After starting as a nonresident senior fellow with
@ACScowcroft
shortly after departing goverment service in the summer of 2020, I am honored to be asked to lead its new Indo-Pacific Security Initiative.
Thanks to the
@AtlanticCouncil
@ACScowcroft
team for the warm welcome as a new Nonresident Senior Fellow! After my time at
@ODNI_NIC
, I am honored to be joining a different "Council" of leading national security experts--this one outside the government:
It still perplexes me that this has not gained widespread attention. If you want to know how the Russians can sustain such equipment losses and still keep the fight going, look to what the PRC is sending:
China's exports of transportation equipment to Russia - that's everything from railway cars to autos and trucks as well as aircraft and ships - have risen +800% since Russia invaded Ukraine. There is no bigger supplier to Russia's war economy than China...
After nearly two decades of government service, I have decided I can better serve my country—at least for now—as an outside author, analyst and strategist. Watch this space.
#NorthKorea
#Mister_G_2
I am very pleased to announce I received my letter of appointment today as an adjunct faculty member of
@GeorgetownCSS
! Looking forward to teaching my new graduate-level course, SEST-663: Strategic Analysis of North Korea starting in January.
The national security community should adjust its terminology. Nuclear weapons are *already* being "used"--with some success--by Russia to coerce and to deter stronger action. A bank robber still can "use" a gun in a robbery without firing it.
Yes, the US government should be warning of and preparing for limited North Korean aggression. As our analysis has found, the "level to which North Korea believes it can escalate without triggering a regime-ending response" is probably fast increasing:
I am disappointed in this dismissive take. It does not represent anything close to a consensus among experienced analysts of North Korea issues. Underestimating Pyongyang's will and capability to advance its nuclear and missile programs is a mistake, as 2016 and 2017 showed.
NEW: North Korea says that it's expanding its long-range nuclear strike capabilities.
But experts believe that the threats are more bark than bite.
"It’s a message urging the U.S. to initiate the dialogue by showing their desperation."
(by
@jungwongida
)
My first piece of written analysis since leaving the government has just been published. Many thanks to Chad, Oliver and the rest of the team at Korea Risk Group!
NATO SecGen Stoltenberg: "China is propping up the Russian war economy, delivering key parts to the defence industry, and in return, Moscow is mortgaging its future to Beijing."
The number of people expressing strongly-held views about what to do about the situation with Russia that think Ukraine is a member of NATO is staggering. Almost as staggering as the number of people who ask "which one?" when I tell them I spent 12 years stationed in Korea.
I've been asked for my assessment of Kim Yo Jong's latest statement.
As someone who has previously spent hours, even days, studying her and assessing comments she has made...
After reading it carefully, my assessment is:
NSTR
Nothing significant (or surprising) to report.
Thanks to the
@AtlanticCouncil
@ACScowcroft
team for the warm welcome as a new Nonresident Senior Fellow! After my time at
@ODNI_NIC
, I am honored to be joining a different "Council" of leading national security experts--this one outside the government:
After nearly two decades of government service, I have decided I can better serve my country—at least for now—as an outside author, analyst and strategist. Watch this space.
#NorthKorea
#Mister_G_2
A bit perplexed by a North Korea watcher debate that seems to be coalescing around essentially: 1. "Kim is deterred, this is regime propaganda business as usual" vs. 2. "they're going to war!" We should be preparing for the dangerous in-between cases:
I suggest Korea-watchers hold off on either condemning or celebrating the direction of US North Korea policy based on this very general description of the policy review. Is there anything in this statement that anyone finds particularly surprising?
White House confirms it has finished its North Korea policy review.
“Our policy will not focus on achieving a grand bargain nor will it rely on strategic patience," says
@PressSec
.
Beijing's intentions today for its massive nuclear buildup are largely irrelevant strategically. In 5-10 years, how could these capabilities affect Beijing's calculus for aggression? How would nuclear deterrence & escalation dynamics for countering PRC aggression change? A lot.
I’m sorry, but it’s obvious what this is. It’s the exact same playbook as the “peaceful rise” narrative. If Washington falls for it again then it only has itself to blame.
Worried about China’s nuclear build-up?
Don’t: Engage in counter build up, insist on reciprocal arms
Posting this here for those Americans who missed the ROK's greater willingness to stand up for itself to the PRC in recent years.
"South Korea's Coast Guard seized five Chinese vessels for allegedly fishing illegally in the country's waters..."
