🧵THREAD🧵 Professor Dr. jur., Dr. phil. Marc Weller presents an insightful analysis on the Brussels Dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo, facilitated by the EU, with a deep focus on its aims, participant's interests, legal aspects, and the Franco-German Initiative of 2022. Summary was made using AI. I. The Brussels Dialogue, launched by the United Nations General Assembly, seeks to normalize relations between the Republic of Kosovo and the Republic of Serbia. Although Kosovo participated in a status negotiation process led by former Finnish President, Martti Ahtisaari, Serbia refused to recognize the resulting agreement or Kosovo's independence. Kosovo has since fulfilled the obligations in the agreement, including those related to the rights of ethnic communities, despite Serbia's non-recognition. The dialogue's aim is not further negotiation of Kosovo's independence but to foster cooperation and good-neighborly relations. It argues that Serbia's failure to recognize Kosovo's status should not reopen discussions for additional concessions, such as autonomy arrangements for Northern Kosovo. The EU requires comprehensive normalization between the two countries as a prerequisite for EU accession. II. Despite the clear aim of the Brussels Dialogue, it's argued that it is predominantly influenced by Serbia's interests. Serbia has largely focused on the implementation of the 2013 Brussels agreement, particularly the formation of the Association/Community of Serb-majority Municipalities (A/CSM). It is criticized that the dialogue has not provided a balanced view of the responsibilities across the agreements, and the A/CSM has dominated negotiations. International pressure has focused on Kosovo's acceptance of this point. III. Legal concerns exist over the agreements. The 2013 Brussels agreement was ratified by Kosovo but not by Serbia, creating an imbalance. A subsequent 2015 text providing more details on the implementation of the A/CSM was deemed partially unconstitutional by Kosovo's Constitutional Court, therefore not ratified. However, the Facilitator has insisted that both the 2013 and 2015 texts are binding obligations for Kosovo. Kosovo's legal opinions on these matters have been largely overlooked. IV. A Franco-German Initiative in 2022 proposed an interim agreement, similar to the German-German Basic Treaty of 1972, leading to a draft titled "Agreement on the Path to Normalization between Kosovo and Serbia." However, it did not offer formal acknowledgment of Kosovo's status by Serbia. Instead, it continued to respect the differing views on the 'status question.' While the agreement did not formally provide recognition, it emphasized commitments to good-neighborly relations, diplomatic exchanges, respect for independence and territorial integrity, and peaceful dispute resolution. It also opened possibilities for UN membership and membership in other international institutions, although Serbia's goodwill is essential for implementation. The initiative also pointed out Serbia's lack of good faith in this process, as shown by their recent vote against Kosovo's potential Council of Europe membership. Chapter V: Serbia's Failure to Sign the Basic Agreement and Annex Despite the Republic of Kosovo expressing readiness to sign the Basic Agreement at a Brussels meeting, the Facilitator postponed the signing, anticipating Serbia to also sign at a later date. However, at a following meeting in Ohrid, North Macedonia, Serbia unequivocally declined to sign any agreement. Rather than insisting on Serbia's compliance, the Facilitator unexpectedly asked Kosovo to sign alone, a request that was declined. Following a tense discussion about the Annex, Kosovo eventually signaled its consent to the Facilitation, operationalizing the Basic Agreement. Despite this, Serbia's President Vucic maintained that he had not agreed to the accord. Chapter VI: Acceptance of Serbia's Claim Not to be Bound in Actual Fact Despite affirmations from the EU and US that the Basic Agreement is a binding international obligation, this had no tangible effect. The Facilitation inclined towards Serbia, refraining from insisting on Serbia's formal recognition of the agreement's binding status. Follow-up negotiations primarily catered to Serbia's interests. Serbia, despite having previously signed formal agreements with Kosovo, refused to sign a formal agreement this time around. This contradicted the Franco-German initiative's principle, as Serbia failed to recognize Kosovo at the international law level. The Facilitation allowed Serbia to enjoy the benefits of the Agreement without signing it formally, highlighting an imbalance in the negotiation approach. Chapter VII: Upsetting the Balance of Interest Underpinning the Supposed Agreement The imbalance in the negotiation format that emerged cannot reasonably