David Perkins
@davidtperk
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I'm excited to serve as the first director of the Ren Foundation.
Since the Roman empire, all currencies have suffered from a technology problem: unbacked and centralized ledgers.
We have paid a price for this problem in the form of currency debasement. Governments spend
Today, we're thrilled to introduce the Ren Foundation, an independent organization dedicated to the research and development of trustless blockchain interoperability.
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1/ I'm excited for
@catalogfinance
, the cross-chain AMM being built directly on
#RenVM
by Ren Labs. Here's why it could become one of the biggest spot exchanges in all of crypto.🧵
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I'm excited to introduce Renbase, a decentralized liquid staking protocol for
@renprotocol
.
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18/ While this is all conjecture, Catalog seems to have the primitives in place for deep liquidity, unparalleled APYs, and a CEX-like experience; all the makings for explosive growth and a top spot exchange. 🚀
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The only theme at ETH Denver more fantastical than sporkwhales and bufficorns were Bitcoin L2s.
With the exception of Lighting, there is objectively no such thing as a Bitcoin L2. L2s are defined by the ability to unilaterally exit L1 assets back to the L1. In other words, L2s
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Update: the grant is approved! Renbase is funded.
Thank you to the
@renprotocol
community for your votes.
It's time to build.
Last week, a grant proposal was submitted to RenDAO to help fund development and operations and was met with overwhelmingly positive feedback.
You can read the grant proposal and learn more about Renbase here: .
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I've never been more convinced of a multichain future and of the role that Ren will play in it as the most secure interoperability protocol and L1 for multichain applications like
@catalogfi
and
@zerodaoHQ
.
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@apolynya
If app chains could 2FA their own funds with a decentralized custodian, they could bootstrap and scale security independent of their own usage.
An RFC I wrote in the
@renprotocol
community on the subject: .
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7/ Interestingly,
@THORChain
's reasoning for a native token was that at the time, MPC and TEEs didn't allow for cross-chain liquidity that was live and safe from theft without economic disincentives. But Ren Labs seems to have cracked it.
@brendanlane00
@CryptoDude213
@TheRuneRanger
@TheCryptoconomy
@BitcoinUltras
@ShitcoinInsider
@ShapeShift_io
@CelsiusNetwork
@lightning
So far what you describe doesn't exist (pending breakthroughs in TEEs and MPC).
You simply can't create a cross-chain liquidity network with funds in vaults that a live, but safe from theft.
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5/ In contrast, Catalog pools could safely be of any two assets (like BTC/USDT) because the pools don't need to be underwritten. This reduces price impact because short-tail assets swap directly within the same pool and with more liquid settlement assets than a native token.
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2/ RenVM’s security enables Catalog’s potential. Its “boundless liquidity mechanism” is secured by MPC and TEEs, which make it impossible for Darknodes to reveal their secret shares of a private key to steal assets.
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9/ Most interestingly, Catalog APYs could potentially be unparalleled. RenVM contracts can respond to events on other chains and autonomously take action on any other chain. So what if Catalog put its own liquidity in other AMMs and rebalanced those positions on its own?
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15/ Second, it reproduces the CEX experience, but with decentralized custody. Traders could deposit any assets into a decentralized hosted wallet, trade any market with sub-second finality, pay for gas out of their asset, and without confirmations or gas on the underlying chains.
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11/ LPs would earn fees from liquidity positions in Catalog in addition to concentrated positions in other AMMs, while traders would get liquidity at both layers. Pareto improvements for both.
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I look forward to the incredible opportunity to continue building Renbase as a decentralized public good for and alongside the community. 🤝
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3/ This means Catalog pools don’t need to include — and be underwritten by — the bond token (REN).
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16/ And like CEXs, settling on RenVM could let Catalog combine multichain stablecoins into the same asset. USDC pools could contain a mix of USDC-ERC20 and USDC-SPL, perhaps along with a USDC-ERC20/USDC-SPL pool to aid withdrawals, deepening markets even further.
