding burnt).
(5/n)
<THREAD>What does raising the alert level of Russian nuclear forces entail?
Russian nuclear forces can be divided into strategic (which can reach the US) and nonstrategic (which can't.) I'm looking to see whether strategic forces, nonstrategic forces, or both are alerted. (1/n)
Putin is meeting defense minister Shoigu and chief of general staff Gerasimov in the Kremlin.
He says western sanctions are "illegitimate" and has ordered to place Russia's deterrence – i.e. nuclear – forces on "a special regime of duty," per
@tass_agency
As they have been every night for the last week, my thoughts are with the Ukrainian people--particularly the brave operators and fire fighters managing this fire--at they face this illegal and horrific onslaught from Russia. (10/10)
<THREAD>Sorry, but nuclear deterrence is a two-way street. Just as NATO’s nuclear weapons deter Russia, so Russia’s deter us.
This isn’t fair or just. But it's the reality of life under the shadow of the Bomb. Ignoring the risk of escalation is a recipe for catastrophe. (1/17)
I assume that the three operational reactors have now been scrammed (switched off). In this case, all six reactors will be reliant on external power for cooling. (2/n)
Here's the websites for the Ukrainian regulator and the plant itself. As of now, radiation levels look normal to me, though I know know how often this data is updated. (8/n)
I'll speculate that the plant was probably not deliberate targeted and it was essentially collateral damage. The Russian campaign has been brutal and sloppy. But, right now, it doesn't matter much, frankly. (6/n)
A fire could damage the connection to the national power grid (if it was still intact after the shelling). It could also threaten backup power supplies (including emergency diesel generators and diesel supplies). (3/n)
I’m highly quantitative and a true believer in probabilistic forecasting. I have studied nuclear weapons, including escalation specifically, for 15+ years.
IMO the probability of nuclear use is so uncertain, I can't even estimate the order of magnitude.
I'm sure this fire will be a priority for fire services. But I can only imagine what else they have to deal with right now and fire crews are at obvious risk in traveling to the plant. (4/n)
<Thread>Diplomacy with North Korea has reduced the risk of war. But the summit—and particularly its immediate aftermath—was a farce, and the respite is only likely to be temporary. (1/14)
But we can at least reduce the costs to his backing down by making it clear that the most punishing sanctions--central bank and SWIFT--will be lifted if the status quo ante is restored. (10/n)
The basic idea here is clearly to scare "the West" into backing down. But part the danger here is that it's not clear to me Putin has a clear de-escalation pathway in mind (except for the capitulation of Ukraine). (8/n)
I’ve trying to think up a witty response, but bluntness may be better.
Russia’s nuclear forces could perform very, very poorly and still cause a civilization-ending apocalypse.
Sorry.
However, Ukraine and Russia are now reportedly engaged in negotiations. We can strengthen Ukraine's hand in negotiations by making the consequences of a deal more attractive for Russia. (12/12)
The immediate danger to Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant appears to have passed. But tonight's events underscore the dangers facing all of Ukraine's nuclear power plants. (1/2)
I encourage others to think creatively now about other elements of a potential off-ramp for Russia. To be sure, it's unsavory to think about providing inducements to Putin for backing down while Ukrainians are being slaughtered. (11/n)
Before going to sleep last night, I recalled Putin’s statement following the invasion of Crimea that if it had gone badly he would have placed nuclear forces on alert.
Putin is meeting defense minister Shoigu and chief of general staff Gerasimov in the Kremlin.
He says western sanctions are "illegitimate" and has ordered to place Russia's deterrence – i.e. nuclear – forces on "a special regime of duty," per
@tass_agency
It's difficult for the West to create an de-escalation pathway; much presumably depends on how Putin view's the domestic consequences of his backing down--something over which the West has no control. (9/n)
.
@NewsHour
reporting that the Russian mystery weapon may be a nuclear-POWERED (not a nuclear-armed) anti-satellite system.
If so, it could be highly effective, though also grossly irresponsible. (1/n)
<THREAD>China now appears to have a comprehensive early-warning system against a U.S. first strike, allowing it to operationalize launch-under-attack options.
Stay tuned a new discovery: a new-ish Chinese radar that rotates (no, not Korla).
(1/n)
If your reaction to a low-probability, high-consequence danger boils down to arguing that the we shouldn't worry about it because it's unlikely to happen then you're missing the point.
