Nataliya Bugayova
@nataliabugayova
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Non-resident Fellow & fmr Russia Research Team Lead @TheStudyofWar | Views are my own.
Joined January 2010
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My new latest with
@TheStudyofWar
. Russia has vulnerabilities that the West has simply not been exploiting. On the contrary, US incrementalism has helped the Kremlin offset and mask its weaknesses. The Kremlin’s weaknesses include its inability to rapidly pivot, dependence on
NEW: Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk has the potential to generate momentum for Ukraine, argues
@nataliabugayova
. If it does, the US can help Ukraine build on rather than dampen that momentum to regain control over the tempo of the war by targeting Russia's unexploited weaknesses.🧵
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1/ Putin didn’t invade Ukraine in 2022 because he feared NATO. He invaded because he believed that NATO was weak, that his efforts to regain control of Ukraine by other means had failed, and that installing a pro-Russian government in Kyiv would be safe and easy. The primary goal
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1/10 Russia’s foothold in the southeast would constitute a permanent threat to Ukraine’s sovereignty and even survival. Control over Ukraine remains Putin’s goal, and that goal is not going to change. My latest in the
@ForeignPolicy
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"Negotiations cannot end the Russian war against Ukraine; they can only pause it. They can only create the conditions from which Putin or a Putinist successor will contemplate renewing the attack on Ukraine’s independence" - a must-read from Fred Kagan
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3/ Putin has always been more concerned about the loss of control over Russia’s perceived sphere of influence than about a NATO threat to Russia. Putin’s actual issue with NATO and the West has been that they offered an alternative path to countries that Putin thought fell in
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1/18 Ukraine may soon face a new threat in this war—Russia’s ceasefire offer. It seems odd to say that a ceasefire is a threat. The default position in the West is to seize the earliest opportunity to “stop the fighting.”
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My latest with
@TheStudyofWar
: Allowing Russia to win in Ukraine would be a self-imposed strategic defeat for the US. Russia targets what it perceives to be the US center of gravity — America’s will to act. The Kremlin is using its information-based warfare together with military
NEW: Putin needs the US to choose inaction in Ukraine, otherwise Russia cannot win. If Russia wins in Ukraine,
@nataliabugayova
says in a new essay, US adversaries will learn that America can be manipulated into abandoning its own interests in a winnable fight.
Thread (1/6):
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2/ Putin has long sought to break NATO and Western unity, but not because the Kremlin felt militarily threatened by NATO. Russia’s military posture during Putin’s reign has demonstrated that Putin has never been primarily concerned with the risk of a NATO attack on Russia.
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The US still does not fully grasp the nature of the Russian threat, Russia’s sources of power and weakness, and the Russian way of war – including reflexive control. This knowledge gap is reflected in the prevailing US national security assessment that, while Russia poses the
Russia cannot defeat Ukraine or the West – and will likely lose - if the West mobilizes its resources to resist the Kremlin.
That the war is unwinnable due to Russia’s dominance is a Kremlin information operation & a glimpse into Russia's real strategy & only hope of success.🧵
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My latest with
@TheStudyofWar
. US should recognize that Russia's intent vs. Ukraine is inflexible. We should stop expending resources trying to change a reality we do not control and focus on what we can shape plenty: denying Russia’s ability to wage a war against Ukraine. 1/
NEW: The
#Kremlin
’s intent regarding
#Ukraine
is maximalist & inflexible. The West should stop trying to change a reality it doesn't control and focus on what it can shape plenty: denying
#Russia
’s ability to wage war against Ukraine. -
@nataliabugayova
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4/ NATO and the West threatened Russia by simply existing and being the preferred partner to many former Soviet states – which, in Putin’s view, undermined Russia’s influence over these states. Putin saw the ability to control former Soviet states as an essential prerequisite to
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My latest with
@TheStudyofWar
. Ukrainian forces have adapted. Now is not the time for Western doubt but for the West to embrace Ukraine’s way of war and commit to sustaining Ukraine on the battlefield. 1/
New from ISW's
@nataliabugayova
:
“Ukrainian forces have adapted.
