Mr. Orange
@Mr0rangetracker
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Born, went to kindergarden, primary school, high school, now university. Loved football and global politics ever since primary school.
Joined September 2010
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Pinned Tweet
#ISI
always had the possible way out of declaring itself a caliphate. This would mean a global split in the jihadist movement.
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Short thread on Abû Bakr al-Baghdâdî's PhD and what it meant for
#IS
. Coming from a religious background, Baghdâdî did his PhD in Quranic studies in Baghdâd. Having an Islamic university education up to a PhD is rather rare in jihâdî circles. 1/
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Once more, a small thread on
#IS
history. The second official spokesman Abû-l-Hasan al-Muhâjir was an
#AQI
old-hand as me and
@DanieleRaineri
found out years ago based on an unofficial vidoe biography. Now, some new pieces of information emerged in written biography. 1/
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Okay, this Europol on Telegram thing worked, easily the heaviest hit jihâdism online has ever taken. I like how most of the old channels simply lost their admins, the channels are still available as an archive. Good for research.
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11
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Bâghûz was a catastrophe for
#IS
media. It lost its head Abû 'Abdullâh al-Austrâlî - previously second in command and likely responsible for the English section, the head of the French section Abû Anas al-Firansî (F. Clain), the head of the Russian section Abû Jihâd al-Shîshanî.
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Just to give you a sense on how ancient Abû Mus'ab 'Abd al-Wadûd was in jihâdism: In his first video he sent greetings to Abû 'Umar al-Sayf, a very influential Chechenya based preacher-warrior from the
#KSA
who was killed in 2005.
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8
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Reasons for the US losing the war in Afghânistan? Exhibit A:
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#IS
says two suicide bombers and only 12 others commited the intial attack. Four squads with three men. A far shot from major operations like the Hadîtha raid in 2012 with 100 men or the 2014 attack on Bâdûsh with 300 that led to the capture of Mosul.
1
4
19
Short thread on
#ISKP
's Jalâlâbâd prison attack:
As we knew from previous attacks, the total loss of territorial control has not impacted the group's ability to stage major attacks in cities where it is deeply entrenched, apart from Jalâlâbâd this is the case in Kâbul and Herât.
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6
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#IS
seems to have (temporarily?) activated cells in places that weren't attacked for some time AFAIR. Mosul VBIED in May with a video release some days ago and a Libya SVBIED today. Absent further evidence I consider these attacks part of the yearly Ramdhân offensive.
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One was in charge of demolishing US infrastructure in Afghânistân "so that the Tâlibân wouldn't hoist their black flag" over them. The Tâlibân's flag is white. Always has been. Difficult to beat if you don't even recognize their flag... 1/
I recently watched the (very good) Netflix series on 9/11. Two scenes made such an impression that I have to tweet about them, both concern American officials and their lack of knowledge.
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According to these new details, Muhâjir's real name was Hasân al-'Utaybî, a graduate of shari'a studies from Muhammad b. Sa'ûd University in Riyâdh, Saudi-Arabia who fled his country during the crackdown on the original
#AQAP
, presumably in 2004. 2/
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1
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Some days ago
@danieleraineri
mentioned something that has been bothering me for some time: the blatant plagiarism of Kyle Orton. Allow me to show a small example of my own.
In case you miss pieces of the stuff I’m tweeting, don’t worry. Kyle Orton will take them from here and will use them on his site without attribution to put some meat on his dissertations.
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Back after having been locked out of my account for a (very productive) week. Thanks to everyone who notified Twitter, especially
@DanieleRaineri
@p_vanostaeyen
@azelin
@AmarAmarasingam
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16
Abû Muhammad al-Masrî after the famous AQ press conference in 1998. Front left is Mustafâ Abû-l-Yazîd
0
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14
I am pretty sure that the new
#IS
spokesman Abû Hamza al-Qurashî previously narrated the intro to the leadership audios as well as a number of al-Furqân videos.
4
11
16
Arriving in 'Irâq in spring 2004 at the latest, Muhâjir joined Tawhîd wa-l-Jihâd and took part in both Fallûjah battles, the second one as part of a special group under command of the overall commander of the city - 'Umar Hadîd. 3/
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1
14
The story of Hasân al-'Utaybî shows the deep bench
#IS
had (or has?), with a totally unknown guy popping up 12 years after his mobilization to take up a top-leadership position, scholarly credentials included. 7/
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4
14
Am I the only one doubting the alleged status of the two Abû 'Ubaydas (AQIM, Shabâb) as candidates for
#AQC
command? Neither of them is personally known to what is left of the old guard. This is unlike the position of Wuhayshî (AQAP) who was well known and liked by those men.
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So, Abû-l-Hasan al-Qarashî - the third
#IS
caliph - was also known as Abû 'Abd al-Rahmân al-'Irâqî. Incidentally, the very name that Zarqâwî's deputy in the mid-00s used. Is it the same guy?
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@Hegghammer
Add.: To say that Baghdâdî was a religious illiterate who used religion to further his political ambitions is an unfactual claim IMO. He belonged
to a known strain of Islâm - one that widely differs from mainstream Sunnî Islâm in a number of points - and was well versed in this.
