RT @confllicts: حياتي مؤخرًا صارت تطلب الصمت أو يمكن بالأصح "تترجى" الصمت يكون لغتنا، يمكن لأن وصلنا مرحلة طلال لما قال— تقبلنا ولا عرفنا ن…

@AzraelArcanus That’s not bad at all, in my introduction to the history of philosophy, we covered some Pre-Socratics and Socratics, two medieval figures (Augustine and Aquinas), one rationalist (Descartes), one empiricist (Hume), and Kant. The main focus was on Aristotle, Plato and Kant.

I suspect that your syllogism is invalid, it becomes clear what the issue is once we formalise it. p: there is another creator; q: God is able to negate this other creators actions. In PL the argument has the following structure: (1) p → (q v ¬q) (2) ¬(q v ¬q) (3) ¬p (1,2 MTT) Let's begin with the first premise, which is just a tautology, making the entire conditional trivially true unless your affirm a falsum, since it is trivially true I don't see how it provides any resource to use MTT to derive the negation of p. It should be obvious what the issue with premise two is, it's just false. I think that the proof for p2 is begging the question also.

@potentia_9 Get this book, it will answer all your shubha.

Thanks for your response, Abdul. I've read a few papers recently, and it seems that formal solutions to the Liar Paradox (LP) have become less appealing, with more focus shifting toward semantic approaches. Kripke, for instance, develops a theory of truth along these lines in Outline of a Theory of Truth. The main issue in this approach is defining what it means for a proposition to be "anchored" or "grounded." While the basic idea is clear enough, but implementing it fully is difficult. It seems that any attempt at a solution to the LP generates a new paradox beyond the scope of the proposed solution—much like Gettier case. A common response is to dismiss the LP as meaningless or as failing to express a proposition. But it leaves it open to the revenge variants of the paradox, consider this revenge paradox RP: (RP) This sentence does not express a true proposition. If RP expresses a proposition, then we face the same problem as the LP: it must be true iff it is not true. But denying that RP expresses a proposition also leads to an issue—if it lacks propositional content, how can it be true? Similarly, consider this revenge paradox for the "anchoring" requirement: (RP2) This sentence is either false or not anchored in an evaluable statement. I recall that Quine called the LP an antinomy, what if manage to get the LP to the same level as the Barber Paradox and dismiss it as a veridical paradox?

@Rainypainyy @JadIbnAloushi @abdul_now Jad al-Lebnani giving a victory speech after ending two israeli infants:

@Rainypainyy @JadIbnAloushi @abdul_now Don’t send him bro 😭😭🥀

@JadIbnAloushi @abdul_now @Rainypainyy 😭😭💔

@Rainypainyy The most arduous conflicts are not waged with swords but with concepts, where precision of thought is the only true weapon.

@Rainypainyy eren did NOT die for this bro 😭

@gammaofzeta G.H Hardy on the limit of φ(n) = (1+1/n)^n

@AtomicnoLXIX @fayyadreturns I remember that we went through the other rendition of this argument togheter; burhan al-tad’if, it suffered the same problem (i.e modern set theory).

@Rainypainyy @ZSalmean @AhmedAlBahri_ 😭😭😭

@umiesque cope

@Rainypainyy @AhmedAlBahri_

@umiesque How does this give you the impression of a femboy?

@abduallah_amin