#Ukraine
’s military decision-making is sound. Now is not the time for Western doubt but for the West to embrace Ukraine’s way of war & commit to sustaining Ukraine on the battlefield.” More:
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1/Putin's partial mobilization order is an acknowledgment that Russia is failing to accomplish its objectives in Ukraine, I tell
@IamAmnaNawaz
. We discussed the impact of Putin's decision on the battlefield, its domestic implications, and the likelihood of escalation.
Putin said more manpower is needed to win a war not just against Ukraine, but against its western backers.
@nataliabugayova
joined
@IamAmnaNawaz
to discuss.
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8/ Russian fictional rhetoric notwithstanding, nothing about the NATO threat was more urgent in 2022 than it had been for years, and Putin could offer no plausible reason for thinking that it would become more urgent any time soon. We must look elsewhere for the explanation for
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5/ The prospect of Ukrainian NATO membership did not drive Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The first NATO commitment to admitting Ukraine to the alliance came in the 2008 Bucharest Declaration, which promised Ukraine and Georgia paths to membership but took no concrete
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7/ The prospect of Ukrainian NATO membership had most certainly not driven Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014. Ukraine pursued a non-alignment policy, the NATO Bucharest Declaration notwithstanding, from 2010 through 2014. Ukraine renounced its non-alignment status in December
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6/ The blocks on Ukraine’s accession to the alliance that Putin had helped establish remained firmly in place. Russia had succeeded by 2022 in freezing any move to bring Ukraine into NATO in accord with the 2008 declaration, and there was no plausible argument to make that any
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5/10 The window to expel Russia is now. The Kremlin is trying to absorb and likely annex Ukraine’s southeast, but Russia has not yet solidified its control over the occupied areas.
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9/10 While Russian forces have begun to entrench defensively in the southeast, they are still trying to advance. The West must help the Ukrainians get a broader counteroffensive underway before Russia transitions to a coherent defense, which it has not yet done.
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The Kremlin’s exploitation of the Western argument for “stopping the bloodshed” conceals a critical nuance. Stopping the fighting does not stop the killing when it comes to Russia. The killing continues in Russian torture chambers on territory that Russia occupies – a process
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The gap between Putin's intent and capability:) I've reproduced a search for 'How to Leave Russia' on Google Trends originally flagged by OperativnoZSU on Telegram. Here are some of the screenshots on what's surging in anticipation of Putin's speech.
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8/10 The West’s attention is focused on Russia’s war in Ukraine, but this Western attention is not a constant nor a given. Putin has achieved some of his advances over the past 20 years simply by outlasting the West in the information space.
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10/10 The less successful the Russian offensive is in the east, the more critical the Kremlin’s need to secure the areas it has already seized will become.
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Russia is not entitled to sanctuaries when it is trying to erase a nation. The West must abandon the Russian information line that Russia, having launched an unprovoked invasion, can demand immunity from attack with Western or Ukrainian weapons. The US must remove any existing
The Washington Post confirms - via an interview with President Zelensky himself - previous reports in the Financial Times that the Biden Administration had "warned against" Ukrainian attacks on Russian oil refineries.
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2/10 Russian control of the southeast would subject the people there to perpetual Russian atrocities. Ukrainians trapped behind enemy lines will have limited ability to defend themselves and will be subject to Russian atrocities as observed in Bucha and throughout Ukraine.
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7/10 The longer Russia is allowed to stay, the costlier it becomes to drive it out. Time also gives Putin an opportunity to adapt the Russian people to the idea of a long war and put the Russian economy on a wartime footing.
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11/It's Ukraine's and Ukraine's decision only whether to continue running that risk. So far Ukraine has chosen to run that risk – in part because the alternative, for many, is worse. It's Bucha. It's Izyum.
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Now is the time to help Ukraine accelerate its campaign to liberate its people and its territories.
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3/10 A Russian military foothold in the southeast would threaten Moldova, the Black Sea region, and NATO. It would make any scenario to end this war costlier in lives and resources.
