Always a privilege to attend a talk by Tom Sargent!
“It is very hard to read, it is only in words” and “You should only read it after you are 5 years older than I am”, about the General Theory by Keynes.
First person to ever call me “Dr Roch”. This photo magnet from my thesis defense has brightened up every fridge I had since 2012. So privileged to have taken your class, been your TA and had you as one of my advisors.
Happy to share the news that my paper with
@fqroldan
on state contingent debt (link to the paper below) has been accepted for publication at the JPE Macro! 🥳🥳
Celebrating with Suman Basu,
@EmineBo88305436
,
@GitaGopinath
the submission of our paper on “Integrated Monetary and Financial Policies for Small Open Economies” (missing in the pic our coauthor
@dfilizunsal
). Link to the paper below.
Just presented my paper on Sovereign CoCos and Debt Forgiveness (joint with Hatchondo, Martinez and Onder) at
@lacealames2023
. Link to the paper below
Are interest rates and flexible exchange rates enough to manage a turn in the global financial cycle?
@GitaGopinath
tackles this question in her Feldstein Lecture, based on our research on optimal monetary and financial policies. (1/2)
Long journey with a great ending! Maybe we should ask what levels of spreads countries should target, instead of asking what levels of public debt they should aim for.
The new Research Handbook of Financial Markets is out!
In Chapter 17, Leonardo Martinez,
@fqroldan
,
@jzettelmeyer
and I survey the literature on sovereign debt. Check it out!
Three years of effort. Many timely, insightful chapters by truly excellent authors. The Research Handbook of Financial Markets is just published.
Now sharing the joy, will write separately to introduce the volume.
Este paper muestra que el riesgo pais cae significativamente ante anuncios de ajustes fiscales, especialmente en periodos de riesgo pais elevado o cuando se da con un programa con el FMI. Esta caida es clave para suavizar el efecto contractivo del ajuste.
Our paper “Numerical fiscal rules for economic unions: The role of sovereign spreads” is now available online. With Juan Carlos Hatchondo and Leonardo Martinez, we show that a spread limit is a more robust fiscal anchor than a debt limit.
La posición arg. es deshonrosa y desopilante. Deberían dejarnos solos. El AEC debe bajar y el Mercosur debe firmar TLC con UE, Canadá, Corea del Sur, etc. Es la vía más segura y rápida para bajar la pobreza. El presidente que no se anime no es un estadista; es un oportunista.
Juan Carlos Hatchondo presenting our paper on Constrained Efficient Borrowing with Sovereign Default Risk (also joint with Leo Martinez) at the
@SEDmeeting
#SED2023
Visiting the Econ department and feeling nostalgic (and a bit old!) looking at the pictures of the entering classes. I’ll start with mine, 2006. Great friends and economists!
@EulerEquation
@IgnacioMunyo
Cambian los efectos de los controles de capitales cuando se aplican a un modelo incorrecto?Encontramos que mientras que el error de especificación no sea muy grande, estas políticas son socialmente beneficiosas.
Por Federico Bennett, Giselle Montamat y
@francisco_roch
Great to see the IMF Economic Review increasing its impact factor (IF) from 2.5 in 2021 to 4.3 in 2022!
The 5-year IF is now at 3.9.
More information on the journal here:
@francisco_roch
@IMFNews
Para informar un poco sobre el FCL del FMI:
The qualification criteria are the core of the FCL and serve to show the IMF’s confidence in the qualifying member country’s policies and ability to take corrective measures when needed.
In two recently published papers (links below) we study precisely common fiscal rules for a Union of heterogenous economies. We show that a common limit on sovereign spreads can generate welfare gains across economies in the Union. A common debt limit does not!
1/6. Christian Lindner is right to insist on common fiscal rules. But he misunderstands the implications. Common fiscal rules do not imply identical desirable paths. Countries are different in many ways, all of them relevant.
Just put out some new research on policy making in emerging markets and developing economies faced with global financial shocks, dominant currency pricing, and currency mismatch on balance sheets. The paper is here: . A blog is here:
Check out our recently published paper! We extend a model of occasionally binding constraints à la
@JavierBianchi7
to allow for model uncertainty
by applying the robustness framework of
@UncertainLars
and Sargent.
New: "Robust optimal macroprudential policy" by Federico Bennet(
@frbennett13
), Giselle Montamat and Francisco Roch(
@francisco_roch
). How is macroprudential policy affected by fears of model misspecification?
1/2
Aprendés IS-LM y te vas con las sensación de que sabés macroeconomía. Movés curvitas de un lado para el otro, sube la tasa de interés, baja tal cosa, pim pum pam y listo. Lo cierto es que no, no sabés mucha economía moviendo las curvitas del IS LM. Es más complejo.
Completely agree! However, in two papers with Hatchondo and Martinez we argue that it may be hard to implement a fiscal rule anchored on a common debt level for a union of heterogenous economies. The spread level is a more appropriate anchor.
