⚡️ 🇸🇾 🇮🇱 | « L’armée israélienne a établi neuf sites militaires dans les territoires syriens qu’elle a pris sous son contrôle après la chute d’Assad et prévoit d’y rester au moins jusqu’à la fin de 2025. Elle mène des raids quotidiens sur d’anciens sites militaires syriens, récupère des armes dans les villages voisins, tout en limitant les patrouilles dans les localités syriennes « afin d’empêcher le sud de la Syrie de se transformer en une autre Cisjordanie » ». — Chaîne israélienne 12

Every Zionist organisation, no matter where in the world it is, must be dismantled. Now. Every. Single. One. #DismantleZionism

Hezbollah’s intervention in Syria was a strategic necessity in response to an immediate security threat, not an ideological war to prop up Assad. At the time, HTS was still operating as al-Nusra, explicitly driven by sectarian ideology with no regard for borders. Their objective was never limited to Syria—it was the expansion of an Islamic jihadist emirate under the banner of Sunni “salvation.” So this made Lebanon a natural target. The first major escalation came when al-Nusra fighters overran the Eastern Mountains, a high-altitude terrain dividing Lebanon and Syria. By seizing these positions, they secured supply routes and launch points for further incursions. The group's strategy was not just territorial but asymmetric. Before Joulani had even revealed his face, al-Nusra began deploying suicide bombers deep inside Lebanon. Civilian areas in Dahyeh were targeted with car bombs and explosive vests, striking markets, mosques, and public spaces to incite and pressure Hezbollah into overextending itself. At this stage, intervention was not a choice but a necessity. The first Hezbollah operation in Al-Qusayr was designed to dismantle al-Nusra’s bomb-making factories and sever their logistical reach. The conflict then expanded into the Aleppo countryside, where al-Nusra and ISIS had embedded themselves in terrain optimized for attritional warfare. So Hezbollah’s campaign was never about securing Assad’s rule—it was a series of targeted operations aimed at eliminating jihadist threats along Lebanon’s borders. Today, we know HTS presents itself as something different. With its rebranding, the group has abandoned the rhetoric of a borderless caliphate and now frames itself as a force of “geographical liberation.” But this is a shift in presentation and not function. The same actors who once pushed sectarian conquest under al-Nusra are now aligning themselves with Western-backed narratives of governance and military legitimacy. This is evident in how media outlets like Al-Hadath—long favorable to jihadist factions—are covering the latest escalation. On the Syrian side, HTS fighters in full military gear openly identify with the governing structure, while on the Lebanese side, local tribes—civilians with weapons—are framed as the aggressors. Meanwhile, the Lebanese army has deployed to the border, insisting it will secure the area and urging the tribes to stand down. But as history has proven, when HTS is left unchecked, the only force capable of stopping it is the one that did so before.

Trump has generally declined discussing the military option re: Iran, but he dropped that here, suggesting if Iran doesn't take a "non-nuclear" deal (presumably including proxies and missiles), they will get bombed. FWIW not a strategy likely to elicit positive reaction in Iran.