The 2024 edition of the Asia Power Index launches today. The headline is that the US remains the top power in Asia, but China is continuing to gradually erode the US military advantage, especially in Asia🧵 1/15
The Thai election results are remarkable. Voters, especially in Bangkok and urban areas, have almost entirely repudiated military-backed parties, with these winning less than 80 out of 500 seats in parliament on initial counts. A couple of thoughts on what will come next: 1/🧵👇
The Philippines has a lot at stake if China continues to undermine the regional security order and erode the status quo on Taiwan; and the choices that it makes will matter. My thoughts following a visit to Manila.
The
@LowyInstitute
released the 2023 Asia Power Index today. The headline is that China paid a high strategic cost for its lengthy international isolation, and the United States remains ahead overall. A 🧵on all our key findings /1
Excited to take on this role as Director of the
@LowyInstitute
Southeast Asia Program. It's a great time to be working on this vital region, and Australia's connections to it.
I’m delighted to announce that
@SusannahCPatton
has been appointed as the Director of the
@LowyInstitute
’s Southeast Asia Program. Her work has been vital to our understanding of the region, and the roles played by Australia and external powers within it.
Because Indonesia and Malaysia's concerns about AUKUS don't accord with Australia's worldview, the temptation to dismiss or minimise them will be strong. I argue that Australia should err on the side of caution and take these concerns seriously:
And Move Forward, a pro-reform party only contesting its second election looks to have overtaken Thaksin’s Pheu Thai to become the largest party in parliament. Its policies, like ending conscription and reforming the lese-majeste law are radical by Thai standards /2
One thing is for sure though, this is a clear vote for change that cannot be ignored. The lessons of the last 20 years of Thai politics show that if establishment forces try to subvert this result, it will only lead to
more instability and polarisation. /6
Released today, the
@LowyInstitute
Southeast Asia snapshot: a deep dive into Asia Power Index data over the past five years, mapping the relative influence of the United States and China in ten countries.
Some personal news: I'm taking parental leave from my job as Director of the Southeast Asia Program and Project Lead for the Asia Power Index at the Lowy Institute. I'll be off for the next ten months, and will return to continue all my projects after Easter 2024.
It’s a law of nature that no matter where you land in Southeast Asia, there will always be a sign welcoming delegates to an ASEAN meeting you’ve never heard of. Hello Manila!
Labor has said it will deepen ties with Southeast Asia if elected. My thoughts on why both sides of politics have underdone Southeast Asia when in government, and what would be needed for a true regional refocus. 👇
Sobering but unsurprising findings for Australia (and India) in Southeast Asia from latest Pew research. In Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore, fewer see Australia as contributing to peace and stability around the world than China. Philippines more positive.
Making predictions about Thai politics is a dangerous business, but in my latest for the Interpreter I set out why I think the establishment will probably allow the election result to stand, at least for now. 👇
But arguably with talk of a grand coalition comprising both military parties and Pheu Thai, it was the only party offering voters a clear choice for change. /3
INDIA overtakes Japan to rank third for comprehensive power in Asia – driven by strong economic growth, demographic potential and rising diplomatic influence under PM Modi. But its influence still doesn’t match the potential promised by its resources 6/15
The obvious coalition now is Pheu Thai + Move Forward. But because the system is stacked against them - a 250 seat unelected senate also votes for the PM - it’s not clear yet if this will happen (the successful coalition needs 376 not 251 in the lower house to override this). /4
Happy to share my essay for
@nytopinion
which argues that in many countries in the Indo-Pacific, the US is losing influence to China in three critical areas: economic engagement, formal diplomacy and elite influence.
Very happy to share my policy brief on Australia’s atrophying education ties with Southeast Asia. Just as Australia is pursuing a more prominent security role in Asia, its soft power is withering - a worrying picture🧵.
I often hear a question along the lines of "what's the one thing Australia should be doing to improve ties with Southeast Asia?" I find it helpful to think about the things the govt should do now, soon, and long-term. My latest for the Interpreter
👇
Quibbling with headlines is pointless, but Southeast Asia, apart from Myanmar, is mostly not unstable. Yes the region has challenges, but the region's recent history is at least as much a story about resilience as instability.
