Nikolai Sokov
@SokovNikolai
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EXTRAORDINARY OIL WITH BECKY
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Withdrawal of OSCE personnel from Donbass is bad news - the less transparency on the ground the greater the risk of fighting. In the absence of reliable information risk of escalation increases.
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@lifewinning
I mean, a mesh against a landslide on the side of the road. Someone put up a sign "pet rock prison" on that mesh.
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@lifewinning
Somewhere on HWY one north of Santa Rosa there used to be a pet rock prison on the side of the road.
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Senseless and fundamentally wrong at all levels. Deeply irrational. The world has become massively unstable, future is bleak and unpredictable. War is never a solution, not ever.
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@TheDEWLine
@KomissarWhipla
The one on the left is stealthy. Which is why no one can see it. The one on the right is regular.
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An exceptionally rare animal: an article about US and Russia working to resume New START inspections. Positive angle, everyone interviewed agrees this will likely succeed. HOpe it works, although politically may be more challenging that should be.
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Efficacy of limited nuclear use option depends on whether stakes for Russia are higher than for US/NATO: a critically important point in my old article reprinted recently by
@BulletinAtomic
that
@DavidAFrench
caught while few have.
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@HannaNotte
Indeed, I do not recall such an intense and open debate in Russia about nuclear use. Hopefully, it will cool down some heads.
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@AtlandKristian
Most likely a missile test but at this juncture I cannot rule out even a nuclear test. I wrote before that a nuclear test could be the first stage of escalation, but do not see the current situation as requiring such a message.
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Let me try to set things straight.
Russia is not trigger-happy and will not go nuclear except in absolutely critical situation (fall '22 was not that). It has less reason to seek escalation now that it fares better (weakly - see scale of advance). But were NATO join the war, 1/n
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Karaganov has published another article calling for nuclear use (excerpt, full text will be in Russia in Global Politics): . Insists limited use elsewhere will make nukes perceived as usable, but limited use in Europe will confirm they are unusable. 1/3
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A few notes from someone who is not a Russia watcher.
(1) Prigozhin did not rebel against Putin - he never said a word against him. His blamed was squarely on top military, including for the war (misplaced, but he chose his targets carefully).
(2) Wagner was not (1/n)
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@tobiaspfella
In my entire career (marked 42 years in arms control on July 1) I've never seen nuclear use debated that openly and intensely. Worse, I have reasons to believe it's but a reflection of debates behind closed doors. We're nowhere near 1962, of course, but it's troubling.
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@russianforces
Never thought I'd live to see offensive deterrence in action. Guess I've always been irrationally rational.
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(1) There's weird belief in the West Russia will not go nuclear under any circumstances and would not touch Western troops in Ukraine. (2) Involvement of NWS classifies it as "regional conflict" under the Military Doctrine, which allows for nuclear use. (1/2)
Note how signalling is explicitly tied to statements by western officials, not surprising but I would expect this to still be misrepresented by some commentators.
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Wrote a short piece on risks and scenarios of nuclear escalation in the context of war in Ukraine. Key takeout - period after active fighting ends may carry biggest risks.
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Oh, a personal note may be in order. My formative years were during the Cold War and take nuclear threat seriously. Even 10-20 percent probability is enormously high, as far as I am concerned.
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@russianforces
Pavel, moving warheads out of storage can be packaged as a defensive step. In fact, a logical deterrence signal. Given the hysteria about nuclear use, I expect Moscow sending more and more messages - hysteria is one (perhaps not the main) goal of signaling.
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(2/2). Moscow apparently concluded that vague warnings were not sufficient and decided to send a more explicit signal. Such exercises happened before, but never announced. So yes, it's about signal, not operations.
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Noteworthy article about nuclear use (will not solve problems and will instead create new ones) and other military affairs (in Russian) showing Russian thinking outside the Kremlin is ... well ... expert.
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I am part of two big fascinating projects on arms control, both near completion. A week ago they seemed highly relevant and perfectly aligned with the emerging agenda. Today, they increasingly seem useless. Good reason to feel frustrated.