Congratulations to Sydney Seiler, who will be leaving
@USForcesKorea
to succeed me as National Intelligence Officer for North Korea
@ODNI_NIC
! Syd brings a wealth of experience, as noted by COL Dave Gigliotti below.
Just completed first session of "Strategic Assessment: North Korea" for
@GeorgetownCSS
. Excellent group of grad students with a range of educational/cultural backgrounds, professional experience and knowledge levels on NK. Feeling really energized about teaching this semester!
For a week, I've heard far more comments about the martial arts demonstrations at North Korea's recent defense expo than anything about the weapons on display. Too many treat North Korea as a ridiculous curiosity rather than a state with advancing nuclear and missile programs.
During a demonstration in North Korea, soldiers can be seen performing high-flying martial arts kicks and smashing tiles with their heads.
Leader Kim Jong Un and other high-ranking North Korean officials watch the presentation.
I am pleased to share that my graduate course, "Strategic Assessment: North Korea" will be offered again by
@GeorgetownCSS
this fall. Potential students should note I am modifying the syllabus a bit, particularly to reduce the reading load compared to the first iteration.
💯 "The hope that Beijing would distance itself, however minimally, from Moscow has finally been extinguished. Europe needs to adjust its approach accordingly. ... ...to quickly come to grips with a China that... openly supports Russia’s imperial war..."
I've started a new semester of
@GeorgetownCSS
"Strategic Assessment: North Korea." Any thoughts on how I explain to skeptical, smart grad students the logic of arguments to drop US demands for North Korean denuclearization, yet demand South Korea not field its own nuclear arms?
Who's stuck explaining to South Korea why the US has a confirmed high-profile ambassador to Tokyo and not even a publically-named nominee for ambassador to Seoul... going into a Senate recess? Not passing judgment, just saying I feel sorry for whoever has that duty!!
It's time to retire the outdated phrasing of "Iran and North Korea's nuclear programs..." They're not even in the same ballpark anymore. After SIX nuclear tests and decades of fissile material production by NK, Iran is... "enriching to 60 percent"?
Kudos to DIA for publishing this lengthy and detailed unclassified report on North Korea's military capabilities. Publishing this sort of authoritative unclassified report is far more difficult for a US intelligence agency--and as a result, more rare--than many seem to realize.
Congratulations to
@leeschafer
on promotion to Major,
@USArmy
! He's an excellent student in my
@GeorgetownCSS
Strategic Assessment: North Korea course. We first met when he was in
@SebastianBae
's wargame design class. He's an up-and-coming
@ArmyStrategist
, expect great things!
This excerpt from Rage is baffling to me. Why would Kim Jong Un fire a missile at Seattle in the first place? If North Korea is firing at Seattle, hasn't North Korea already begun a war?
Why continue to call North Korean missile launches provocations when it is clear that North Korea neither intends nor expects to provoke much of a response... and when it is clear that Washington and Seoul are not actually provoked by them anymore?
Invitation: Join
@GeorgetownCSS
for a virtual discussion with
@BonnieGlaser
and I regarding US-PRC strategic competition and the Korean Peninsula on 9 March, 12:00-1:30pm. Register here --
My strongly-held position, now that I am out of government: It has been unwise for the US to either endorse or ignore launches of shorter-ranged *ballistic* missiles by North Korea. All North Korean "ballistic missiles" are proscribed by UNSCRs-not just those ranging the US.
@DanDePetris
Hey, sanctions worked pretty well at forcing Japan to decide to go to war with the United States in 1941. That's a change in foreign policy behavior!! ;)
Former CIA analyst & North Korea expert poised to join State Department as Biden administration faces increased nuclear threat from Kim Jong Un's regime.
Yes, and we need to start this pivot by coming to grips with the fact that North Korea has made its nuclear "breakout"--time to start mitigating the consequences as soon as possible instead of pretending we can stop it. (More on this in a forthcoming piece.)
@EvanFeigenbaum
The fantasyland scenario is one where a US-led coalition fights the PRC in the most intense and impactful regional/global conflict since World War II--raging all around Korea--yet NK, USFK, and ROK remain in stasis. Seoul hoping not to be "involved" is wishful thinking.
Thanks to
@JRCookson
and
@AtlanticCouncil
colleagues for publishing this timely commmentary on the newly declassified US National Intelligence Estimate on North Korea. Congrats to NIO Syd Seiler and his team,
@ODNI_NIC
,
@ODNIgov
and partners on this NIE!
