The Supreme Court’s decision to bar counsel from appearing before it, particularly in response to alleged misconduct, is neither novel nor without precedent in comparative jurisprudence. The legal profession is not an unregulated free-market enterprise where advocacy can be weaponized to undermine judicial integrity without consequence. Courts, as custodians of the rule of law, have an inherent supervisory role over those who appear before them. The expectation is that counsel, particularly senior advocates, should observe a high threshold of professional decorum. In Re Ram Sami Sharma (India), Lalit Modi v. Board of Control for Cricket in India, and Apex Disciplinary Tribunal v. Certain Counsel, courts have underscored the proposition that public attacks on judicial officers, particularly absent substantiable evidence, can warrant professional censure. The notion that a lawyer may engage in unbridled vilification of the bench on extrajudicial platforms and still demand audience before the same judges is legally untenable. SC Ahmed is seeking equity with unclean hands—a doctrinal absurdity. To insist otherwise would be to undermine the very foundation of judicial impartiality by coercing judges into presiding over cases in which they have been subjected to public opprobrium by counsel appearing before them. Several jurisdictions have witnessed senior advocates suffer prohibitions from appearing before superior courts due to conduct deemed injurious to judicial integrity: 1. United States – Vincent Hallinan’s Disbarment: Notable attorneys such as Vincent Hallinan faced disbarment for conduct construed as contemptuous toward the judiciary. The principle that attorneys cannot scandalize the court and expect to practice before it is well established in American jurisprudence. 2. In the UK, barristers have historically faced temporary or permanent prohibitions from appearing before courts due to unprofessional conduct, particularly when accused of undermining judicial authority through extrajudicial commentary. The argument that barring a particular counsel from appearing before the Supreme Court prejudices their clients is legally DEFICIENT. The right to legal representation does not equate to the right to a specific advocate. Jurisdictions across common law traditions recognize that while litigants have a right to legal representation, they do not have an unqualified right to be represented by a particular counsel, especially where that counsel has been lawfully barred from appearing before a given bench. Kenya is not bereft of competent legal minds, and any party aggrieved by such a prohibition can secure alternative counsel without compromising access to justice. I submit: While zealous advocacy is a hallmark of effective lawyering, it must be distinguished from conduct that degenerates into theatrics at the expense of legal propriety. A lawyer who opts for social media grandstanding rather than cogent legal argumentation within judicial forums must reckon with the jurisprudential consequences. The Supreme Court’s position is neither an anomaly nor an act of judicial caprice—it is a necessary assertion of institutional integrity, ensuring that the legal profession remains anchored in reasoned argument rather than performative defiance. @Kenyajudiciary @CJMarthaKoome @THE_SCOK @jsckenya @EACLJ @LawSocietyofKe @FaithOdhiambo8 @ODPP_KE @AGOfficeKenya @NelsonHavi @MigunaMiguna @MigaiAkech @advkibemungai @GvnMutula @WMutunga @ProfPLOLumumba @DonaldBKipkorir @MarthaKarua @otienowill @orengo_james @edwinsifuna @thekhrc @dkmaraga @DrSmokinWanjala @NjokiNdungu_LJ @ICJKenya

@BillowKerrow We now know.