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6/10 Russia is approaching the limits of the combat-capable manpower it can make available for the war in the short term. Mobilization, if Putin pursues it at all, would take months to put new, usable combat troops into Ukraine.
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A Russian victory would create an ugly world in which the atrocities associated with Russia’s way of war and way of ruling the populations under its control are normalized. More in my
@TheStudyofWar
assessment on the price of losing Ukraine: .
NEW: Putin needs the US to choose inaction in Ukraine, otherwise Russia cannot win. If Russia wins in Ukraine,
@nataliabugayova
says in a new essay, US adversaries will learn that America can be manipulated into abandoning its own interests in a winnable fight.
Thread (1/6):
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Resurfacing my March
@TheStudyofWar
assessment of risks of any Russian ceasefire offer amid another wave of misguided ceasefire discussions. These risks still stand. The Kremlin will use any ceasefire to adapt, not scale down, its ambitions to destroy Ukraine’s sovereignty.
1/18 Ukraine may soon face a new threat in this war—Russia’s ceasefire offer. It seems odd to say that a ceasefire is a threat. The default position in the West is to seize the earliest opportunity to “stop the fighting.”
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4/10 The Kremlin will likely try to link its territorial gains across Ukraine and potentially beyond by annexing or otherwise integrating other territories that Russia illegally occupies.
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A reminder that Russia is not entitled to sanctuaries when it is trying to erase a nation. The West must abandon the Russian information line that Russia, having launched an unprovoked invasion, can demand immunity from attack. A must-read assessment from
@georgewbarros
.
Russian aircraft can strike Kharkiv City indefinitely without ever leaving the sanctuary of Russian airspace. Kharkiv City lies 40 kilometers from Russia’s international border with Ukraine. Russia’s glide bombs have a glide range of 40-60 kilometers.
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My latest with
@TheStudyofWar
. The West risks handing the Kremlin another opportunity to prolong its war in Ukraine if it fails to resource Ukraine’s sustained counteroffensive. 1/
NEW: The West risks handing the
#Kremlin
another opportunity to prolong its war in
#Ukraine
if it fails to resource Ukraine’s sustained counteroffensive, writes ISW
#Russia
Fellow
@nataliabugayova
:
Delays and fragmented aid are exactly what allowed Russia
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Ukraine will not liberate all the Russian-occupied territory in a single counteroffensive and will require several successive counteroffensives to win the war. The US must prepare to resource Ukraine's successive efforts. More in my
@TheStudyofWar
piece:
“The expectation from our counteroffensive campaign is overestimated in the world,” Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov said. “Most people are … waiting for something huge,” he added, which he fears may lead to “emotional disappointment.”
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Negotiations, ceasefires, and peace deals are not off-ramps but rather on-ramps for the Kremlin to renew its attack on Ukraine in the future under conditions that advantage Russia. More in my latest
@TheStudyofWar
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2/17 But while some ceasefires lead to peace, others lead to more war—as the Russians have repeatedly shown. Those seeking enduring peace must resist any Russian ceasefire offer that sets conditions for renewed conflict on Russia’s terms or gives Russia leverage on Ukraine.
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1/ Putin is consolidating his power projection system around those willing to pursue his maximalist goals in Ukraine, increasingly relying on a smaller cadre of devoted followers and a silent majority who will simply comply. My latest at
@TheStudyofWar
:
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My latest with
@TheStudyofWar
. Putin is on a path to disappoint all elements of his power projection system. It does not make him imminently vulnerable. Russian military failures, however, will worsen the schism within Putin’s regime.
ISW's
@nataliabugayova
: Military setbacks will likely worsen schisms in
#Putin
’s regime, but Western leaders shouldn't underestimate Putin's ability to get his regime or the Russian people “in line” nor
#Russia
’s ability to normalize a new worse reality.
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Many of you around the world have asked me how to help Ukraine. Here are at least 7 ways. The list will grow. If you have verified additions, please PM.
1. Join rallies in your city:
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Russian military failures will worsen the schism within Putin’s regime and likely increasingly require Putin to focus on domestic issues. The West thus must help Ukraine make Russia fail on the battlefield faster. Every day of Russian occupation also means further atrocities.