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10/ You could imagine Catalog putting a % of liquidity in concentrated positions and leaving the rest in its "hot wallet" to save gas on withdrawals from RenVM. It could update its own pools' supplies after external swaps and rebalance and withdraw from its positions as needed.
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6/ Long-tail assets too volatile for economic security altogether wouldn't pose a risk either. And they'd be widely swappable without a native settlement token because stablecoins make a good alternative. An A->B swap can swap A->USD and then USD->B.
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CatVM Bridges Considered Unsafe Too
CatVM bridges can be bricked by a single dishonest operator, which would result in a complete loss of funds for users.
A CatVM bridge requires the state root of a rollup to be posted to Bitcoin. This allows any rollup user to unilaterally
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12/ Catalog can have all of the same pools as other AMMs, but with higher APYs. In fact, I would expect Catalog's APYs and breadth of markets to make RenVM one of the largest LPs in the AMMs we use today.
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14/ First, it accelerates a multichain DeFi. Multichain dApps on RenVM need a liquid AMM to use in the same atomic transactions as their own logic — think of flash loans & multichain CoWs — which would be impossible with asynchronous calls to AMMs on other chains.
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13/ That would attract enough liquidity to make Catalog an AMM for not just cross-chain assets, but all assets. The implications of this are two-fold.
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4/ For example,
@THORChain
's economic security model underwrites liquidity with the bond token (RUNE), so pools can be made whole by slashed bonds in case of theft. This requires RUNE as a settlement asset in each pool, which is why A->B swaps must first swap A to & B from RUNE.
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To maximize Ren's economic security and create the most favorable conditions for adoption by third-party applications, Renbase is designed to enable and incentivize every REN holder to contribute security in a decentralized way.
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@WillemSchroe
@0x_orkun
@lightning
L2s are defined by unilateral exit.
LN is a state channel that provides unilateral exit, which makes it an L2.
Rollups are blockchains that provide L1-grade double-spend resistance, but not necessarily unilateral exit. Validiums and optimiums provide L1-grade double-spend
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8/ Catalog's scalable liquidity reduces price impact even further.
@THORChain
is secure as long as RUNE bonded > 2x liquidity, enough to underwrite pools in case of theft by nodes. But if nodes can't steal funds, then any amount of liquidity is safe, enabling much deeper markets.
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Last week, a grant proposal was submitted to RenDAO to help fund development and operations and was met with overwhelmingly positive feedback.
You can read the grant proposal and learn more about Renbase here: .
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Just published: a framework for dApps, app chains, and rollups to operate their own Bitcoin bridge and share security
Happy New Year, fRens 🎊
Let's kick it off with some new research: a framework for dApps to operate their own Bitcoin bridge.
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"Actually there is a very good reason for Bitcoin-backed banks to exist, issuing their own digital cash currency, redeemable for bitcoins. Bitcoin itself cannot scale to have every single financial transaction in the world be broadcast to everyone and included in the block chain.
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@0xngmi
Securing $9 billion of BTC with $35 million of collateral is a recipe for disaster with enormous national security implications.
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It's time to break up the proposer monopoly.
From limiting inclusion to raising tips, proposers have used mev-boost to create markets for censorship, crush equilibria & harm degens.
This a new era of real-time censorship resistance.
@ethereum
Neuder is holding Big Proposer
It's time to break up
@Apple
's monopoly.
From limiting digital wallets to raising iPhone prices, Apple has used its power to stop innovation, crush competition & harm consumers.
This a new era of antitrust enforcement.
@TheJusticeDept
Kanter is holding Big Tech accountable.
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Thanks to RenDAO for the quality of engagement thus far. After so many months of building and iterating, it's been so rewarding to be met with such positive feedback and excitement.
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A Snapshot vote for Darknode operators to approve or reject the grant proposal is now live.
If you operate a Darknode, you can vote here: .
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Intraoperable ≠ interoperable
Cosmos app chains, Polkadot parachains, and Avalanche subnets are intraoperable within their own ecosystems.
But there isn't a Coinbase for each ecosystem. There's just one Coinbase. That's interoperability. And the interoperable L1s are coming.