Preparing a discussion on state-contingent debt instruments for a workshop organized by the UNCTAD and the ECLAC on Innovative Financing Instruments. Will rely heavily on my work with
@fqroldan
. You can access a non-technical piece in this LSE blog post
Los espero el lunes 22 a las 12:30pm en
@UCEMA_edu
donde presentaré el trabajo “Constrained efficient borrowing with sovereign default risk” (coautores: Juan Carlos Hatchondo y Leonardo Martinez)
Taylor: “...while interest rate rules work well to keep inflation low in a low-inflation regime, getting inflation down from high levels to low levels is a transition issue which raises other concerns.” “the role of quantitative instruments such as the monetary base is crucial.”
Glad to have participated in this great conference! I discussed a ver interesting paper by
@TimTkehoe
and coauthors on the role of shocks to the risk-free rate on default incentives. We need to think more about the relationship between external shocks and haircuts!
In this paper we develop a tractable model that characterizes the optimal joint use of these policies (monetary policy, foreing exchange intervention, capital controls and macroprudential regulation). (2/2)
"Inflation Targeting in High Inflation Emerging Economies".
Muy buena esta conferencia de John Taylor (si, el de la regla) en el CEMA el próximo jueves 29/11 18:30.
(Lástima que a esa hora ya no habrá transporte público por el G20)
En respuesta a la pandemia de COVID-19, la mayoría de las economías han implementado programas de estímulo fiscal que llevaron la deuda pública a sus niveles históricos más altos. Estos desarrollos puesto las estrategias de desapalancamiento al frente de los debates políticos.
Today
@fqroldan
and Jeromin will be presenting our chapter on Sovereign Debt (also joint with Leonardo Martinez). Check out the conference program and follow live on YouTube.
The Research Handbook of Financial Markets Conference
November 1-2, 2021
Online conference organized by
@BilkentEconDept
and
@cepr_org
For conference program, registration and more information:
🆕 Download the latest IMF Research Perspectives newsletter: "Solving for the Recovery." Our Spring/Summer 2021 issue offers insights on how we can solve the puzzle of building back better.
Fantastic new issue of the IMF Research Perspectives! Glad to have contributed with an article featuring our paper on Sovereign CoCos and Debt Forgiveness. Check it out!
This
@voxeu
column estimates jointly issued
#euroarea
debt of 15% GDP could be issued without fiscal transfers
•
A free lunch! the “convenience yield” on a euro area safe asset
•
@pogourinchas
@IMFNews
En este capitulo del Regional Economic Outlook complementan el analisis y muestran que el efecto en el riesgo pais es todavia mas significativo si el ajuste se hace por via del gasto que impuestos.
Este paper muestra que el riesgo pais cae significativamente ante anuncios de ajustes fiscales, especialmente en periodos de riesgo pais elevado o cuando se da con un programa con el FMI. Esta caida es clave para suavizar el efecto contractivo del ajuste.
Great conference program that can be attended virtually as well! My coauthor Leo Martinez will be presenting our paper Constrained Efficient Borrowing with Sovereign Default Risk (also joint with JC Hatchondo). Check it out!
4 prerequisites for successfully adopting inflation targeting, according to the IMF:
1) Institutional independence. The central bank must have full legal autonomy, and be free from fiscal and/or political pressures that could create conflicts with the inflation objective.
"the more dynamic, uncertain and ambiguous is the economic environment that you seek to model, the more you are going to have to roll up your sleeves, and learn and use some math."
La economía se formaliza con matemática. Es una herramienta para poner los supuestos sobre la mesa y que todo sea transparente. Si querés charla y prosa, elegí otra ciencia social.
“El régimen de metas de inflación puede ser perfectamente razonable una vez que la inflación haya convergido a niveles bajos y que el BCRA tenga mayor credibilidad ... en la transición hay que establecer un ancla mucho más sólida para las expectativas”
En su libro, Vegh muestra que se requiere mucha más credibilidad en un plan de estabilización bajo esquema IT que con ancla cambiaria o de agregados. Igualmente en los tres es clave bajar el déficit fiscal.
En un IT lo clave es que la inflación termine estando en el rango que dice el BC. Sino, no funciona, guste o no. Es claro que Arg. no está en esa situación. La inflación se bajará más rápido con un ancla fuerte (y que la maneje el BCRA) y fácil de entender para la gente.
Just gave the AEA Joint luncheon address on “New Foundations for Macro Policy” Great to see old friends, including brilliant women
@Susan_Athey
, President of AEA, &
@skalemliozcan
.
Podés ver la presentación de Francisco Roldán
@fqroldan
"Uncertainty Premia, Sovereign Default Risk, and State-Contingent Debt" en nuestro Seminario Mensual
Reforzando lo de Mauro.
FCL no tiene conditionality. El PLL tiene “focused conditionality”:
“under one- to two-year PLL arrangements, prior actions, structural benchmarks, and quantitative performance criteria will only be used when they are critical for a program’s success”