The role of Bhum Jai Thai party (which began life as a breakaway from Phea Thai way in 2008) and its leader Anutin could be decisive. He’s previously said he wouldn’t work with any party supporting lese-majesty reform but also open to talks with any party. 🤔 /5
CHINA is still far ahead of the United States on economic relationships; The United States is still leagues ahead of China on defence and security relationships. Neither gap is closing any time soon 3/15
The Lowy Institute is looking to hire an experienced researcher on Southeast Asia. It's a great opportunity to join a warm and friendly team based in Sydney and to do interesting work on politics and foreign policy in this critical region!
Smaller Southeast Asian countries, especially Cambodia and Brunei, do surprisingly well - disproving the notion that they are unable to navigate rising US-China competition. Both surprised on the upside in their ASEAN chairing in the last couple of years.
Australia’s ties with Southeast Asia are far better than they were 20 years ago, in part due to changed perceptions of our alliance with the United States, I argue in today’s
@smh
We're recruiting for a Research Associate in the Power and Diplomacy Program at the Lowy Institute to play a key role in the annual Asia Power Index. If you're great with data and interested in trends in the Indo-Pacific this is a unique opportunity.
Writing in
@ThinkChinaSG
, I argue that Southeast Asian leaders have been worryingly permissive of aggression in 2022 - both Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and China’s escalation against Taiwan
This week Penny Wong visited Manila, closing out her tour of Southeast Asian countries since the May 2022 election in Australia. Some brief thoughts on what this visit says about Au-Ph ties 🧵/1
China also remains on top for diplomatic influence, and the US falls behind Japan, perhaps a surprisingly mixed assessment of the Biden administration’s Asia diplomacy, which has been concentrated on a small handful of allies rather than wider range of non-aligned countries 4/15
There have been so many great analyses of Southeast Asian responses to the crisis in Ukraine. In this piece I identify four implications of these varied responses for how the US and Australia. 🧵
A lot of focus on the topline $. But what is actually worse is the lack of coherent narrative from the disparate components - from forests to transport, space, youth, business etc. It sends the message that the US does not know what it wants out of its relationship with ASEAN.
In my new
@AusForeign
essay I assess that Australia’s post-AUKUS diplomacy with Southeast Asia has been moderately successful. Yet AUKUS shows that genuine disagreement with the region about how to maintain security will be a long term challenge.
What happens in the South China Sea matters for Australia, but as security cooperation between the US, Philippines and Japan evolves rapidly, Canberra's contribution is ambiguous - my take in the Interpreter 👇
JAPAN is in relative decline and has lost some of its economic and cultural influence. It’s score for economic relationships has declined precipitously since 2018 in part because it’s become a relatively less important source of capital flows 7/15
The United States leads China by far when it comes to defence networks and despite some modest gains by Washington, Beijing's economic relationships remain an overwhelming advantage. /2
My new
@USSC
report is released today. It makes the case for why inclusive regional institutions like ASEAN, the East Asia Summit and APEC remain important for US Asia strategy. Short 🧵
This week, my family said goodbye to my father. While I’m very sad, I’m also so proud of everything he achieved in his life, some of which is captured in this article about his professional achievements.
Treating threats from "malign actors" like China, Russia and Iran as a single global authoritarian challenge collapses important differences between these actors and makes prioritisation impossible. First post in my new job
@LowyInstitute
👇
My perspective in the AFR today on how Australia needs to ensure the AUKUS announcement, response to defence strategic review and even the Quad summit don’t derail positive momentum in ties with Southeast Asia.
Part of the reason for this is that the United States diplomatic (and security) effort remains heavily concentrated in just a few partners - nearly 40 per cent of its high-level diplomacy in the region was with Quad partners, leaving less to go around for everyone else 5/15
Why is VP Kamala Harris in Singapore and Vietnam? The Biden team is visiting countries where it can be confident of a warm welcome. The rest of the region will be harder,
@ashleytownshend
and I argue in
@ForeignPolicy
Penny Wong gave her first major speech as FM on Southeast Asia in KL. Focusing on the section on ASEAN, it is mostly familiar and could have been given by any Australian FM. But one phrase is new(ish): strategic equilibrium. /1
INDONESIA – the most improved country in this edition of the Index, and since 2018. Its economic capability has grown and it is more outward looking in defence, diplomacy and economic relationships 11/15
But the news on Japan is not all bad. Tokyo is becoming a more important defence and security player – both in terms of its alliance with the United States and its ties with other regional countries like the Philippines 8/15
My take with colleague
@RahmanYaac6291
on the remarkable growth in Australia-Indonesia military ties which led to yesterday's announcement of a new defence cooperation agreement.