The dangers stemming from fighting around Ukraine's four active nuclear power plants--which contain 15 reactors and are not inside large exclusion zones--is almost certainly greater than at Chernobyl.
There's concern about the war's implications for Chernobyl because it's well known. But the risks to Ukraine's four active nuclear power plants--which you've probably never heard of--are much greater. Here's my analysis. (1/2)
Folks are giving Matt a hard time for this tweet. But they shouldn’t.
Unusually for a political scientist, Matt is acknowledging that his preferred theory—that nuclear superiority enhances bargaining leverage—is incorrect.
Kudos for the honesty!
Day to day, Russian nonstrategic warheads are kept separate from delivery systems in "centralized" storage (an organizational not a geographic term).
A first step to prepare these warhead for use would be to move them to the sites where the delivery systems are located. (2/n)
GOOD NEWS - The fire at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power station broke out IN A TRAINING BUILDING outside the plant's perimeter, the state emergency service said in a statement
Separately, the plant's director told Ukraine 24 TV radiation security had been secured at the site.
I have an even better—and equally technologically feasible—idea. Just use the matter transporters from Star Trek to beam all the Russian troops inside Ukraine to back to Russia. Problem solved!
Separately, some members of congress are beginning to advocate for a non-kinetic no-fly zone – something to the effect of using electromagnetic pulse, sonar, and cyber to keep Russian jets on the ground so they can never take off. Unclear how much support this will end up getting
I'm looking for which forces are alerted (strategic forces=clear signal to US; nonstrategic forces=more directed at Ukraine). And how far the alert proceeds. (7/n)
🧵Entanglement in action.
Ukraine has reportedly attacked the Russian early-warning radar at Armavir. This strike was a bad idea. It provided only limited military benefit to Ukraine and exacerbates nuclear risks.
It's time for the U.S. to act. (1/n)
Russian early warning SHF radar Voronezh DM near Armavir was attacked by (presumably Ukrainian) drones. Another piece of Russian nuclear infrastructure targeted during this conflict
…
There are real risks to Trump’s expectations being dashed. Once diplomacy has been tried and it has “failed,” then the administration may start arguing that war is the only answer. (11/14)
Ukraine's path to survival--as Zelensky has said--is to negotiate with Putin.
To strengthen Zelensky's hand, the U.S. and its allies need to offer Russia sanctions relief if Moscow and Kyiv can reach an agreement.
My latest for
@CarnegieEndow
.
Russia's road-mobile ICBMs are not survivable when in their garrisons, but are highly survivable when dispersed (likely more survivable than SSBNs). So, these would likely be dispersed as part of any alert of strategic forces. (4/n)
To put Russia's nuclear alert in a historical perspective. The last nuclear alert in a U.S.-Russian/Soviet crisis was by the United States during the 1973 Yom Kippur war--almost 50 years ago.
China is building more than 100 new ICBM silos--a major discovery by
@ArmsControlWonk
and
@dex_eve
and reported by
@JobyWarrick
.
My working hypothesis (as mentioned in article) is that China will deploy much fewer than 100 new missiles. (1/n)
Some strategic delivery systems--silo-based ICBMs and SSBNs at sea--are kept ready for use with minimal preparations. Russia may be able to send additional SSBNs to sea. (3/n)
Re "Iran Was Closer to a Nuclear Bomb Than Intelligence Agencies Thought" by
@michaelphirsh
in
@ForeignPolicy
.
There is not one concrete example in this article of Iranian technology being more advanced than IAEA reported.
Literally, not one.
Warheads are not mated to strategic bombers on a day-to-day basis, but they are located on-site. It is possible that warheads could be loaded on these aircraft. Even more aggressively, aircraft could be placed on airborne alert. (5/n)
Don’t forget, before he became National Security Advisor, Bolton supported a summit because it would “foreshorten the amount of time that we’re gonna waste in negotiations.” (12/14)
Last week I failed to explain--280 characters at a time--why the AUKUS submarine deal is bad for nonproliferation. So, now, here's 16,548 characters that won't convince you either. 😜
<THREAD>Why I doubt that Chinese cell phone equipment could disrupt U.S. nuclear command and control (even if it could be used for espionage).
My take on yesterday’s
@KatieBoLillis
/
@cnn
story. (1/n)
As someone who worries a lot about nuclear escalation in the war on Ukraine, I do NOT find this morning's New York Times story particularly concerning--for the simple reason that militaries discuss *everything*. That's their job. (1/n)
Talk about burying the lede... Trump explicitly threatened regime change if KJU doesn’t make a deal. Nothing “veiled” about it. That’s the big take away, not the assurance.