Further setbacks for
#Putin
in
#Ukraine
could see an inner circle fracture between hardliners and those who fear a long term loss of Russian power -
@nataliabugayova
. Domestically, Western leaders "should not underestimate Putin’s ability to ... to normalize a new worse reality"
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16/17 As long as the Ukrainians are willing to fight, the West should provide Ukraine with everything it needs to win and resist Russian ceasefire offers that give Putin leverage on Ukraine.
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17/17 Faster Western assistance is critical to helping Ukrainian forces maintain their momentum and reducing the number of lives it takes to preserve Ukraine’s sovereignty. The text is here:
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12/Additionally, such a strike is unlikely to break Ukraine's will to fight, which is one of the two key centers of gravity of this war – along with Western support.
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10/While we cannot rule out Putin's use of a tactical nuclear weapon in Ukraine, there are two critical points worth stating. First, Ukraine has been taking on that risk since the day it chose to push back on Russia’s full-scale invasion.
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Putin’s intentions toward Ukraine have not changed and likely never will. The Kremlin will use any ceasefire to adapt, not scale down, its ambitions to erode and ultimately destroy Ukraine’s sovereignty. My latest
@TheStudyofWar
.
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3/17 Russia is on the ropes in Ukraine today. It has not achieved any of Putin’s central objectives. The Russian army is suffering damage that will take years to repair if repair is even possible.
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A reminder that negotiations, ceasefires, and peace deals are not off-ramps but rather on-ramps for the Kremlin to renew its attack on Ukraine in the future under conditions that advantage Russia. They are means to the same ends—full control of Ukraine and eradication of
⚡️ Putin looking for ceasefire to cement gains in Ukraine, Reuters reports citing sources.
Russian President Vladimir Putin is open to a ceasefire that recognizes the current front lines on the battlefield but will fight on if Ukraine and its allies do not agree, Reuters
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9/17 Russia has a long history of ceasefire violations. It violated ceasefires in Syria and framed its troop rotations as “withdrawals” to buy time and regroup, as
@JennyCafarella
analyzed in detail. The Kremlin has also repeatedly violated ceasefires in Ukraine since 2014.
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6/17 Putin’s intentions toward Ukraine have not changed and likely never will. Putin’s goals in Ukraine always exceeded countering NATO or forcing Ukraine into neutrality. Putin has made it clear he will accept nothing less than Russian control over Ukraine.
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4/17 Russian forces are regrouping and preparing to launch a new campaign. But Russian units are badly damaged and repairing them will take time. If the currently planned Russian push in Ukraine’s east does not quickly go Moscow’s way, Putin might offer a ceasefire to buy time
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12/17 Driving Russian forces out of Ukraine, especially from the south, is critical to Ukraine’s long-term viability, given the south’s military and economic significance. Ukraine might be able to do that with proper Western support.
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8/17 The Kremlin will use any ceasefire to adapt, not scale down, its ambitions to erode and ultimately destroy Ukraine’s sovereignty.
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My latest with
@TheStudyofWar
. The Kremlin’s principal effort is to force the US to accept and reason from Russian premises to decisions that advance Russia’s interests, not ours. The Kremlin is not arguing with us. It is trying to enforce assertions about the Kremlin-generated
Russia cannot defeat Ukraine or the West – and will likely lose - if the West mobilizes its resources to resist the Kremlin.
That the war is unwinnable due to Russia’s dominance is a Kremlin information operation & a glimpse into Russia's real strategy & only hope of success.🧵
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6/Equipping these forces will be another challenge, and the shortcomings of
#Russia
's defense industrial base will only compound this problem. It is essential for that reason that the West keeps and expands its export controls on electronics.
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The ground truths of this war have not changed: Russia still explicitly intends to erase Ukraine as a concept; Ukraine’s will to fight remains strong; and Ukraine’s will combined with the West’s collective capability (which dwarfs Russia’s) can defeat Russia on the battlefield.