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2
10
Yesterday IS released footage showing 'Umar Hadîd (killed 2004) unveiled for the first time. To the left the official photo released by AQI.
1
11
11
Short thread on HaD: It is rather interesting that the bigshots of this group are widely named as
#AQ
veterans. I'd rather call them Zarqâwist veterans. This especially holds true for al-'Arûr, Khallâd and Abû Julaybîb, all of whom have been killed in recent months.
1
10
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The Katâ'ib Khattâb al-Shîshânî video on the attack on Russian troops in Syria has been released.
1
4
10
Okay, I am late to this but Wilâyat Bâkistân? Seriously? From breaking borders and using geographical terms for wilâyât to using the name of a post-colonial nation state.
#IS
wilâya labels are out of control.
0
3
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The biography lauds Muhâjir for his opposition to the Khawârij - both in 'Irâq in the mid-2000s and in Syria during his tenure as official spokesman. Likely due to his background in Islamic law, he was used as a negotiator preaching to hardliners like the Hâzimîs. 6/
1
1
10
Finally watched the new
#ISWA
video. Interestingly includes the first public confirmation of them fighting
#GSPJ
. The martyr eulogy for commander Abû Fâtima says: "He made the Khawârij of Shekâu and the apostates of Africa drink from the bitter cup."
#Nigeria
#BokoHaram
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Those learning about Abû 'Abdullâh al-Muhâjir for the first time from this should read this
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Subsequently, he joined the media department of the
#AQI
, becoming a voice of the group. Presumably in 2013, he accompanied Abû Muhammad al-Furqân - the media minister - to Syria. He continued in the media wing, at one point as spokesman of the media ministry. 4/
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0
12
Short comment on Moscow: It is interesting that the captured
#IS
guys stress that they got money for the attacks. IMO this is directly linked to the Russian discourse on Jihâdism since the 90s that described local and foreign rebel commanders in Chechnya as mercenaries. 1/
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Agree with much in here But worth to mention that a) Usâma Bin Lâdin was a protege of 'Abdullâh 'Azzâm. b) A large chunk of the Tâlibân participated in the Afghân-Soviet war as Mujâhidîn, mostly in the ranks of Hizb Islâmî Khâlis & Harakat Inqilâb Islâmî.
0
2
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In 2016, he replaced the deceased Abû Muhammad al-'Adnânî as official spokesman of
#IS
. Now at the latest, he occupied a top position within the group, appearing next to Abû Bakr al-Baghdâdî in the 2019 video. Later that year, he was killed in a U.S. airstrike 5/
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Seems to have gone rather unnoticed: Baghdâdî mentions that 'Umar al-Shîshânî's sidekick Abû Jihâd al-Shîshânî has been killed.
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Still, the media is working quite okay. It seems that the foreign language department was hit hardest. Usually, a video by al-Baghdâdî himself should have been accompanied by different language subtitle files. As this is not the case I am confident to say that al-Hayât is down.
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Oh, wow! The new al-Nabâ features the first part of Abû Muhammad al-Furqân's biography. It is for these features that I still download that magazine every week.
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2
11
The answer to this is incredibly simple:
#IS
is an opportunist actor. The security situation in Irân has worsened. At least some security forces that may have guarded the shrine were likely stationed elsewhere precisely because the regime expected heavy protests on this day. 5/
1
8
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Nice review of
@amhitchens
by
@Hegghammer
. I somewhat disagree on the end of superstars. When speaking about impact on supporters and accesible style there are at least two men who come close to al-'Awlaqî: Abû Muhammad al-'Adnânî & Abû Basîr al-Wuhayshî.
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Okay, just this one thing. The Haqqânî's are no delineated group. No flag, no own history as political faction (previously part of Hizb Islâmî Khâlis), just a network of people with tribal, geograpahical or biographical links listening to a powerful guy.
Not going to repeat my fact-check on this that goes back to 2012 or so. Someone message that journalist and tell him the truth.
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Finally: Trump as usual was talking out of his behind when claiming that Muhâjir was a prime candidate to replace Abû Bakr al-Baghdâdî. As member of the 'Utaybah, Muhâjir had no claim to Qurashî lineage and thereby disqualified for caliphate. 9/9
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So if Z. is dead, was Abû Muhammad really killed in Teherân some days prior? And who would that leave as possible picks aside from Sayf al-'Adl?
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@ajaltamimi
So incredible on the one hand and not surprising on the other. I remember how that Algerian(?) PhD student had a six month stint in jail for printing Abû Mus'ab al-Sûrî's 'Da'wa' for research. I'm convinced that this wouldn't have happened if your name was Alan instead of Aymenn.
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"They [...] pledged their allegiance to one Aba Ibrahim Al-Hashimiyil AlKhuraishi, whom they unanimously ordained as ‘Khalifan Muslimai’." Nigerian press being blissfully unaware who this Abû Ibrâhîm fellow is.
0
2
10
The execution of Christian hostages by
#ISWAP
as reported by
@A_Salkida
IMO reveals sth. about the
#IS
center-province relationship as well as the leading role of the media apparatus.