You can be simultaneously optimistic about peace building between the Koreas and pessimistic about the denuclearization of the North. Big question, though, is whether the US can tolerate the former without the latter.
As I’ve said before, I became genuinely scared, last summer and fall, about the possibility of a U.S.-DPRK war, which would have real potential to turn nuclear. I support diplomacy because I don’t want to die. No exaggeration. (2/14)
JUST PUBLISHED: SecState Pompeo has a plan to force the extension of the arms embargo on Iran: If it ends, the US will declare itself a "participant" in the nuclear deal it has renounced, and use that status to reimpose pre-2015 UN sanctions.
Trump: Kim will get back to N. Korea and start the process of denuclearization "right way." "I think he might want to do this as much or even more than me."
My just-published take on China's test of a (probable) gliding fractional orbital bombardment weapon--it's no Sputnik moment.
The US has long been vulnerable to Chinese nuclear attack and, at the end of the day, a nuke is a nuke is a nuke.
There could well be numerous changes to other aspects of Russia's nuclear posture: more troops called up, airborne command-and-control aircraft alerted, security as bases increased. (6/n)
The more I think about this, the more difficult it is to overstate the magnitude of this story—both in terms of its potential impact on policy AND the significance of the leaking.
<Threads>Some thoughts and suggestions--for both governments and journalists--on news that the IAEA has detected 84% enriched uranium in Iran.
This is a serious and worrying escalation, but we don't yet know how serious and worrying. (1/n)
<THREAD>Concern about China's nuclear build-up (see below) is partly premised on the fear that Beijing seeks to challenge the United States numerically.
This misses a key point: China lacks the fissile material to do so. (1/n)
While Russia should get out of Ukraine entirely, it must keep all military operations well away from Ukraine's power plants and avoid attacks, such on Ukraine's power grid, that could endanger them. (2/2)
<THREAD>Helping Ukraine to threaten Russia's hold on Crimea is not in U.S. interests.
While I've supported U.S. assistance so far and believe Crimea is Ukrainian, the risks of this idea are too big.
My thoughts on yesterday's
@nytimes
story. (1/n)
Let me be clear. Anyone who worries about tens of millions being incinerated in a nuclear war is a total, self-deterred wimp. We shouldn't fear Russian nuclear weapons; we should *welcome* their exploding in our cities as proof of our credibility.
“We must not be linked at any point or place to the targets that this system engages,” said Scholz.
So yes, this is fundamentally about Scholz being afraid of 🇷🇺 nuclear weapons. I can't even begin to describe how damaging this type of signalling is to our deterrence credibility
I can believe this was a deliberate attack by Russia. I can also believe it wasn't a deliberate attack by Russia. One of those times to wait for more evidence before opining.
Two missiles or rockets are reported to have hit a farm in Poland, near the border with Ukraine, killing two people.
It's unclear where the projectiles came from, but they landed at roughly the same time as a Russian missile attack on western Ukraine.
Instead, many Biden critics (wrongly) argue the United States is “self-deterred” from taking more action. It’s a way of implying that fear of nuclear war is irrational and Biden should ignore it.
But this isn’t self-deterrence; it's the unpleasantness of BEING deterred. (5/17)
In short, there's no shame in being deterred by the threat of nuclear war. That’s what we tell our adversaries and we’re right when we do so.
#keeprealismreal
, as
@ProfPaulPoast
would say. (17/17)
If it's true that the US and the UK are going to help Australia to acquire nuclear submarine technology, they are making a significant mistake.
It will create serious proliferation risk down the line. (1/n)
The denuclearization language is meaninglessly weak for 3 reasons:
1. “Towards”
2. For DPRK, “denuclearization of Korean Peninsula” ≠ unilateral disarmament.
3. By reaffirming Panmunjom declaration, US effectively conceded that Korean denuclearization part of global disarmament.
Trump made the surprising concession of stopping joint U.S.-ROK exercises.
Was this a quid-pro-quo? For a continued testing moratorium, perhaps? Was this announcement planned? Was it a spur of the moment unilateral concession?
¯\_(ツ)_/ (8/14)
Trump says the US will stop joint military exercises with South Korea, saying it will save "a tremendous amount of money" and noting the war games are "very provocative"
A huge concession
Rather than risk everything in pushing for rapid denuclearization (not gonna happen), we should focus on modest steps to reduce risks in return for modest concessions—an approach I term less for less. (13/14)
The democratically elected president of Ukraine has said he’s willing to negotiate over territorial issues because, you know, he wants to stop his people being slaughtered and to prevent the occupation of the whole of his country.