RUSSIA – Putin’s visit to Asia looks more like a last gasp for an Asia strategy than a reflection of strength. Distracted by its invasion of Ukraine, Russia has slid down the rankings in Asia to sixth place, overtaken by Australia 9/15
Working on the Asia Power Index over the past year with
@HerveLemahieu
@JackRSato
and many more wonderful
@LowyInstitute
colleagues has been a terrific experience. Looking forward to sharing the findings tomorrow!
The
@lowyinstitute
will shortly be launching its own balloon over the Indo-Pacific: our annual assessment of the balance of power in the region. Watch out for the fifth edition of the Asia Power Index, and the first one led by my colleague
@SusannahCPatton
!
When it comes to hosting leaders and foreign ministers from Asia, China was also ahead of the United States, while Indonesia scored very highly, contradicting the stereotype that Indonesia is not diplomatically dynamic enough /4
The growth in Indonesia's defence ties with Australia and US is an unheralded good news story of recent years. Given we're doing more together anyway, it makes sense to seek a new defence cooperation agreement that could help facilitate combined activities more readily. 1/2
Story to come, but I'm told Australia and Indonesia are hoping/planning to sign new upgraded defence agreement later this month. DPM Richard Marles expected to travel to Jakarta for it. Plus the PM confirms Prabowo Subianto is visiting Canberra in the "next fortnight"
Quoted in this
@FT
piece on Australian international education reforms, making the very obvious (but apparently, not obvious) point that Australia should be careful to protect the soft power asset that is our ability to attract international students.
My latest article for the Interpreter, analysing the impact of China's propaganda against the Philippines' position on the Second Thomas Shoal. Manila is responding well but would benefit from more support in countering China's narratives
What are the most surprising findings? An article from Jack Sato and me in the Interpreter that looks at some of more counter-intuitive findings – from Singapore’s influence, to South Korea’s lack of cultural influence 13/15
Where it gets interesting is Diplomatic Influence: China is narrowly ahead, despite the Biden administration successfully improving ties with key allies like Japan and the Philippines. By contrast, China's approach focuses on shallower ties with a broader range of partners. /3
President Biden’s recent trip cancellation provoked a lot of hand wringing. But as
@JackRSato
and I set out in a new analysis, the US diplomatic tempo in Asia is already much lower than that of China or Japan 🧵/1
I’m looking forward to joining the emerging leaders dialogue in Melbourne next week and connecting with lots of old and new friends from Australia and Southeast Asia!
The ASEAN-Australia Special Summit is next week!
The theme of the Special Summit is ‘A Partnership for the Future’, reflecting Australia’s commitment to our relationship with
#ASEAN
now and into the future.
Learn more
#ASEAN50AUS
AUSTRALIA rises to fifth place, its second rank increase since 2018. But its overall score for power in Asia has just remained steady over this time – so it is more a case of Australia having stability while others falter 10/15
Australia needs a more open conversation about the benefits and costs of our alliance with the United States and Emma Shortis' new book, Our Exceptional Friend, is an important contribution. My review:
Since 2018, Thailand has been seeking to revitalise its political and economic influence in the Mekong sub-region. My analysis of the Thailand-Vietnam dynamic, and view on the role of the US, Australia and other partners:
We talked about the 17 June confrontation at Second Thomas Shoal, the Ph-US alliance and whether the MDT would ever be invoked, whether Manila is receiving support from other ASEANs e.g. Vietnam and Indonesia and the outlook for de-escalation.
In the first episode of a new
@LowyInstitute
Conversations series on the South China Sea tensions,
@SusannahCPatton
discusses the Philippines’ strategy with Assistant Director-General of the National Security Council of the Philippines Jonathan Malaya.
🎧
And if after all that you still want more, please read the essay that
@HerveLemahieu
and I wrote in
@ForeignAffairs
which explores the implications of the Index’s findings for US Indo-Pacific Strategy 15/15
Has the Biden administration done a great job at strengthening US alliances in Asia? Absolutely. Has it "checkmated China?" Absolutely not. My examination of the US President's recent foreign policy claims:
This week I sat down with
@HungSon_DAV
, Vice-President of the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam, to discuss Vietnam’s foreign policy. We covered lots of ground - from Myanmar, Quad, SCS to Taiwan.
