Conducted on the strength of Article 51 of the UN Charter pertaining to legitimate defense, Iran’s military action was in response to the Zionist regime’s aggression against our diplomatic premises in Damascus. The matter can be deemed concluded. However, should the Israeli
I have seen many awful things in my two-and-a-half decades of working on national security, but none compare to the Oct. 7 Hamas terrorist attacks in their level of depravity and cruelty. 1/
Iran is caught in a dilemma of its own creation. After years of cultivating asymmetric power and prizing deniability in its responses to the US/Israel, it has shifted to an avowed strategy of direct, open retaliation using conventional means. 1/
I'm often asked how one can see such things yet soberly make policy. My answer-you must see them to understand the urgency of our task. Unstinting justice, a strong defense, the rule of law, robust institutions, liberal education-these are what prevent depravity running rampant.
Still early going, but so far one thing Iran has achieved is to have demonstrated the close and effective military coordination between Israel and its Arab allies, which are helping to down the drones and missiles. I am guessing this was not Tehran's intent.
I was posted as a US diplomat in Israel when 9/11 occurred, and I remember very well the outpouring of support that the United States - and all of us personally - received from Israelis. Now is the time to repay that solidarity.
@shoshanaparker6
Don't let them get you down! Look instead to all the people working to make the world a better place - there are lots of them, but they aren't as loud.
Some will praise this, but I view it as misguided. The US should not be reassuring Iran but should be seeking to accentuate its anxiety about US and Israeli military threats. The outcome of this diplomacy was a massive Iranian attack on Israel.
Official and unofficial US-Iran back channel diplomacy since the Damascus strike on April 1 helped to prevent this crisis from spiraling out of control.
Consistent messaging across multiple channels clarified each side’s thinking, spelling out intentions and redlines. 1/
Yet in doing so, it is playing to its adversaries' strength - Iran's conventional power pales in comparison not just to that of the US and Israel, but to that of other regional neighbors as well. The Iran-Israel exchange in April highlighted this disparity in capability. 2/
Plausible deniability is key to Iranian strategy. So the fact that we are debating the extent of Iran’s involvement - sure it had some role, but not sure exactly what - is more or less the point. Iran wants “credit” without accountability.
Iran may also hope that Hezbollah will shoulder the greater burden of retaliation and perhaps therefore bear the brunt of any response, but Hezbollah too seems to lack the appetite for an escalation in its conflict with Israel. 6/6
Iran has left itself with three options - 1) back down, 2) escalate & risk a war that Iran likely does not want and could not win, or 3) simply run a repeat of its April salvo, which would either be similarly ineffective or, if it works better this time, put them on path 2. 3/
Disappointing to see serving US officials publicly slamming the admin's Mideast policy. Govt officials have a duty to the country- engage in the policy debate and then faithfully implement whatever the President decides, or resign if you cannot in good conscience do so.
Faced w/these options, Iran may be stalling in hopes a fourth option will present itself - that the US will offer concessions in an effort to deescalate, e.g., or that a Gaza ceasefire will be reached and Iran can claim its threats of force yielded a diplomatic victory. 5/
The US position at the moment seems to be that the Iranian attack was intended to cause widespread death and destruction, but that Israel should refrain from responding due to the attack’s failure. In my view this is a mistake. 1/
The IRGC has claimed that the drones/missiles have already struck their targets, and that only "tens" were fired, when US sources have suggested hundreds were fired. Presumably this is meant to mask what is likely to be a very low rate of penetrating Israel's air defenses.
It is certainly possible that Iran will throw caution to the wind and simply hope that the US/Israeli desire to extend the conflict exceeds its own. But this is a serious gamble indeed and one that already seems to have provoked vigorous debate inside Iran. 4/
I am sorry to say that the growing US-Israel rift, which was all too predictable, risks benefiting Hamas and working against the achievement of a hostage deal or favorable "day after" conditions. 1/
Whatever one thinks of Israel's actions in Gaza, it is simply not true that Israel had the world on its side on October 7. Indeed, it was shocking how many countries and organizations declined to condemn Hamas' barbaric attacks.