Or... North Korea may conduct a nuclear test to advance the capability and credibility of its nuclear arsenal, in accordance with the guidance of General Secretary Kim Jong Un.
Another reminder that Beijing is now much more closely aligned with Pyongyang than many optimists want to admit. They have FAR more shared interests and perspectives in common with each other than they ever will with Washington or Seoul, absent fundamental changes in government.
Amidst optimistic interpretations of what has been in North Korean state media... This is the apparently necessary annual reminder that NK conducted a nuclear test mere days after Kim's 2016 New Year address did not even mention the nuclear program.
I don't often weigh in on debates regarding questions that are rooted as much in belief and tradition as analysis. However, let me be unequivocal and clear on one issue of enduring debate: Die Hard can be enjoyed year-round, but it is indeed a Christmas movie.
This is absolutely true... but I think it's also important for American observers not to underestimate how many South Koreans already understand the threat Beijing poses to their security just because official public facing documents from Seoul use guarded language.
Key quote from Kim "...comparing it with the military parade held in this place in celebration of the 70th founding anniversary of the WPK only five years ago, the modernity of our military forces has remarkably improved and anyone can easily guess the speed of its development."
“'The relationship between Russia and North Korea makes Russia a little bit more dangerous and a little bit more problematic, but it makes [NK] a lot more dangerous and a lot more problematic,' said Markus Garlauskas director of [
@acscowcroft
Indo-Pacific Security Initiative]"
I often feel deep sympathy for the North Korean people, but rarely do I ever feel bad for NK intelligence officers. This is one of those times. I pity whoever in Pyongyang has to write up the points for Kim Jong Un assessing the prospects for US policy on NK based on the debate.
My brilliant wife started us on a re-watch of Rogue One. I had forgotten how good it is, especially K2SO's dialogue. I need to use this one more often... so many situations where it could apply:
Thanks to
@KDVAVets
for the opportunity to watch
@President_KR
bestow ROK medals upon US Korean War heroes and to celebrate 70 years of the ROK-US alliance together.
All too often, I hear "North Korea is just a distraction. We can't waste time and resources on Korea. China is the priority." This is like telling Kennedy in 1961: "Cuba, Berlin, those are distractions. You should be focused on the Soviets." Read this for just one example why.
New from
#InDepth
, Markus Garlauskas (
@Mister_G_2
) uses a fictional, future scenario to explore
#NorthKorea
's strategic advantage in the Yellow Sea.
It will be something to see how South Koreans react to widespread access to NK media. It may result in more sympathy for the people in the North and less sympathy for their regime and the Party. I hope word gets back into North Korea far and wide that the ROK is doing this.
I'm all for not buying into NK propaganda, but we should be more "wary" of underestimating North Korea's progress in its weapons programs and its ability to achieve their stated goals, given time.
“It’s a significant development & direction of intent, but we should be wary of assuming or assigning similar capabilities that we associate with other contemporary land-attack cruise missiles at this stage,” says
@JosephHDempsey
More here by
@ColinZwirko
Regardless of what one thinks about Beijing's larger ambitions, a major military conflict starting with PRC aggression against Taiwan is very unlikely to remain confined to the vicinity of Taiwan. Both sides have strong capabilities and incentives for horizontal escalation.
In
@NikkeiAsia
I make a point I believe is key:
China's ambitions manifestly go beyond Taiwan. We can tell because of the *kind* of military and basing architecture it's developing.
We need to keep this in mind in debating whether to defend Taiwan.
These are not families "separated by the Korean War" -- these are families that remain separated because of the systematic human rights abuses of the Kim regime. Neither the Moon nor Biden administrations are the obstacle to these separated family members having a chance to meet.
A proposed U.S. bill would require the State Department to report on talks with South Korean officials on reunifications of families separated by the Korean War.
A House committee passed the bill on Friday, with a vote to be held at an unspecified date.
ICYMI, thanks to
@AlexWardVox
for this interview! It obviously doesn't cover all my thoughts on NK policy/strategy, there are details I couldn't discuss, and I think a few readers may have misunderstood my points, but I appreciate the opportunity and I hope it is informative.
Another example of North Korea portraying even routine ROK rear-area military training as threatening. No matter how much training is dialed back, they can still criticize it, call it hostile, and use it as a pretext.
In response to requests, I promised a while back to post the list of required North Korea texts for my
@GeorgetownCSS
graduate course "Strategic Assessment: North Korea." Rather than making a long thread -- here they are in a single LinkedIn post:
Beijing continues to act as Pyongyang's defense lawyer for the UN Security Council. Not only is Beijing blocking new action at the UNSC on proscribed NK launches, it is openly interfering with monitoring and enforcement of a series of existing resolutions--ones it had voted for.