NEW: Putin needs the US to choose inaction in Ukraine, otherwise Russia cannot win. If Russia wins in Ukraine,
@nataliabugayova
says in a new essay, US adversaries will learn that America can be manipulated into abandoning its own interests in a winnable fight.
Thread (1/6):
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15/17 The Kremlin has effectively used ceasefires to muddy the diplomatic waters in the past. And the West has shown that it does not cope well with Russia-introduced ambiguity—especially in long-lasting conflicts.
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The Kremlin’s ability to sustain a long war in Ukraine is not a given — it disproportionately depends on whether Russia gets the time and space to rebuild its capabilities. Enabling further successful Ukrainian counteroffensives will deny the Kremlin a breather to replenish its
The current debate over US aid to
#Ukraine
is filled with terms such as "long war," or "proxy war." But, as ISW
#Russia
Fellow
@nataliabugayova
wrote in April, that debate is a misframing of the conflict and what the United States must do:
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5/17 Any consideration of a Russian ceasefire offer must take account of six primary risks. The full text is here:
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7/17 Ukraine has fended off Putin’s attempts to control Ukraine for years: by denying the Kremlin’s proxies the ability to dominate Ukraine’s politics in 2004 and 2013; by halting Russia’s offensive in 2014 and refusing Putin’s manipulative peace frameworks for the past 8 years.
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23/The West must also be laser-focused on depriving Russia of military technology. Putin will not hesitate to throw additional people at the problem in Ukraine.
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11/17 Russia can use a ceasefire to consolidate gains and freeze the frontline in the best configuration Putin can hope for. A ceasefire would allow Russia to focus on consolidating its gains in the south, which would inevitably mean increased terrorizing of the local population.
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13/17 Russian forces are militarily controlling some places, like Kherson, but they cannot yet govern them. The local population, including many Russian speakers, is challenging Russia’s rule despite Russia’s brutal efforts to force the locals into submission.
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14/17 The Kremlin will use any ceasefire to introduce ambiguity in the information space. Russia is on the defensive in the information space domestically and globally. The Kremlin would use a ceasefire to put Ukraine’s forces on the defensive by blaming them for any violations.
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Russia is hijacking and substituting key concepts of Western debate, such as notions of peace, defense and escalation, contributing to Western category errors. [Peace = Surrender. Resisting Russian Aggression = Escalation.] No one should be confused about verbs when it comes to
Russia cannot defeat Ukraine or the West – and will likely lose - if the West mobilizes its resources to resist the Kremlin.
That the war is unwinnable due to Russia’s dominance is a Kremlin information operation & a glimpse into Russia's real strategy & only hope of success.🧵
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10/17 A ceasefire is one of the few options Putin has available to him to interrupt Ukraine’s initiative, as well as to shift the Russian invasion off the losing trajectory.
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5/Many Russians support the war rhetorically but are not willing to fight in it.
#Russia
will also face limitations in throughput and deployment of these forces – both efforts require officer cadre – an increasingly diminishing resource and bottleneck in the Russian military.
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2/Putin launched a full-scale invasion of
#Ukraine
in February with an insufficient force that's since been exhausted in pursuit of limited gains, an error in campaign design from which Russia has yet to recover.
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7/ We should not be overly dismissive of the mobilization either. We should watch how Russia will integrate this force, how it will train it, and the resulting effect it will produce on the battlefield, which we are unlikely to see until 2023.
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I wrote in May that Bucha was an observable microcosm of a deliberate Russian terror campaign against Ukrainians. Helping Ukraine liberate its people and territories is the only way to stop Russian atrocities and prevent future ones.
Horrific news of a mass grave in Izyum should reinforce our collective resolve to hold Russia accountable for its atrocities and to support Ukraine in its efforts to defend its homeland and liberate its citizens suffering horribly under Russia’s forces.
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The West is a giant that – at times – behaves like a mouse when it comes to Russia. All it needs to do is stand up. The power dynamic favors the West — and Ukraine, if the West decides to mobilize on behalf of Ukraine. Mobilizing would mean surging the West's military production,
For Christ sake. We have a historic opportunity to defeat an enemy who has been at war with us for years. Putin is destroying everything that matters to us. He is weak now. Stop being so timid and act like a superpower. Give Ukraine what they need to win!
