Three quick thoughts on Missouri's #sportsbetting ballot measure, which is set to usher in retail and online wagering by Dec. 1, 2025: 1. ATTRACTIVE TAM. We project a Year 5 OSB market of $548mm in GGR, implying GGR-per-adult of ~$121, which we regard as conservative. We see TAM as large enough, and fees / taxes as reasonable enough, to attract large and mid-sized operators, as well as smaller operators. Toward that end, there will be 21 online licenses. 2. ATTRACTIVE FEES AND TAXES. License fees are low ($500k initial fee, 5-year term). Moreover, using some reasonable assumptions regarding tax-deductible items (e.g., promotional credits, uncollectible receivables, federal excise taxes), we get to an effective OSB GGR tax rate of ~5.8% across Years 1-5. That's well—more like far—below the national average (~21%). 3. WINNERS. $FLUT and $DKNG are likely, in our view, to get the state's two untethered online licenses. Assuming that's the case, the very low effective GGR tax, together with the absence of market access cost (i.e., no NGR sharing with casino or sports team partners), could make Missouri one of the highest-margin OSB-only markets for both operators.

RT @SteveRuddock: In today's newsletter I take a look at Fanatics rising handle numbers, the future of election betting (which is not yet w…

More on the $FLUT US online gambling TAM build: if you make a squish-reasonable assumption about 21+ population in 2030 (I used 275mm), you get implied OSB GGR / adult of $177 and iGaming GGR / adult of $349. That, by current comps, is pretty high. For context, the only market currently doing anywhere near this level of productivity is NJ, where T12M OSB GGR / adult = $163 and iGaming GGR / adult = $310. But NJ is a massive outlier for so many reasons, including its relative wealth / PDI levels, below-average levels of land-based casino accessibility, proximity to a massive center of commuter demand (NYC), and so on. FLUT, rightfully imo, is optimistic about the trajectory of the US market—and its place within that market. The implied levels of GGR / adult productivity in its updated TAM build, though, do not seem to be anchored or even proximate to any non-NJ comps—a factor I'd consider if I were diligencing FLUT. If you take this discussion together with my previous post (a discussion of FLUT's iGaming TAM expansion assumptions), you get a TAM build that, imo, looks very, very aggressive—one I consider to be on the outermost edge of plausible.

RT @OPReport: Light & Wonder fell out of bed in a mostly green week for gaming-related stocks when a NV District Court judge granted Aristo…

For those perusing the $FLTR investor deck's US TAM build, the righthand chart is notable. To get to 25% iGaming population access by 2030, you have to assume roughly one new state per year (depending, ofc, on states you select). That happening—either linearly or lumpily—just does not square with i) the status quo (see, e.g., the ongoing cannibalization impasse) or ii) the last 23 years of history, during which only a small handful of states (starting with NV in 2001) have legalized iGaming. FLTR's crystal ball is interesting—undoubtedly it contains information to which I'm not privy. I do not see, though, how you can get to this kind of a TAM build without some very aggressive, non-consensus state expansion assumptions.

We can't make our model do this without making some really, *really* aggressive assumptions—particularly regarding iGaming TAM expansion. And in the status quo, we don't see a plausible path to really, really aggressive—or even just plain old aggressive—iGaming TAM expansion.

Um. 👀

Congrats, @DavidPurdum.

RT @OPReport: If you're sick of the sound of my voice but still interested in what I have to say about the macro for gambling M&A, this rep…

@nigeleccles @ProfNoahGian Lol. I f*ck this up EVERY time.

On this week's episode of Zero Latency, the @EilersKrejcik online gambling podcast, my colleague @BradAllenNFL chats with @nigeleccles about why he's building in the crypto betting space rather than more regulated markets. Listen👇

@Blackmrphophet @gamblinglamb @EJHartmanCA @astraffon @stevebrubaker All companies do not report NGR because … they are not public. GGR—which nearly every state reports, many on a by-brand basis—is a useful way of lensing all companies’ relative performance on a state-by-state and nationwide basis. Our points of view are not mutually exclusive.

@Blackmrphophet @gamblinglamb @EJHartmanCA @astraffon @stevebrubaker GGR is not non-reality. Further, estimating GGR for every brand in every state—we are the only firm that does this, btw—also involves far fewer assumptions on our part and so is higher confidence. GGR is flawed, of course; so is suggesting that GGR is not a useful benchmark.

@FamilyOfficeBro @FanDuel @SpuriousCapital, @FamilyOfficeBro, good catch—you are both correct. Bad formula in my sheet. Here is the corrected version:

RT @OPReport: Following the surge in legal sports betting options post-PASPA, what do you think has happened to the illegal sports betting…

@jfitzgerald25 When we last modeled in Jan-24 (we forecast 2x a year), we had 11 states by 2028. However, as this year has gone on, even that projection—which felt conservative at the time—has begun to feel too bullish.