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@bradmillscan
This is not true. Alameda has never held (1) RenVM's Bitcoin private key, (2) any secret shares of the private key, or (3) any admin keys for the renBTC contracts on Ethereum.
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Bitcoin bridges are simply decentralized, bitcoin-backed banks that issue redeemable currency compatible with secondary levels of programmability.
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Enabling bitcoin's (the asset, not necessarily the network) programmability in trust-minimized execution environments increases freedom by reducing our reliance on trusted third parties.
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@0xngmi
This was our experience with Ren v1. At one point, we had $65M of REN collateral and $1.2B of BTC. This is why v1 never became fully decentralized; it would've been unsafe.
The problem isn't that one collateral is better or worse than others. The problem is that global fee
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Hal Finney wrote this in 2010, well before Ethereum. If Hal advocated for "a secondary level of payment systems which is lighter weight and more efficient," he likely would've also advocated for a secondary level of programmability that's more expressive.
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@anthiasxyz
@TheTNetwork
@thesis_co
Correcting some core assumptions. There is no conceivable scenario in which an honest majority with $35 million of stake can be trusted to not steal $9.2 billion of BTC.
> to overtake the network, a user would need to create approximately 145 new validators overnight
Not true.
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@ercwl
I wouldn't call them tiny. But more importantly, every Ethereum rollup project has a practical roadmap to get to stage 2. Barring a miracle, it won't be possible to get to stage 2 on Bitcoin without new opcodes. And it's currently Bitcoiners who are being more vocal about already
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I was debating whether an FHE coprocessor on
@aztecnetwork
could be a (very) long-term end game for batch auctions, but I realized FHE isn't even needed.
1. Traders submit encrypted intents that can be decrypted by solvers;
2. Solvers decrypt intents, pass the order book into
On Chain Auctions, but
🔒 P 🔒 R 🔒 I 🔒 V 🔒 A 🔒 T 🔒 E 🔒
New research x hack from myself and
@Janmajaya_mall
We set out to create a good model for shared private state; and we've built an FHE co-processor on Aztec.
Everything remains PRIVATE
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@notnotElliott
@0xngmi
It probably would've required third-party app communities to operate their own bridges and share security with each other (and as a bonus, to bridge between each other via Lightning).
That's a "many honest majorities" system. We're building towards a weaker-than-honest-majority
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@ViktorBunin
In web3, an account is a public/private key pair, which is completely self-custodial. And a wallet is just a GUI over that key pair, like 🦊.
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@aztecnetwork
Batches can also be infinitely large; there's no block gas limit since execution and proving are done client-side.
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@mrsThreshold
@beau_shinkle
@mhluongo
Randomly selected nodes and rotating wallets have absolutely nothing to do with economic security. In fact, they make security weaker, because you can randomly sample into a wallet with less than 51% of the network.
When an attacker in a permissionless network has enough
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Finance on a centralized sequencer is real-time censorship-resistant finance.
If the cost to censor a transaction is a function of the transaction's tip and block producer's reputation, then it'll always be more expensive to bribe a block producer who has a reputation to lose.
Finance on a centralized sequencer is not decentralized finance.
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@Dr_DAO_
@lightcoin
@ercwl
@udiWertheimer
@rot13maxi
Honesty is min(safety, liveness).
Safety is the property that nothing bad happens. If you need to trust others to not do bad, that's an honesty assumption.
Liveness is the property that good eventually happens. If you need to trust others to eventually be good, that's also an
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Trust-minimized ≠ bug-minimized
New blog post: Cosmos IBC Reentrancy Infinite Mint. A critical reentrancy bug in ibc-go could have enabled the infinite mint of IBC tokens on Cosmos chains.
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Threshold FHE has identical trust assumptions to MPC because of the threshold decryption key.
FHE layers are unlikely to be economically practical if holders of key shares cannot charge fees that are commensurate to the sensitivity of — and not just the cost to homomorphically
Exciting to see
@FhenixIO
building FHE as Ethereum rollups!
Unlike secure multiparty computation, where program integrity assurance requires trusting a majority of nodes, FHE is self verifiable so it can be built as a rollup.
