So yesterday I got canned for an interview because the presenter felt the Dublin Regulation was too complicated to get their head around (no names, no pack drill)
Let's see if we can cover the main points in the simplest form known to man: a short Twitter thread
1/
Referendum campaigns on both sides were simply about getting people to vote their way, not efforts to set out settled plans of What Comes Next
"Vote for us and everything will be dandy" is not a plan
4/
And so it went until 2019, when someone finally had a solid majority in the Commons to do what they wanted
However, that someone was Johnson, someone not given to strategic vision, but instead to rolling with the good times
7/
That might have been alright if post-vote there had been a national discussion on how to proceed in an inclusive manner, but instead the political logic pointed to trying to capture the meaning of it all to serve particular agendas
All very majoritarian, as per
5/
And behind all this, we still don't know what Brexit is for, in the sense of having anything like a national consensus, or even just a meaningful government policy.
Crisis management isn't it
10/
So however the next week and month plays out, I'm confident that we'll still be in the same position we have been since 2016: disappointed and frustrated
11/
Yes, we talked a lot (A LOT) about 'Europe' and the EU, but primarily as a function of lots of other things
A touchstone of dissent, if you will (h/t
@PaulAdamTaggart
)
3/
Let's run through the 'duress' argument once again
spoiler: Whatever Baker argues, it's not 'duress' in a form that would stand up in (international) court
1/
Brexit hardman Steve Baker claims Johnson signed the Brexit deal 'under duress'. Odd that critics of it were dismissed as 'Remoaners' while his ERG colleague Iain Duncan Donuts stood up in the House of Commons to mock the notion that MPs might need more time to scrutinise it.
However, absent robust parliamentary majorities, May couldn't own the narrative, but nor could any one else
Cue fudging and obfuscation. And battles over dominance that were (again) more about being top dog than any sense of where the UK might be going
6/
So, now we've all slept on it, a possibly less hot take
AZ/Art.16 mess highlights importance of UK being closely across EU/COM activity, because it will affect UK and there's no one permanently in place to look after UK interests
1/
Unfortunately for him, we are already in a situation where good times cannot be built from the objective geopolitical or economic facts.
And maybe not even from the subjective tropes of 'taking back control'
It's a choice from various problematic options
8/
NEW: 🚨🚨🚨🇬🇧🇪🇺🚨🚨🚨UK planning legislation to override key parts of
#brexit
withdrawal treaty and Northern Ireland protocol - a potentially HUGE move in negotiations; major ructions in Whitehall - my latest via
@FT
Very stoked to share the news that they made me a Professor
@SurreyPolitics
!
Even more stoked at the thought of not having to explain what a Reader is/does...
tl;dr Dublin is about internal EU management of asylum applications, not standards, and leaving it means UK has less/no say over how it works/doesn't work
Sixthly, Matt lives in a state with: a partially hereditary, partially appointed Upper chamber; no codified constitution; an executive that predominates over Parliament; and a highly incomplete and uneven system of devolved power
7/
🚨🚨New job!!🚨🚨
Very pleased to tell you that I'll be joining the great team
@OUPolitics
@OpenUniversity
in May as Prof of Politics & International Studies, after many happy years with
@SurreyPolitics
So if you want to avoid a future that you really won't like, then you need need to try to shape the debate, to find common ground, to build something that includes
14/
I'm struck by the parallels between this and Brexit: in both cases, there's a failure to accept that making rules for your state doesn't mean being able to make rules for other states
1/
That's not good for the UK, for the obvious reason that were going to have a lot more of All This [expansive hand gesture]
But also for a less obvious reason
12/
Key point 5: post-transition, UK will not be bound by Dublin, but will still have all its UNRC (and other international) obligations.
EU/France will not be obliged to accept returns across Channel and UK can't force them to
6/
Some thoughts about the poor set of options available to UK govt on Northern Irish Protocol
tl;dr whatever it does, someone's going to be very unhappy
PDF:
Some thoughts on the UK's approach to the NI Protocol and what that might mean
Short version: UK wants to hold it in unstable situation, to avoid wearing costs of Brexit domestically, but this isn't a long-term strategy
1/
Even more elements in this: grace periods, transitions, negotiations and reviews of the TCA, Withdrawal Agt and NI Protocol
Huge thanks to
@DPhinnemore
@CSBarnard24
for their help (and
@StevePeers
for making me check it all again)
PDF:
Right
Late to this whole 'Swiss style deal' thing, but key point to remember is that EU isn't a supermarket: you don't get to pick & mix what you want
What bundle EU is prepared to offer you is their call, from membership all the way down to participation in a single programme
No constitutional today, just a Beauty Bush for my beautiful dad, who died last night
If you want to do something nice for him, then go for a walk today with someone you love
Thinking again about the UK's European policy and why it doesn't work
tl;dr EU doesn't think UK has a credible alternative to making things work in long-run
1/
Fourthly, the UK had direct representation in the Council, which got to vote on all legislation, in line with treaty processes agreed by the UK, plus direct representation of British people in the European Parliament, the only such body in any International Organisation
5/
Key point 1: Dublin is about which state decides on asylum claims, not the standards for those claims. UK (like almost every state in world) accepts standards in the UN Refugee Convention. That has been constant (and will be so, even after transition ends)
2/
Key point 4: those criteria matter, because they also form the basis of transferring individuals between EU states. That transfer mechanism is what allows for legal return to France, and will stop at the end of this year (there's no equivalent mechanism in international law)
5/
Thirdly, each time the member states thought to change and expand the core treaties, it did so by unanimity and with each member state following its own national ratification process, in line with their particular constitutional norms
4/
Key point 3: The various criteria for deciding who decides are formulated in line with widely-applied principles about family unity and documentation, NOT country of first entry (although the latter is usually the one that is applied most often)
4/
UK is now a third country and so will always come after member states in political calculations.