Isn’t this Zelensky’s call to make?
<THREAD>How should we interpret Putin's latest nuclear threat?
BLUF: Don't read it like a lawyer; read it like the parent of a petulant child. The general mood it conveys is more important than the specific words. (1/n)
Twenty years ago today, President George W. Bush announced the United States' withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
In a new
@carnegieenow
op-ed, I argue that was a mistake. A big one. (1/6)
Three U.S./Russian nuclear developments in the last 48 hours or so.
First, Russia held a nuclear exercise on Tue. I tend to think this was a nuclear signal, though if there's evidence it was pre-planned I could be persuaded otherwise. (1/n)
Yesterday I became a proud US citizen. I am honored to become a fully fledged participant in the "long march" to form a more perfect union that then-senator
@BarackObama
described in 2008:
Time for some hypersonic myth busting!
Given Russia's Avangard announcement was last week, I'm a bit late to the party on this (parental leave, vacation). But Steve Simon's
@nytimes
op-ed is a useful springboard. (1/n)
Preventing further escalation may hinge on both sides feeling able to claim victory—Iran on the basis of what gets through, and Israel on the basis of what doesn’t. No guarantee that’s what happens, of course; but escalation isn’t inevitable, contrary to some commentary.
<THREAD>On Sunday, Putin ordered Russia's "deterrence forces" to be placed on "high combat alert." So far, the U.S. has not observed any change to Russia's nuclear force posture. What does this mean? (1/n)
If you think this agreement is a useful first step, I suggest you compare it to the 2005 Joint Statement with North Korea, let alone the 2013 JPOA with Iran (yes, I do mean JPOA not JCPOA). (6/14)
Given the lack of time to prepare and the President’s obvious desperation for a summit, the language in the U.S.-DPRK joint statement was predictably weak and vague. (3/14)
Put another way: The uncomfortable reality for supporters of Ukraine (including me) is that the interests of Ukraine and its backers are closely, but not perfectly, aligned.
Rationally, Zelenskyy is more willing than Biden to risk nuclear war over Ukrainian territory. (11/17)
THREAD on nuclear alerts.
One additional thought: I strongly oppose any decision by U.S., UK or France to raise the alert level of their nuclear forces. Putin's evil, not an idiot. He's fully aware of NATO nuclear forces. No need for us to escalate further.
<THREAD>What does raising the alert level of Russian nuclear forces entail?
Russian nuclear forces can be divided into strategic (which can reach the US) and nonstrategic (which can't.) I'm looking to see whether strategic forces, nonstrategic forces, or both are alerted. (1/n)
The rightness of Ukraine’s cause, however, should not blind us to the appalling consequences of a nuclear war, even if the responsibility for starting such a war would inevitably lie with Putin. (10/17)
Misleading. Iran made clear that the deal’s enhanced verification provisions are still in effect. I’m not optimistic about the deal’s future—and haven’t been since Trump withdrew—but overstatements like this are unhelpful.
Iran's decision to have "no limitations in production" of nuclear fuel means the effective end of the nuclear deal, experts said, though Iran left open the possibility that it will return to the limits if sanctions are lifted.
A few thoughts on Trump's announcement that the U.S. will withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty (before I disconnect from Twitter from the evening). (1/n)
Two things are simultaneously true about Mueller’s statement today.
1. There was nothing new.
2. Media portraying much of statement as new.
Tells you something about how carefully report had been read.
In fact, the denuclearization language in the joint statement is particularly weak, as I noted earlier. So much for an unambiguous commitment to complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement. (5/14)
The denuclearization language is meaninglessly weak for 3 reasons:
1. “Towards”
2. For DPRK, “denuclearization of Korean Peninsula” ≠ unilateral disarmament.
3. By reaffirming Panmunjom declaration, US effectively conceded that Korean denuclearization part of global disarmament.
Bottom line: Diplomacy will rumble on for the time being, but I am not optimistic about the longer term.
And now, not unrelatedly, some free advertising for
@armscontrolwonk
(14/14)
Let's hope the Trump-Kim summit goes well. I wrote a novel about what might happen if diplomacy collapses and how the US and North Korea might stumble into a nuclear war. I would prefer the book to stay in the fiction section.