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@MichaelStahlke
@ArmsControlWonk
-- How did you become rich?
-- I bought apples for $1 and sold them for $1.5; then I bought apples for $1.5 and sold them for $2; then my aunt died and I inherited $1 million...
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@konrad_muzyka
I've been waiting for expansion of nuclear sharing to Poland since circa 2010. Simply put, B-61s are not credibly usable from current locations. They should be either withdrawn or moved eastward. Latter has always been more likely, esp after Perry-Schlesinger.
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So exercises for tactical nukes in the Southern MD have begun. Involve release of warheads by 12th GUMO to Iskander, then simulation of launches. Also involve Kinzhal(!).
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Laura Rockwood passing directorship of VCDNP to Elena Sokova.
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The thesis that NATO enlargement was not a concern to Russia until Maidan is factually incorrect. Opposition began in the 90s (1st wave) and never ceased. There were attempts to mitigate consequences but none succeeded. 1/4
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Persistency and publication on RIA may mean high-level endorsement of at least a debate on nuclear use if not escalation toward nuclear level. May mean that Moscow wants to end the conflict, but on its terms. Worth recalling Prigozhin said starting war is a crime...2/3
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Vulnerability of Soviet SSBNs to USN was among primary reasons for option to launch SLBMs from pier. Problem - should be launched on 1st warning or they may be lost. We witness reemergence of trigger-happy situation here.
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Thanks to
@BulletinAtomic
for an opportunity to share my analysis of the Russia-Belarus nuclear sharing. Many vital details still unclear, but more tangible than last year's vague reference to nukes: for the first time (1/2)
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@JohnJHarwood
@DaveMajumdar
And he does not meet May at G-7. Interesting. I expect no meeting with Merkel, too.
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An
@WSJ
article on Russian claims about Ukraine and nuclear weapons. It quotes me on the history of the issue. I can only add that I find Russian claims about Ukraine trying now to acquire nuclear weapons lacking any degree of credibility.
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My cut at Putin's nuclear decree is live: . Had too many things to say to make it a thread. Arguments and counter-arguments are welcome!
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The authors of Foreign Affairs article about combat and non-combat missions of European militaries in Ukraine simply assume these troops would be immune to Russian strikes. And what happens if (rather when) body bags start coming home.
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@steven_pifer
It reminds me of the Queen refusing to meet Sov leaders b/c they shot Nicholas II, but forgetting Britain refused to give him refuge, which, given the circumstances, created high risk of execution (parallel to Louis XVI). Bottom line, history is a pawn in political games.
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@amenka
@bank_of_russia
Historical record shows that defense industry can provide tangible boost to the economy if it does not continue too long. Plus, Bank of Russia is doing excellent job. Long term probably not sustainable, but who can define "long"?
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I read the 🧵. On nuke aspect, it has 3 points:
(1) Russia has nukes
(2) Russia has not used them
(3) Ergo, it will not use them.
I do not see how (3) follows from (1) and (2). This is not a yes-no issue, it's probability, which can go up and down. As I see it, ...
@DrUlrichKuehn
Why? You disagreeing with him /= he made a “quick/cheap” take. Your pop at him, frankly, seems cheap. In fact, he seems to have some very credible followers. What did he say that you disagree with? When did he use the term “predictable”? Please explain.
@ArturRehi
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@walberque
The impact of a dirty bomb is almost purely political and psychological. I would call it "political contamination" and its effects are global even if immediate physical effects may be next to negligible.
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@scharap
@ZelenskyyUa
One problem with this invasion that severely complicates planning is that it's impossible to imagine Putin's idea of the end state. I increasingly feel he's replaying Gulf II with all mistakes (such as remove Saddam and it'll be a democracy) with only a fraction of resources.
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... but now we have to win it. May be a broadly shared attitude. In that case, key is not so much situation at the front lines, but the need to "win."