ISWAP Executes Christian Captives on Christmas Day.
As the reveries and celebrations of Christmas wound up in Nigeria, the Islamic State West Africa Province, (ISWAP), released a video of its execution of 11 captives, most of whom are Christians.
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As the 2nd part of the Sunâ' al-Malâhim series - this time from Egypt - is in the usual compilation style, it is now obvious that
#IS
simply didn't have enough usable footage from Pâkistân for the 1st part.
Farfetched idea:
#IS
might want to transition to a new media strategy, highlighting individual attacks with more frequent video releases as it did during its ISI years.
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10
"We cannot fall for the claim that they are a transnational group or ISIS affiliated. It gives a sense of pride to Islamist groups to claim that they are affiliated to transnational ISIS . It seems more of a localized phenomena linked to the grievances of people in Sinai." WTF?!
2
2
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An unoffical
#ISKP
video confirms that Abû Sa'îd was its third wâlî, replacing 'Abd al-Hasîb after the latter was killed in April 2017. Considering that Shihâb al-Muhâjir only became wâlî in 2020, reports of Abû Sa'îd's demise in 2017 and after must have been wrong. 1/
1
4
9
Heavily impressed by
#IS
supporter archiving. Found the video in question in the main archiving hub maintained by a certain supporter group.
I am currently searching for a video. In 2008 al-Furqân released "Katâ´ib Kurdistân fî Dawlat al-Islâm" a.k.a. "al-'Awda ilâ-l-jibâl". Much of the footage had been released previously in a shorter video by the Kurdish group itself. Does anyone have that original Kurdish release?
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It seems as if there is actually something left of the original Caucasus Emirate defectors to
#IS
Caucasus Province. In May security forces in Ingushetia launched a search operation for Aslan Byutukaev (Amîr Hamza).
1
2
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I recently watched the (very good) Netflix series on 9/11. Two scenes made such an impression that I have to tweet about them, both concern American officials and their lack of knowledge.
2
0
10
Finally read this interview . I agree with Roy on some points, namely: 1/
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2
11
I was surprised to see that virtually no one defected from the Tâlibân and the
#AQ
camp when it became apparent that thay had been following a dead man for the past two years (at least).
1
2
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But how incredible is it that
#AQIM
's Abû Mus'ab 'Abd al-Wadûd might have been killed already the minute I wrote that tweet yesterday...
1
0
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Dumbest idea ever to have the Arab kingdoms announce their participation in
#IS
air raids. Really, really dumb. Unbelievable.
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So, the
#IS
pledge from Tâjikistân features two scenes. The first shows seven guys pledging, the second shows six guys giving a statement, the audio of which is not included. Both scenes show the same hand-made flag and the shaking implies a cameraman. 1/
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3
9
With the rest of the
#TTP
Hakîmullâh Karwân splinter rejoining the mother organization one may ask whether the recent video biography of Hakîmullâh that was produced by 'Umar Media was meant as an outstretched hand to the splinter. And I'd like to know who killed Shehriyâr.
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1
9
Europol mentions "a steep decrease in terrorist propaganda output, especially high-profile items coming from the officially endorsed media outlets" as sign of their success. IMO the decrease is due to jihâdist losses on the ground that Europol hadn't much to do with.
0
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.
@simnasr
“In these last three attacks, there’s an absence of political demand but just a religious demand”, adding that the assailants were “fanatics” rather than “jihadists” [motivated by] religious anger, stemming from the republication of the caricatures [...].
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A truly good paper by
@warnjason
and Stephanie Lizzo. 1/
New (timely?) piece just out:
After 2016 split of ISWAP + JAS, how did factions' patterns of violence compare?
S Lizzo + I show why current data makes an answer challenging, offer some methodological solutions + introduce "the BH disaggregation problem."
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@JJSchroden
I remember times when the so-called Kâbul attack network was considered to consist of Hizb Islâmî members, not Haqqânis. Which points to the likely explanation of the Haqqâni-
#ISKP
story: people switched allegiance over time.
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This might help explain the extremely high death toll for a single PBIED: fear of another suicide bomber leading to indiscriminate protective fire, not necesarily (only) by US forces. The Tâlibân at the airport have no experience with such a situation.
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From right: Abû Ibrâhîm al-Hâshimî, Abû Hamza al-Qurashî, Abû-l-Hasan al-Muhâjir, Abû Bakr al-Baghdâdî.
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So, about four years later, we know who met Abû Bakr al-Baghdâdî on video
So, is al-Baghdâdî really meeting with three top commanders of
#IS
in the latest video? And who would they be?
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Caveat on all the
#IS
leader killed takes: We don't know for certain that al-Mawlâ/Qardâsh is actually Abû Ibrâhîm al-Hâshimî. It is what first Irâqî and later US intelligence believes. Old thread of mine:
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Comparable to the 2020 Jalâlâbâd prison break by
#ISKP
though. That one featured only one suicide bomber but had a larger number of inghimâsiyîn and a second attack team that used mortars. The attack initially freed about a 1000, about 200 got out for good.
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