In response to certain country calling for countries to take all measures possible to impose sanctions on the
#DPRK
, FM spokesperson said that sanctions and pressure does not help the political settlement of the issues on the
#Korean
Peninsula.
BREAKING: President Moon says that he thinks that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un still "clearly has the willingness" to denuclearize, and to commit to peace and talks
@HayesBrown
Good, fast editors can dramatically improve and clarify a piece, and can be a source of joy. Bad, stubborn editors can actually turn good work into mediocre and suck up massive time and energy in the process. The bad editors I've dealt with don't even realize the damage they do.
On Thurs, my "Strategic Analysis: North Korea"
@GeorgetownCSS
course covered 2015-17. At the end a student summarized, roughly: "So, when 2016 started, North Korea hadn't even shown the ability to hit Guam, but by the end of 2017, they'd shown they could hit the continental US."
Markus V. Garlauskas (
@Mister_G_2
) discusses the rise of Ri Pyong Chol, and how his new status and history relate to
#DPRK
's strategic weapons programs.
Telling your superiors what they need to know, and not just what they want to hear--while remaining reliable and trustworthy--is a core element of true professionalism for military officers and government officials. An important example of General Scowcroft as a role model--
“Brent has a great propensity for friendship. By that I mean someone I can depend on to tell me what I need to know and not just what I want to hear, and at the same time he is someone on whom I know I always can rely and trust implicitly.” President George H.W. Bush
@Robert_E_Kelly
Its become a bit of a pattern for some... If North Korea hasn't tested a missile recently: "This is a sign they are open to talks!" If North Korea launches a missile: "They are trying to get our attention, because they are desperate and want talks!"
When I joined
@ODNI_NIC
my first deputy was
@JunghPak
, a very talented analyst and author. Not surprised by her post-NIC success: Korea Studies Chair at Brookings, insightful TV interviews, her first book now in print-Becoming Kim Jong Un. So happy for her!
#NorthKorea
Kim Jong Un doesn't have to be suicidal, crazy or stupid to be dangerous. The possession of increasingly capable weapons by a calculating autocrat bent on ruthlessly securing his position at any price, and confident in his reading of Washington, is a different kind of dangerous.
Let’s look past the shiny missile North Korea tested earlier this week and start looking at the motivations behind it. A threat = capability + intent. More focus on the latter, please.
In South Korea--which has a government that is arguably the most publicly optimistic about the prospects for North Korean denuclearization of any in the whole world--over 90% of those surveyed think that North Korea will not give up its nuclear weapons.
Findings from new KINU survey of South Korean attitudes towards North Korea: over 90% surveyed think North Korea will never give up its nuclear weapons, with over 70% of millennials completely disinterested in the topic
Glad to see my new graduate-level course on Strategic Analysis of North Korea for
@GeorgetownCSS
has been filling up very fast. Our first session has been pushed back to 28 January. Will tweet about it afterward.
Get ready for articles in the coming weeks quoting people characterizing North Korea's latest weapons tests as "responses" to the carrier deployment and Yoon Administration "hardline" policy--despite the testing surge starting before Yoon was elected and the carrier showed up...
The most important phrase in this article:
"I'm afraid this concept of a brighter economic future was a bait that was much more attractive to us at the end of the day than it was to a dynastic totalitarian dictatorship."
Unfortunately, the flaw in
@ElbridgeColby
's logic is if the US is going to be ready to fight China in a war, it must also be prepared to at least deter, preferably to defeat, North Korea simultaneously. The risk a PRC-US war will also pull in NK is high:
Why doesn’t the U.S. military have a two war force strategy?
It’s not because we don’t want it to be able to fight simultaneous wars. It’s because resources are scarce and we decided it’s most key to get the biggest thing right, *which we’re behind on*: China in Asia. 1/
It's been 2 years since the NK-US Hanoi Summit. Be skeptical of NK propaganda and Washington spin that followed. To dig deeper, read two briefings by a State senior official in the aftermath--including key details others omit: and
Separating a "secondary fight" vs. N. Korea from the "main ring" vs. PRC may sound logical in theory, but realities of geography, weapons ranges, logistics, politics, and basing means Taiwan & Korea are just as likely to be two fronts/theaters in one war.
In other words, we can't get distracted, weakened, and worn out in secondary fights that will leave us vulnerable to a knockout blow in the main ring against the biggest and most important opponent, China.