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Gave a lengthy interview to Kommersant about de-escalation and other fascinating (to me) stuff. Thanks to
@ElenaChernenko
and Kommersant for great opportunity!
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@steven_pifer
Finally, SU did not participate in Normandy landing, but that landing was not outside broader context - imagine there was no fighting on the Eastern front. My point - it was common effort, but there is a tendency to have separate celebrations. Sad.
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It's impossible to predict Russian leadership's decisions but end of gas delivery on April 1 may be serious: They know Europe will eventually stop buying Russian gas so it makes sense to end it at the time when it is least convenient for the West. 1/2
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Current crisis has deep roots. Idea after end of Cold War was common security space and joint decisions. That's why OSCE. Gradually, after 1st wave of enlargement, NATO began to make its own decisions first, more countries joined, etc. Now NATO is in effect THE decision maker.
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Sound proposal. Historically, mil-2-mil has been often more productive than contacts of diplomats and politicians. And no serious arms control and such can go ahead without militaries talking directly to each other.
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@russianforces
I wrote in that it was dedication of the military that prevented loss of control over nuclear weapons during the transition from SU. These people take their jobs with extreme seriousness and do not treat these things lightly.
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A lot of unanswered questions in Putin's speech.🧵
(1) Recognition required a simple statement that efforts by Macron and Scholz to revive the Minsk process failed and Ukraine was trying to take Donbass back by force. Why such a long speech? 1/4
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@alxgraef
The group was formed in 1991 and already demanded Yeltsin's resignation in 1992. Nothing new - they do that regularly.
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@steven_pifer
On (A): you do not suggest all other leaders came uninvited, right? On (B): you do not suggest that reading of history should change depending on current events, right?
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To add, Ukraine did not have a nuclear weapons complex, starting with enrichment, or production of other key components to maintain existing weapons or produce new ones.
Not quite. Ukraine didn’t have, as in possess (let alone have access to/control), nuclear weapons. It had Russian nuclear weapons on its territory and there was an agreement to repatriate them. Giving the impression that Ukraine gave up “its” nuclear arsenal is incorrect.
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Last fall's fashion was belief that Russia would nuke Ukraine any moment. This spring's fashion is belief is that Russia will never, ever use nukes even when US tanks shoot at the Kremlin. In both cases, it's just fashion, not analysis. Which is why it is dangerous.
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4/4... escalation is hard to control; worse, pace will be accelerating. This may not only bring us very close to the threshold, but carry uncomfortably high risk of crossing it.
That is, you enter escalation without plan to go nuclear, but logic of events may lead to it.
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@walberque
@SamRamani2
@mattkorda
I'd argue the mil-to-mil hotline is more important than the president-to-president hotline these days. More relevant for preventing escalation risks and less politicized.
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2/n ... it will be defeated (and depending on the scale, defeat may end up with nuke use). So it will react strongly to any sign NATO comes to the battlefield. This then launches an escalation spiral (we've seen first steps already).
No one - including Russia -
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I do not know the source, someone sent me this pic. But implications are truly amazing🙂.
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Just out: my angle at Putin's decision to deploy dual-capable Iskanders to and nuclear sharing with Belarus: Russia-Belarus nuclear sharing would mirror NATO’s—and worsen Europe’s security - Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists via
@BulletinAtomic
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3/n ... will want to see nuke use, but it will be a battle of wills and credibility, so stopping escalation will be very, very hard and tantamount to defeat. Hence all sides have reasons to up the ante. Even with that, no one will want to cross the threshold, but ...
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So arms control talks are over (for now?). They apparently stalled last fall over the same issue of scope anyway. New START expires in Feb 2026 without replacement but that could have happened anyway. Significant arms race is unlikely anyway but transparency will be lost.
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"Neighbors, first time in history we can save humankind by sitting on a couch in front of TV. We must succeed!"
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Very important interview by
@ElenaChernenko
with
@DmitriTrenin
. In-depth look at causes of current crisis and options for near-term developments. Notable Trenin says Western reluctance to compromise is a sign of weakness.