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3/Efforts to replenish Russia's troop shortage short of mobilization have failed. A call for a partial mobilization is thus Putin’s attempt to reconcile the gap between his unchanged intent – which is to control all of Ukraine - and Russia's rapidly degrading capability to do so.
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4/The mobilization is unlikely to close the gap between Putin’s intent and capability in the short-term - if at all. Russia will likely face several challenges with recruiting and integrating its force, both qualitative and quantitative:
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But sanctions are undoubtedly degrading Russia's military/DIB capabilities and making it harder to sustain Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Because Washington is averse to evaluating the effectiveness of the economic sanctions it proliferates, it is worth noting the record of sanctions so far in the Ukraine war: they failed to deter the invasion and have failed to stop the war.
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9/
#Putin
is trying to reconcile irreconcilable realities - keeping up this promise of the "great Russia," his eroding capability to deliver on it, as well as the unwillingness of the Russian people to fight in this war.
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Putin’s intent toward Ukraine has not changed and likely never will. Putin’s intent will most likely outlast him—by design. Russia will use any territory it keeps in Ukraine to stage future attacks. 3/
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Always a privilege to back in Kyiv with General Petraeus and this great delegation. Russia cannot defeat Ukraine - and will likely lose - if the West mobilizes its resources to resist the Kremlin. The Kremlin’s real strategy and only real hope of success in this war is to
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The Kremlin's intent to control Ukraine will likely outlast Putin, by design. Putin is indoctrinating his goals into Russian formal legislation, information space, and society. More in my latest assessment: 1/3
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Negotiations, ceasefires, and peace deals are not off-ramps but rather on-ramps for the Kremlin to renew its attack on Ukraine in the future under conditions that advantage Russia. 2/
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The West must learn a lesson from last year and invest proactively in sustaining Ukraine’s initiative to deny Russia the time to reconstitute. The West should focus on enabling Ukraine to do what works, not try to enable Ukraine to do what the West thinks it would do. 6/
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The West must learn a key lesson from last year and invest proactively in sustaining Ukraine’s initiative to deny Russia the time to reconstitute. This is key to denying Russia's prolongation of the war, as I've written in July.
We made the mistake of not proactively empowering the Ukrainians following Ukraine's successful counteroffensives in Kharkiv and Kherson in winter 2022-2023.
Russia's respite over the winter helped the Russians regroup and dig in.
Hopefully we won't make that mistake again.
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Those seeking enduring peace in Ukraine must resist the temptation to accept a Russian ceasefire offer that sets conditions for renewed conflict on Russia’s terms.
More on risks of any Russian ceasefire offer in my
@TheStudyofWar
piece.
⚡️China's Xi agrees with Macron on urgency of ceasefire in Ukraine.
Chinese leader Xi Jinping “agreed on the urgency of a ceasefire” in Ukraine during a call with his French counterpart Emmanuel Macron, the Élysée Palace said in a statement.
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Sustained Ukrainian operations on the battlefield that continuously – even if gradually – drive Russian forces out of Ukraine, will likely have compounding effects on Putin’s ability to sustain the war. 10/10
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In light of events in Russia, resurfacing my assessment from October forecasting that Putin was even then on track to disappoint multiple competing factions in Russia that he relies on to sustain his regime and the war in Ukraine.
2/We should not underestimate Putin’s ability to stay in power nor Russia’s ability to normalize a new worse reality. However, Putin is on a path to disappoint all elements of his power projection system, as he is consolidating this system around conflicting objectives.
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A reminder that Russia is not entitled to sanctuaries when it is trying to erase a nation. The West must abandon the Russian information line that Russia, having launched an unprovoked invasion, can demand immunity from attack with Western or Ukrainian weapons. More in our
⚡US not supporting Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries, Blinken says.
The U.S. has "neither supported nor enabled strikes by Ukraine outside of its territory," U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said at press conference on April 2.