Quick reaction from me to Australia's Myanmar sanctions announcement today. Sanctioning the junta is a welcome and obvious step, but Canberra now faces harder questions about sanctions policy.
What would an effective US Indo-Pacific strategy look like? Our new
@USSC
report makes eight recommendations. Some are not easy, but allies like Australia want (and need) the US to succeed.
Australia is the only middle power to emerge from the pandemic relatively unscathed. Most larger countries suffered big losses in their power during the pandemic years. /6
TIMOR-LESTE – a future ASEAN member, we included T-L for the first time. Of course, it is a small country, and ranks second last. But the Index sheds light on its ties with Indonesia and shows that even before ASEAN accession, Dili has surprising diplomatic clout. 12/15
The data questions the Biden administration's heavy emphasis on partnering with Japan and India. Each has challenges: India's influence is limited outside South Asia, while Japan's new security role is not taking shape fast enough to compensate for declining economic weight. /5
The first time a Vietnamese navy vessel has visited any Western country. Baby steps maybe but shows the role that Australia and multilateral exercises can play in drawing Vietnam out and encouraging it to play a more outward looking role on regional security.
Vietnam’s ship 18 has successfully completed the exercise portion of Kakadu 2024, accomplishing a number of “firsts” along the way.
Congratulations. 🙌
Thank you for coming!
It’s reasonable to criticise ASEAN for not supporting the Philippines in the South China Sea. But criticising the ASEAN-Australia summit for failing to get them to do so is missing the point.
Writing in the AFR, I argue Australia can't afford for the Biden administration's Indo-Pacific economic framework to flop. Canberra will need to reprise its traditional regional institution building role to help the initiative reach its modest potential.
From Kurt Campell's remarks at CSIS yesterday. Saying the Indo-Pacific will be the "dominant arena for engagement" for US is not 100% clear but still the message delivered to regional leaders is still good.
"Insofar as language learning by school and university students is a measure of Australian curiosity in, and fitness for, engaging with its regional neighbours, the country is in poor and worsening shape." Must read state of play from
@acicisCD
The Quad should walk its talk about an inclusive region by stepping up dialogue with countries who aren’t members. In this Interpreter piece I run run through some options for how this could work:
Ahead of the US-ASEAN Summit on 12-13 May, resharing my
@USSC
report from last year which explains why institutions like ASEAN remain essential in any US Indo-Pacific strategy. . Some further thoughts on the summit 🧵
ASEAN and APEC meetings are powerful tools for the US to engage regional officials, present itself as a positive partner, prevent China from dominating regional affairs, and focus itself on Asia. My view on why these groups (still) matter:
Rather than lacking prioritisation, I argue Australian foreign policy risks becoming too narrow in its regional focus. I offer a quick scrutiny of where our effort is going, and ask if this is the right balance.
Very important recognition from the President that the United States cannot disregard the economic component of Indo-Pacific strategy. And a great opening for discussion with allies and partners.
"Biden also announced that the United States will explore with partners the development of an Indo-Pacific economic framework." No policy yet, but should help to address concerns that the Administration didn't have an answer to China on the economic side.
Russia: still ranks fifth in the Asia Power Index, but it went backwards in seven out of eight measures, especially Diplomatic Influence. Post Ukraine invasion, its influence will almost certainly decline further.
My (unpaywalled)
@STopinion
piece: it's clear the Biden administration can work well with close "allies and partners". But what about countries that don't share strategic alignment? Engagement w ASEAN is a test.
Today in the
@LowyInstitute
Interpreter,
@JackRSato
and I dig into a handful of the thousands of data points that make up the Asia Power Index - from flights and tourism to diplomatic and defence meetings.
At least three ASEAN leaders used their visits to Washington to speak frankly about the shortcomings of the US Indo-Pacific economic framework. 🧵pulling together views expressed by Singapore, Malaysia and Vietnam
My take on the recent Quad summit in tomorrow's AFR. The Quad is good, but there's no proof of the concept that it can deliver public goods to regional countries. For that, Australia should focus on building influence through its bilateral relationships.