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Gaslighting people into thinking it would be safe for users to deposit their funds into an honest majority bridge that has 260x less stake than TVL — and then censoring counterarguments — is abject villainy.
Why is this so important? Because when signers don't need permission to
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I was just blocked by
@mhluongo
for correctly calling out that his proposal to add an additional $9 billion of BTC with only $35 million of collateral would be a recipe for disaster with enormous national security implications.
But he doesn't want you to know that. So instead of
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@arjunbhuptani
@auryn_macmillan
@haydenzadams
@karl_dot_tech
Cryptocurrencies exist specifically because there are probabilistic guarantees that they will not be replicated.
But while the asset cannot be replicated, 99.99% of its value can. And that's why bridges exist.
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@cryptotura
@mhluongo
Ask him how an honest majority with $35 million of stake can be trusted to not steal $9 billion of BTC.
This is his "core insight." You cannot trust a majority of stakers to be honest when becoming dishonest has a 99.6% profit margin.
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The Nakamoto coefficient should not be greater than the minimum number of operators that meet a Byzantine threshold. In PoS, that threshold is 33%. A chain isn't any more decentralized just because more operators are needed to control the fork choice than to break liveness.
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Is
@monad_xyz
not really designed for PBS?
If txns need to be public before they're included in block proposals, then builders can't hide order flow from proposers.
This gives proposers all the order flow they need to build their own blocks and extract more MEV than they'd get
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@macbrennan_cc
@hotpot_dao
@DomantasPe
Single sequencers are actually *more* real-time censorship resistant because block producers with a reputation can lose that reputation by taking bribes to censor transactions.
Conversely, untrusted block producers without a reputation will take bribes for pennies.
Finance on a centralized sequencer is real-time censorship-resistant finance.
If the cost to censor a transaction is a function of the transaction's tip and block producer's reputation, then it'll always be more expensive to bribe a block producer who has a reputation to lose.
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@cryptotura
4. "GTFO"
5. "moron"
6. "woefully misinformed"
7. "he isn't correct but he is shouting that he is"
I read the docs. And the blogs. Lots of words, no rebuttals. This isn't complicated stuff either. It's bridge 101.
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@rot13maxi
@roasbeef
@QuantumCatsXYZ
What if the sequencer censors an exit in the state and users can't pass in their serialized txn in t+1 since it doesn't exist in the state? Can they force include?
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@dbatthebeach
@mhluongo
@HouseofYogiX
@0xngmi
Of course, it's all in their docs.
"The system was designed from the outset to be fully permissionless - anyone with the minimum amount of T stake, could run a node and have a proportional chance of being a custodian...We will make the Signer set permissionless."[1]
[1]
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@0xroborosCap
@SmallCapScience
@Cryptoyieldinfo
That RenBridge would be the highest 7d volume bridge if it were included ($74.8m).
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@mcitizen42
@mhluongo
@0xngmi
> no attacker would be able to gain access in such quick manner to all wallets
The malicious majority can simply wait to have control of more wallets before attacking. "Forward security" is like a speed bump before you can drive on the Autobahn
> assumes stake value remains
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@muneeb
@olairet
@lightcoin
@FTI_DA
If you’re researching ways “to reduce trust assumptions”, then will you be correcting
@FTI_DA
’s report and the source it cited claiming that sBTC is “trustless”?
And because sBTC is not trustless, and Stacks does not provide unilateral exit (or L1-grade data availability or
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@mrsThreshold
@beau_shinkle
You came into our Discord this morning to attack me ad hominem
I politely asked you to tell me how I’m wrong and have been waiting for your response for 4 hours now
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@dbatthebeach
@mhluongo
@HouseofYogiX
@0xngmi
trying to reply here, since I can't reply to Matt after he blocked me
Being in a permissioned beta is not a valid counterargument. If your goal is for staking to be permissionless, and for anyone with enough stake to be able to run a node (as your docs claim), then stakers will
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@mhluongo
@HouseofYogiX
@0xngmi
My man, what I described is exactly how tBTC v2 works.