This applies to Korea but also Europe and the Middle East. 2/
Just hit 1000 followers, in less than 3 weeks tweeting--a pleasant surprise. Thanks to all of you for following and making me feel so welcome in the Twitterverse!
Realism from the IC again on North Korea. Latest assessment: "[NK] will be a WMD threat for the foreseeable future... Kim remains strongly committed to the country’s nuclear weapons... is actively engaged in ballistic missile research and development..."
What 'proof' do they expect? "For all its... advances in recent years, there is one key thing that [NK] has not proved it can do: Make a nuclear warhead that is small enough to put on a missile. That process is called miniaturization — and it’s difficult."
In this latest article, I argue it's not worth the effort to try to "predict" what Kim Jong Un will do come January... better to consider whether or not the US response to Kim's likely testing and probing will encourage or discourage him from an ICBM launch.
There are reasonable discussions that can be had about why and how to calibrate allied military training. But I am disappointed to see this of level of inaccuracy, hyperbole and lopsided Pyongyang-style propagandizing. This is not helpful to having a reasoned policy conversation.
OP-ED: The U.S.-ROK joint military drills need to be terminated if peace is to be maintained on the Korean Peninsula.
"The beaches, mountains and fields of South Korea are assaulted and blown up in imagined warfare," writes Cheehyung Harrison Kim.
Good intelligence is more akin to diagnosis in medicine than meteorology, given the potential for the audience to affect the outcome. An accurate assessment of when a patient will die is not as useful as a diagnosis enabling timely treatment that gives a chance to delay death.
Many thanks to
@fravel
,
@NarangVipin
and
@MIT_SSP
for a great discussion on strategic analysis methodology, analysis/forecasting of a "hard target" and a range of North Korea strategy/policy issues. This link jumps to the event start:
I am really looking forward to this first opportunity for General Brooks and I to discuss NK issues on the record. I have some questions in mind for the General, but I am also curious to see what questions we will get from the audience--there's still plenty of time to register.
EVENT: North Korea's Strategic Weapons
Join us on Friday 1:30pm, Oct 2 for a discussion with the former commander of US Forces Korea, General Vincent Brooks & the former US National Intelligence Officer for North Korea, Markus Garlauskas
Register🔽
The US has no "nuclear posture" in South Korea, not since 1991. NK has tried to distort "Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" into include ending US military commitment to the defense of South Korea, since the US is nuclear armed. Smart move by them try to redefine the term.
You get the picture. The underlying problem is that North Korea uses "denuclearization of the peninsula" to encompass an end to the US nuclear posture there. The other formulation implies just disarming NK.
Two of the most misleading and unhelpful misconceptions on North Korea are: 1) that North Korea's economy was wrecked by sanctions rather than Kim regime economic/trade policies and 2) that North Korea launches missiles for "attention."
In the beginning, there were missiles. Sanctions came later, as a stifled response. Thus it has always been.
All this talk of "hostile policy" & "double standard" came after, a pretext for the next "projectile." 2020's another manufactured annus mirabilis. More missiles must be.
So I guess the extremely sensitive period of the run-up to Xi Jinping's 20th Party Congress was not deemed sensitive enough in Pyongyang to prevent or at least delay this:
Glad to see this from
@CIA
's Center for the Study of Intelligence. "Trump’s first expert brief, which he received following a PDB briefing on 30 November, was on North Korea. The NIO led a briefing team of IC officers..." Doesn't feel like 4 years ago...
This sort of framing is disappointing, but not surprising. Even if not deliberate, the constant reference to some recent ROK or US military activity when reporting on NK is firing weapons is misleading. The launches were not caused by ROK-US naval exercises in the Philippine Sea.
North Korea launched a barrage of short-range ballistic missiles toward the waters off its east coast, officials said, a day after South Korea and the United States finished a joint naval exercise.
@ElbridgeColby
I agree reshaping USFK in coordination with the ROK with is long overdue. Today's USFK is largely a legacy of decisions made decades ago. But one part of this premise is off - the ROK is *already* "bearing the great burden of conventional defense against North Korean aggression."
Not every NK launch is a "test."
@nktpnd
zeroes in on how NK media is characterizing this launch: "The important bit here is that the exercise was ordered day-of, without warning to the crew involved,"
Lots of intelligence analysts do that, too. Breaking up run-on sentences was probably a third of the editing work I had to do as NIO... This carries over into how many analysts talk, particularly when excited.