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Interesting thread except
@FRHoffmann1
does not explain why Russia would want to take piece of NATO territory (presumably, Baltics). Without credible explanation, the construct is purely theoretical. Personally, I do not see reasons, but ready to be enlightened.
In this thread, I will explain why we are much closer to war with 🇷🇺 than most people realize and why our time window for rearmament is shorter than many believe. In my opinion, we have at best 2-3 years to re-establish deterrence vis-à-vis 🇷🇺. Here's why 👇 1/20
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Nuclear takeaways from Putin interview to Kiselev ():
- Will use nuclear weapons if sovereignty and territorial integrity threatened (same language since 2010);
- Said NATO troops in new regions will be intervention (cf. above);
(1/3)
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Appropriately professional toy for a nonproliferation family puppy.
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I think it's worth talking some basics. Who is to blame for the war? Obviously, Russia. But that does not mean that it just went off the rocker. It was dumb to isolate Russia from decision-making on European affairs, which concentrated in NATO and the EU 1/3
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@KofmanMichael
JFK did not quite respect the sovereign right of Cuba to accept Soviet missiles but no one condemns him. Difference to 1962 is that we are moving toward war amid Twitter/Facebook cheers. Same type of decision-making as in 1962 is just impossible today.
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Moldova needs international assistance - it's not a rich country and the presence of so many refugees strains its resources.
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Allegory of art after nuclear war (or how I interpret that installation). Palazzo Reale, Turin.
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Spent four days off the grid: no Internet, even no cell connection. And you know what? The sky did not fall and it felt great. In a year of increasingly bad news, one needs a break from news services and Twitter.
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Russian MOD has been reporting daily intercepts of NATO aircraft (sometimes up to 3/day) for about a month. I wonder how long until we hear shots fired or other forms of dangerous confrontation? I don't think many fully realize the level of military tension in Europe today.
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Can
#OpenSkiesTreaty
survive US withdrawal? The Pros, the Cons, and the likely course of events.
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Very useful thread. Bottom line - nukes are outside this event. Personally, this is the last thing people should worry about.
Let me just note that the Voronezh-45 site (aka Object 387 or Borisoglebsk) may well be empty. Its only "daughter" unit is the air force training center at Yeisk (the map is at , the org chart is in the Lock Them Up report, linked there) 2/
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@JamesMartinCNS
@VCDNP
@PatrickJKiger
@HowStuffWorks
My favorite pic of Tsar-Bomb: regular maintenance is key.
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On Afghanistan, I admire Biden's courage - he made an unpopular but necessary decision. Obama could not muster enough courage even during his 2nd term. Trump toyed with it but was afraid, too. My opinion of Biden as a statesman has vastly improved. I'm close to admiring him.
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A propos Helsinki. Someone just shared this with me, so I feel the need to share, too.
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"Like cat and dog" can have different meanings.
They take turns to bug the other but never hurt and they rest together. If only states could behave the same.
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@PatriciaMary
@Amb_Ulyanov
Patricia, Russian public supports official policy on the war and will not be changed by Western consensus. If you want long-term change in Russian attitudes, you need alternative paths. In this case - a non-Western investigation which Russian public will accept.
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Just got off air with
@FRANCE24
on Zaporizhzhe NPP. The situation is serious because it's a nuclear installation but apparently no shelling of reactors and these were designed to withstand an airplane crash. Need vigilance, not panic. An arrangement to ensure...
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@steven_pifer
I just meant to say that other leaders did get invited although it's 75 yrs, not 70 or 80 (referring to your earlier post). And selective invitation can be construed as declaration that reading of history depends on current events.
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@jakluge
Only a guess, of course, but it appears to be about exempting of all pipeline-related equipment from sanctions. Same as the deal on grain included a demand to exempt relevant ships, insurance, payments, etc. from sanctions (grain AND fertilizers).