Fortunate to have IE looking after Protocol, and Barnier to still be around, to unpick the situation last night, but might not apply to other situations
2/
Most obviously, UK left EU because it exercised its right to do under the treaties (Art.50), following only the third national referendum ever, a process confirmed by both the Supreme Court and Parliament
2/
Key point 2: Dublin exists because asylum-seekers were bouncing around the EU: not good for anyone. Hence the notion that a decision by one EU member on your application would be a decision for all members
3/
A quick Monday morning run-down of where the UK is on the Northern Ireland Protocol
tl;dr yes it creates problems, but those are ones of the UK's choosing
1/
Secondly, it joined the EEC following a vote in Parliament in 1973, in accordance with constitutional norms, following many years of public debate on the issue
3/
Hopefully the model translates to real-world examples easily enough for you, but the tl;dr is:
if you don't want in, then you carry the costs of being out
/end
Fifthly, Parliament had developed one of the best performing and comprehensive systems of managing EU business of any member state, making sure that ministers or civil servants did not make freelance decisions without oversight from British democratic institutions
6/
In one breath, IDS says that he can't accept EU imposing itself on UK rules and regulation, and in the next insists EU must grant equivalence on financial services for UK (despite being a unilateral EU decision)
🤷♂️
@BBCr4today
Ignore anyone who says this is a sign of a state in a strong position. As bad for future deals with third countries as it is for the Future Relationship negotiations
NEW: 🚨🚨🚨🇬🇧🇪🇺🚨🚨🚨UK planning legislation to override key parts of
#brexit
withdrawal treaty and Northern Ireland protocol - a potentially HUGE move in negotiations; major ructions in Whitehall - my latest via
@FT
HMG thinks its aggressive strategy on Protocol is working in getting EU to move, so it's going to continue to push that
Let's think about why this is not the case
1/
Frost continues the tough talk ahead of the EU publishing its Northern Ireland Protocol proposals on Wednesday. Brussels solutions must deal with role of the ECJ, he’ll say in a speech in Lisbon on Tuesday. EU expected to offer compromises on SPS, customs & medicine, but not ECJ.
I'm going to go through this once again, today mainly because 'we didn't realise how the Northern Ireland Protocol would work in practice' is no grounds for trying to get out of your treaty commitments
1/
What better way to tie up the week than with a run-through of pacta sunt servanda?
A short thread, with pictures
Thanks to
@Cardwell_PJ
& Therese O'Donnell
@UniStrathclyde
for their help on this (any errors will be mine)
1/
More crucially, part of Horizon's value when the UK was in the EU was its connection with free movement of people: not only could you build remote networks of scientific collaboration, but you would also move researchers to work together in person
That's not coming back now
3/
Earlier this week, the DUP set out 7 tests for any new arrangements on the NI Protocol. But does any model work, especially if you throw in the UK & EU's red lines?
Huge thanks to
@DPhinnemore
@LisaClaireWhit1
for their help in making this work
PDF:
This isn't a trap or a plot, but a mechanical result of removing yourself from regulatory coordination: even a decision that you'll go 'light touch' in those areas still needs legal and administrative structures and processes
14/
Right, what I think is happening here is that someone has come up with a cunning plan around Art.18 NIP consent provisions, so let's have a look at these, shall we?
1/
UK prepares law to give ministers power to tear up Northern Ireland post-Brexit trade deal — my latest via
@FT
with
@Sam1Fleming
@jude_webber
- thread tomorrow
Producer calls, ask if I can be in a debate, excited I can.
Less excited I see both sides of the argument in hand, says he really needs someone taking one side.
I totally get media values, but do wonder how much it helps public understanding to be pro/contra so often
@anthonyzach
Key thing is that no democratic system is ever fully so, so much hangs on popular consent to imperfections, on procedural compliance and on non-coercion
In that light, UK's EU membership wasn't undemocratic, just a different model of democracy
Put differently, Brexit isn't 'done' and UK needs a working relationship with the EU, so chucking another barrier to that on the pile doesn't strike me as a good move
Recognition would have probably gone unnoticed by all but the most bothered tbh
6/
Various addenda:
Forgot the whole 1975 referendum to reconfirm popular acceptance of EEC membership, the first national such vote
And
@ReallyMrSteve
rightly points out it was 1972 that Parliament voted on membership
To help unpack a current debate, here's a quick guide to the difference between a 'hard' Brexit and a 'no-deal' Brexit.
And when I say 'highly uncertain' I'm being an academic and mean what others might term 'no-one really knows and will be very much making it up as we go'
1/
So, I made this summary of the EU (Withdrawal) (No.2) Act, also known as the Benn Act.
Maybe it's of use on what it does (and doesn't) require
@UKandEU
A quick stab at unpacking Johnson's choice this week
Short version: there are no unambiguously 'good' options, just a variety of major downsides, which partly explains why he's not decided yet
PDF:
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), which provides a generally-accepted baseline of international treaty-making, dislikes treaties being made if there's some reason they shouldn't have been
2/
Read my piece in
@telegraph
on the importance of safeguarding peace in Northern Ireland ahead of my 1st meeting with
@MarosSefcovic
at Chevening this week👇
DEAL DONE: The UK is joining Horizon Europe.
Following negotiations with
@EU_Commission
, UK scientists will now have access to the world’s largest research and innovation programme on better terms for British taxpayers.
It’s another step to grow the economy. Here’s why ⬇️
Simplest way to think about today's UK announcement on NI Protocol is as a holding position: keep things in as much flux as possible in hope that EU wearies and/or someone comes up with an actual plan
Neither is likely BTW