The honest majority maintains custody of 1:1 BTC, but signers bond T, which is what gets slashed for misbehavior. Collateral is what signers bond; it's their disincentive to misbehave.
How can I cherry pick your own
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@toghrulmaharram
If trust is a term for the likelihood of losing coins to any third party, then trusting the base chain for coins at rest ≠ trusting the base chain for coins in motion (MEV).
So, bridging to and using an MEV-minimized rollup could require less trust than using the base chain.
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TVL is antithetical to capital efficiency and introduces unnecessary risk from blackhats, market manipulators, and Dark DAOs. A sign of lazy mechanism design.
@0xSisyphus
Why do you want tvl? It’s literally a negative to have a single dollar more at risk than what is absolutely necessary to support volume.
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@ThogardPvP
I'm guessing your argument is that the shared mempool disincentivizes sandwiches because Searcher A can break the atomicity of Searcher B's bundle by outbidding him for the backrun. And if the proposer includes a losing backrun (ie their own), that would be attributable
If so,
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@adamscochran
@0xngmi
Au contraire. FROST is non-attributable, so you'd need to slash all signers in case of a safety failure. If the economics aren't sound, there's a greater risk of honest signers getting slashed.
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@ThogardPvP
It wouldn't be attributable. The proposer would operate the sandwich bot from different accounts, so you wouldn't know if the bot was the proposer or an independent searcher. The proposer can then claim to have obliviously ordered the sandwich by PGA (plus tips perhaps), which
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@texasred1969
Alameda did, so now Labs is exploring other funding options. The devs are all on GitHub.
@jzgulati
,
@nsusruth
, and
@MaxRoszko
will be on the open community call tomorrow at 8am UTC if you have other questions. Link: .
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@Sean41530274
@renprotocol
Thanks, Sean. Would love to hear what you're most excited about. DMs open if you prefer.
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@toghrulmaharram
You don't lose assets through price impact (which isn't MEV), but you do through slippage (which is).
MEV isn't captured on L2 transactions by L1 validators.
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@dennishegstad
@renprotocol
18 months ago was Feb 2023. We didn't resume development until June 1. RenEVM was the idea for v2 at the time, which we decided not to pursue for the same reasons as those I've been tweeting about (safety). We worked on shared security until the fall or so, then pivoted to what
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@kendaIIc
@adamscochran
@0xngmi
FROST has identifiable aborts, but valid signatures aren't attributable
@0xngmi
@adamscochran
I think there's some confusion here. Threshold signature schemes can have identifiable abort during the signing phase (as FROST does), but once a valid signature is produced, there's no information encoded in the signature that would reveal which specific signers produced the
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@arjunbhuptani
@auryn_macmillan
@haydenzadams
@karl_dot_tech
The representation minted by (b) is not the same cryptocurrency precisely because (b) is a discrete mechanism with implementation risk. Two assets secured by discrete mechanisms cannot be the same asset, even if their value is near parity.
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@dennishegstad
@mhluongo
@renprotocol
We're active in the Ren Discord, but you were banned for repeatedly lying about what was happening. v2 is being built.
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@apolynya
@AntonioMJuliano
Instead of introducing latency, levy a progressive withdrawal tax paid to token holders. Withdrawing x% of TVL above some threshold incurs an x% fee on the withdrawal. Instead of incentivizing slow attacks that may go undetected, disincentivize attacks altogether.
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@ericglau
@OpenZeppelin
It would be great if Upgrades Plugins gave an option to use Flashbots bundles for multiple UUPS upgrades. Would get the upgradeability benefits of Beacon without the additional SLOAD and CALL.
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@ThogardPvP
> sandwich attacks
How does the shared mempool prevent a proposer who has an order transaction in their mempool from propagating their own sandwich transactions before proposing the block?
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@0xngmi
@adamscochran
I think there's some confusion here. Threshold signature schemes can have identifiable abort during the signing phase (as FROST does), but once a valid signature is produced, there's no information encoded in the signature that would reveal which specific signers produced the
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@bergealex4
If users need to interact with the server periodically to keep their coins secure, and the server can claim the coins of those who don't, what prevents the server from censoring interactions?
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