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Debates about targeting Russia and instructors to Ukraine obscure a pretty fundamental point: NATO is not part of it and is dropping other projects re: Ukraine. If Russia escalates, it will be against an ad hoc group of countries, which are members of NATO, but NATO...
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@russianforces
Indeed, you are right, this is not about exercise itself, it's about going public with it to send a signal. Exercises like that have been conducted since at least late 1990s.
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The cat was grnuinrlt surprised when his freedom to jump on a Christmas tree ended in this. He thought a consistent 7-day record of no accidents was a reliable indicator.
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... but primarily by better tactical and strategic planning. Having eliminated intellectual freedom and normal discourse, Putin ended with a disastrous policy. By mimicking Putin,
#NAFO
-ids weaken the West. Their BS-ing is not as innocent as it might seem. 2/2
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Glad contributed to a good article in CSMonitor about non-strategic nuclear weapons in the context of the war in Ukraine. (My first name is not Viktor, as the author claims, but the article is still good).
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Agree risk exists and should not be ignored, but I find current discourse on nuclear escalation schizophrenic, alternating between "he'll use them tomorrow" and "he'll never use them." Neither makes sense, but latter is popular now. Yet, I find its arguments faulty.
WP point that fear of nuke escalation in Ukraine has been overblown is probably right. But that doesn’t mean unjustified; Russia openly & repeatedly threatened escalation. Nor does it mean risk can be ignored going forward.
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@Gottemoeller
US reaction has been measured and restrained, yet sufficiently firm. Very good job. It was wrong for Putin to invoke nukes in the first place overturning, on top of it, Russia's own declaratory policy.
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My next tweet will be from Vienna. I will miss everyone at CNS (but will still see them often in Vienna and elsewhere) and Monterey even as I look forward to Vienna and the VCDNP. Hope that in Vienna I have greater chances to meet in person people I got to know via Twitter.
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Good to know Russians will never, ever use nukes no matter what. Unlike us - we don't want to use them, but will when required.
This is sarcasm, of course.
To all those worried about Russia using a nuclear weapon, please watch/read Putins remarks at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum. Very informative.
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@RALee85
@KomissarWhipla
Did they also ban the use of Google Maps? Because you can get location of units there.
On a serious note, this runs against long-term fundamental interests of Russian national security. Like in Sov time, analysis and data will be only coming from the West.
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Biden's decision not to return to OST is not surprising. The language to explain it was: this is Trump language. If the same attitude dominates possible future arms control talks, no new agreements and New START will expire in 2026 without replacement.
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@nukestrat
That's definitely big relief: only 40 percent of 1,550 strategic warheads will reach their targets in the US, another 20 percent will miss (Philadelphia instead of DC).
I do not know how it's calculated but we're still talking about hundreds. No grounds for optimism.
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it's about planning policy in a way that combines support for Ukraine with avoidance of escalation to nuke level. Abandoning former is unacceptable, ignoring latter is dangerous.
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Did I claim validity of that data? No. Did I say they done what they claimed? No. First rule of honest research is to acknowledge (not blindly trust!) all data, including questionable. Your approach simply shows you are bad analyst using only data you like.
Has anyone done the leg work to figure out which Russian intelligence service Sokov works for?
I assume SVR, though genuinely curious if it’s FSB or GRU instead.
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Reversed Cold War logic. A has conv superiority; B relies on nukes; A builds up nukes to prevent escalation; B thinks A wants nuke cover for free use of conv and builds up more. INF deadlock. Faulty.
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Finally read the Radchenko-Zubok article on the Cuban Missile Crisis: . An absolute must-read. Fascinating analysis of Soviet decision-making and blunders; very strong and convincing parallels to present-day Russian decision-making. 1/3
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"We were in a bank and then a few men IN MASKS come in. We were so scared! But turned out it was just a robbery."
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"Freezing" of Russian participation in New START was a possible option, but it is so much against interests of Russia itself (not even talking about international security) that I always considered it low probability. Guess these days only the worst options become reality.
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