I've updated my comparison of Hume's discussions on Liberty and Necessity (aka free will and determinism) in the Treatise and the Enquiry, which are very similar.

@pschofie79 I'd like to see Kanye hook up with someone who makes him walk around naked.

Glad to see RFK Jr. finally landed a job!

@morallawwithin Here is my contribution, but remember I haven't eaten dinner yet. If these posts are good examples of philosophy, then everyone is a philosopher. Everyone is a philosopher. Therefore, these posts are good examples of philosophy.

@TalcottNYC This is fine but I think we can go further. Theoretically all we need is determinism, not fatalism, not a loss of contingency. Boethius had it right. Some necessities are conditional, some absolute. Only the latter are worrisome, but determinism is a conditional necessity.

@SteveDavis21069 @MichelleRM68 What about Carter and Iran?

@Kiddodoc @MichelleRM68 I'm waiting.

Another chart with the differences.

@hookskat Ignorance and arrogance are bad combination.

@PAHoyeck @No5mallf3at Suppose you had a dispositional power but it only worked half the time. How is that distinct from having indeterministic free will?

@KennethLPearce Hume makes similar points to show that we can't gain the idea of power from internal sensation or introspection.

That implies "indeterministic free will" is distinct from the kind of freedom we would have in a determined world. Maybe I can put the point another way. If indeterminism is true, then there are physical possibilities that our world has that it would not have given determinism. How does an increase in physical possibility lead to an increase in controlled action? There is no guarantee as far as I can tell. Another example. If you didn't care about whether you lived or died it would increase your options. There are things you would do that you might not do otherwise. Does it increase your control over the environment?

But this is question begging in a way since it presumes complete knowledge would remove power and freedom. I will add that when you bring prediction into you also complicate the problem since the problem of prediction is its own problem independent of free will. In other words, it might be paradoxical for a supercomputer to have complete knowledge of any system it is part of.

@PAHoyeck @No5mallf3at Again, what are things we can do with indeterministic free will that we can't do if determinism is true? Both of you seem to be asserting that indeterminism increases power but how can that be?

@PAHoyeck @No5mallf3at What are things we can do in the world if determinism is false that we can't do if determinism is true?

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I totally agree. If there are two distinct concepts, the compatibilist will always be accused or providing something else, a different concept of free will than the one folks are interested in. This is why Hume is so tricky to talk about because there is not just the "but that's not real freedom" criticism, there is also the "but that's not real determinism" criticism. We can ask whether it makes coherent sense to talk about non-causal, or probabilistically-causal powers.

@Johnny2Fingersz Describe it in a positive way. It is a power. What power is it?

@The_Pilgrim67 @Johnny2Fingersz No they disconnect the specific ability to do otherwise from moral responsibility. But they still think it is threatened by determinism. So they buy into the incompatibility program to some degree.