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1/3 My key points to the Yalta European Strategy conference in Kyiv: There is no indication that Putin is seeking any sort of offramp. Any efforts to try to change Putin's intent just through talks is a pre-determined failed policy. Thanks,
@anneapplebaum
, for the discussion.
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25/This makes the question of the Russian ability to produce heavy and advanced weapons one of the most essential dynamics of the next few years. Efforts to degrade Russia’s military-industrial complex should be a priority for the West and Ukraine.
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Crimea has been an anchor of Russia’s power projection in the region. It continues to provide strategic military benefits to Russia. Ukraine is rightfully focused on depriving Russia of these benefits by making Crimea increasingly untenable for the Russian forces. More in our
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My latest with
@TheStudyofWar
. The debate about the US facing a “long war” in Ukraine is misframed. The catchall phrase “long war” is skewed by legacy US thinking about wars, Kremlin information operations, and the inherent difficulties in parsing battlefield realities. 1/
NEW from
@nataliabugayova
: The debate about the US facing a “long war” in
#Ukraine
is misframed.
Failing to resource all of the required Ukrainian counteroffensives — not just the next one — will protract
#Russia
’s war & increase the risks for the US.⬇️
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As I explained to CSPAN last month, we are entering a phase wherein Ukraine will again have an opportunity to capitalize on a culminating Russian offensive. The question if whether the West supplies Ukraine with what it needs to seize this opportunity.
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My latest with
@KatStepanenko
and Fred Kagan: "Weakness Is Lethal: Why
#Putin
Invaded
#Ukraine
and How the War Must End." 1/
"Weakness Is Lethal: Why
#Putin
Invaded
#Ukraine
and How the War Must End."
Latest from ISW's
@nataliabugayova
,
@katstepanenko
& Fred Kagan of
@criticalthreats
:
Key takeaways 🧵⬇️
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10/ Putin is on a trajectory to disappoint the extreme nationalists rallying around the idea of a total victory in Ukraine, which he cannot deliver. Even the most extreme options are unlikely to bridge the gap between Russia’s capabilities and Putin’s unchanged goals in Ukraine.
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Putin will not hesitate to sacrifice more of his forces in Ukraine. This makes the question of the Russian ability to produce and maintain heavy weapons one of the key dynamics in this war. Denying Russia’s military-industrial complex access to global markets is essential. 11/
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The US thus must help Ukraine liberate its territories and people through a large-scale counteroffensive or risk facing the same challenge with the same escalation risks under worse conditions in the future. 17/
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22/The West must help Ukraine make Russia fail on the battlefield faster. Russia cannot reverse its lost momentum in Ukraine rapidly. Ukraine has a window of opportunity to further liberate its territories and people.
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Indeed. Russia used filtration camps during its brutal wars in Chechnya to establish a state system of terror and intimidate the local population. Atrocities are a part of the Russian way of war in Ukraine and beyond. More in our
@TheStudyofWar
piece:
Putin's playbook doesn't change. At filtration camps in Chechnya, Russia beat, tortured and executed civilians. We
#standwithUkraine
.
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A Russian victory in Ukraine would present the West with a reconstituted and emboldened Russia that is more determined to undermine the US. There is no going back to the pre-2022 status quo. The US is on track to be blindsided by Russia’s transformation — again. More in my latest
3/ "A Russian victory in Ukraine is a nearly guaranteed path to another Putin or worse, however, because of the political imperatives that an empowered nationalist community would create."
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Ukraine has crossed many of Putin’s supposed red lines, from liberating what Russia constitutionally claims to be its land to attacking the Crimean Bridge. Each time, the Kremlin did not escalate but rather reshaped its narrative to explain away its losses. 16/
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1/3 Russia is hijacking key concepts of Western debate about this war, such as notions of peace and defense, contributing to Western category errors about both. The West has been non-escalatory toward Russia for years to the point of self-deterrence and ceding its own interests.
Interesting chapter from Alexander Bick who led the NSC's Russia-Ukraine Tiger Team on the Biden administration's thinking during the Russian buildup:
"Over the fall, the administration was trying to balance two contradictory objectives—to ensure that Ukraine had the
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