be supported by Kosovo. If the Agreement is binding, it should apply to all its aspects. The current approach negates the essence of an international agreement by allowing Serbia to selectively choose which obligations to implement. This leaves out several crucial provisions for Kosovo. The refusal from Serbia to formally recognize Kosovo resulted in the expected balance of obligations being upset. Despite this, the Facilitation proceeded as if both parties fully accepted the Agreement, pressuring Kosovo to fulfill its obligations while offering no prospects for the implementation of other elements. Chapter VIII: Breach Material Serbia has not recognized any binding agreement with Kosovo, effectively repudiating it, breaching Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Serbia even started violating the supposed agreement within a week of its conclusion, specifically the obligation to not object to Kosovo's membership in international organizations. Serbia openly objected to Kosovo's membership in the Council of Europe. Despite Kosovo's complaints to the Facilitator about this and other violations, there was no significant response, and Serbia's violations were seemingly tolerated while Kosovo was pressured to meet its obligations. Chapter IX: An Unfair and Unbalanced Process: The Example of Ohrid The imbalance in the negotiation process was starkly reflected in the debacle at Ohrid. On the eve of negotiations, a significantly revised and expanded draft annex was handed over to the Kosovo government, ignoring their substantial inputs while favoring Serbia's interests. Despite promises of walking back some of these last-minute changes, the negotiations began based on this unilaterally modified draft. The lack of a clear, balanced implementation plan from the Facilitator and unilateral changes in terms put Kosovo at a disadvantage. Chapter X: Implementing Only Article 7, and Even Then, Only Parts of It Current negotiations are solely focused on Article 7. The Facilitator proposed a separate negotiation track for implementing a specific part of Article 7, frequently using outdated terminology rather than adhering to the Basic Agreement's language. Even though this issue is sensitive for Kosovo, their ideas for approaching the problem were ignored, with the Facilitation providing dismissive responses to Kosovo's submissions. Chapter XI: The Aim of the Agreement of 2013 The Agreement of 2013, confirmed by then EU High Representative Baroness Ashton, aimed to end Serbia's illegal parallel structures of governance in Northern Kosovo. This was to be achieved by establishing an association/community of Serb majority municipalities in Kosovo, assuring the local ethnic Serb population that they would not be left without a means of coordinating actions. However, the focus has shifted from dismantling parallel structures to establishing the association/community, resulting in the loss of the original balance of the agreement. XII. Unbalanced Methodology Chapter XII criticizes the Facilitation's approach in the Republic of Kosovo and the Republic of Serbia negotiations, emphasizing an alleged bias towards Serbia. It states that the Facilitation's method of preparing and presenting drafts, which predominantly accommodates Serbia's views and disregards Kosovo's, is unjust and unproductive. The chapter argues that the Facilitation needs to be more balanced to yield acceptable outcomes for both parties. XIII. The Issue of the Management Committee and its Draft Chapter XIII discusses issues concerning the Committee of Management, established in 2015 with a mandate to draft the statute for the Association/Community of Serb-Majority Municipalities (A/CSM). The Facilitation insisted on the Committee presenting the draft statute, eight years later, even with changes in Committee members and context. Kosovo raised objections, citing conflicts of interest and violation of original terms. The Facilitation, however, dismissed these concerns, thereby seemingly enabling Serbia to exert influence twice: as a draft producer and a negotiating party. XIV. Partial Vision of Article 7: The Issue of Parallel Structures Chapter XIV discusses the problems with addressing parallel structures. In 2013, the A/CSM was conceived to dissolve such structures. However, the draft Implementation Annex of 16 March proposed a substantial transition of Serbia-administered structures to the A/CSM, which could potentially create another layer of governance. The Facilitation acknowledged this as a drafting error and reassured that lawful functions would be performed by individual municipalities, with the A/CSM merely facilitating coordination. However, Kosovo claims the discussions focused more on the establishment of A/CSM than on dissolving parallel structures. 1/2

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