RT @CSISKoreaChair: @petereharrell Trump leaves room for a deal—keeping multiple negotiations in play and seeing what lands. However, Trump…

RT @CarnegieChina: 彼得·哈勒尔（@petereharrell）撰文表示，美国政策制定者需要制定更系统、更全面的框架来管理来自跨境数据流、中国软件和联网设备的数据安全和影响风险。

Targeted tariffs have tended not to have large top-line inflationary impacts; the US economy is big and not that trade dependent. But very broad tariffs would definitely hit some of the product categories that are already seeing price hikes and ultimately consumers.

RT @Brad_Setser: Excellent thread -- Canadian primary aluminum production is an asset for all of North America, including the US ...

Would be good to see Trump’s “reciprocal tariff” proposal—which would certainly require a lot of work to develop (not to mention legal questions!)—get shifted into the overall tariff process Trump laid out in his Day 1 Trade EO, rather than being a separate process/policy.

Indeed you heard echoes of this in parts of the Biden Administration's "worker centered" trade policy rhetoric, which USTR Tai defended directly as a rebalancing in trade policy from a heavy focus on consumers to a greater focus on workers and production.

@EWErickson Completely agree that Congress should reclaim what is, constitutionally, its tariff power from the Executive. Presidents need targeted trade powers to deal with emergencies and to fight discrete unfair trade practices. But Congress should make major trade policy decisions.

RT @Brad_Setser: One of the least useful statistics around (even if it is getting a lot of attention now). Trade doesn't balance bilateral…

Trump's new steel and aluminum tariffs are consistent with what Trump has signaled for trade policy in Term 2: Term 2 trade policy is more aggressive than Term 1. 1. Aluminum rate is higher, at 25%, not 10%. 2. Revoked deals with Canada, Mexico, Argentina, EU, etc. (Tho possible he negotiates new ones?) 3. No exclusions process, as opposed to thousands of exclusions during Term 1. This likely will boost U.S. steel and aluminum production, but also prices for U.S. steel and aluminum consumers, which may drive up some large construction costs as well as some manufacturing costs. I expect retaliation; will be interested to see details.

RT @YahooFinance: "I think we're going to be in for some friction over the coming weeks," former White House senior director for internatio…

RT @mmcassella: Just now from the White House: a sweeping expansion of the steel and aluminum tariffs from 2018: - Upping tariffs from 10%…

With "reciprocal tariffs" proposal coming this week, I'm interested in what Trump's proposed legal authority will be. I'm skeptical that Trump uses IEEPA here. But thanks to @CovingtonLLP's John Veroneau and Kate Gibson for a history of Section 338...

RT @ForeignAffairs: If the Trump administration pushes Washington’s trading partners to raise their own barriers to Chinese products, it co…

@Brad_Setser Thanks for the flag. Had not seen that detail.

@Brad_Setser I agree that is what it looks like, but I want to see the details before fully assuming that Trump’s own Term 1 deals are terminated as well. Good point that if he does eliminate the North American deals, the price impacts will hit quick.

RT @Brad_Setser: @petereharrell Seems like President Trump also plans to roll back President Trump's first term deals with Mexico and Canad…

Interesting to see EU rumblings about deploying the "anti-coercion instrument" (ACI) if the US tariffs Europe. By its text, the ACI is a very powerful tool. (US should develop something similar)! Broad powers to retaliate against coercion, incl.: bans on services; tariffs; investment restrictions; public procurement restrictions; and elimination of EU IP protections for companies based in the country engaging in coercion. There are also a variety of other, more technical measures. While the U.S. could potentially "win" a tariff-only trade war (insofar as anyone wins trade wars)--we have a trade deficit with Europe, and Europe is economically weak right now, making the EU vulnerable to tariffs--the ACI would let Europe open up multiple new fronts in what could quickly become an "economic relations war" rather than just a "trade war." However, the ACI does appear to require an extensive investigation and Europe would likely take some time to deploy it at scale. I continue to hope both Washington and Brussels will be able to reach a deal in the coming months that will head off a major blow-up in trans-Atlantic economic relations, and that we can instead focus on the challenge we both face from China.