The shame is on you
@AmbDermer
. Israel had much of the world on its side on October 7 but you squandered the goodwill by failing to adequately address the humanitarian situation in Gaza. You were urged, warned, pressured and you’re still not doing what you should.
The Malaysian government decided to block the Israeli-based shipping company ZIM, including all ships carrying the Israeli flag from docking at any Malaysian port.
Some confusion around Mark Milley describing US policy as being: “Iran will not have a fielded nuclear weapon”. Col. David Butler, his spokesman, told me: “General Milley was not indicating any policy change when he used the word “fielded” referring to Iran’s nuclear program.”
Those who are writing that Iran has ended or reversed its nuclear de-escalation are wrong. Iran never engaged in a meaningful nuclear de-escalation in the first place.
Sad to say, but we have spent over a billion dollars fighting the Houthis and it is hard to point to any achievement there. The Red Sea remains effectively closed.
Chinese media not only repeating Iran's false claim to have "destroyed key military targets in Israel," but suggesting that Iran's hand was forced by "international organizations." Nonsense, but highlights how Chinese and Iranian messaging often echo one another.
One consequence of the terrorist attack on Israel must be that all the talk one used to hear of engaging Hamas or including it in a political process now ends. Hamas should be regarded like ISIS - beyond the pale - both internationally and in the region.
A "fielded" nuclear weapon? Need to clarify/hear more, but this sounds like a concerning goalpost shift..."The United States remains committed as a matter of policy that Iran will not have a fielded nuclear weapon," Milley told lawmakers.
False - Iran's provision of drones to Russia has been crucial to Moscow's campaign of aerial bombardment against Ukrainian infrastructure and other civilian targets. Indeed, without Iran's aid these attacks likely would not be possible.
We categorically deny any presence in the
#UkraineWar
. They deceitfully claimed that Iran was involved in the Ukraine war. This is absolutely false. We are not involved at all.
Nasrallah's speech will be greeted with relief in Washington, I expect, as it does not portend Iranian escalation and may even be viewed as a message to other Iranian proxies to limit their actions. The bluster about the US and Israel is just scaffolding for the real message.
Make no mistake - this Nasrallah speech is a case for why Iran and Hezbollah are not responsible for 10/7 and shouldn’t be held accountable or be expected to get involved, plus the usual “resistance” filler text.
Only by changing the Russian calculus - i.e. by forcing it to consider the real prospect of military defeat by stepping up support for Ukraine and signaling our long-term commitment - can diplomacy come into play and even then may be fruitless. 2/2
My latest - Iran's most recent nuclear advance, stopping just short of weapons-grade uranium enrichment, underscores that a shift in US strategy is overdue. 1/2
This is inaccurate. According to US officials there is no blockade on aid into Gaza, though it has faced numerous obstacles. Rather, there appears to be a collapse of security in Gaza that makes aid distribution nearly impossible. Airdrops likely won't help. 1/2
A few thoughts on this letter. First, it is certainly not the case that the US signs defense treaties only with democracies - the Philippines was not in 1951, nor was South Korea in 1953, and I imagine the list goes on - others can elaborate. 1/
NEW: 20 US Senators led by
@ChrisMurphyCT
and
@ChrisVanHollen
write to President Biden expressing concern over Saudi Arabia's demands for Israel normalization, including a security guarantee from US.
Iran inadvertently undermined its own deterrence w/its massive but unsuccessful attack on Israel. This was precisely the sort of attack many felt Tehran would mount in response to a strike on its nuclear facilities; its failure arguably now lowers the bar for such a strike.
This is wrong (as is ascribing a view to "the rest of the world"). Israel wasn't occupying Gaza, hadn't been since '05. It was pursuing "pragmatic engagement" w/Hamas, in hopes boosting Gaza's economy would reduce conflict. Hamas then mounted devastating cross-border attack. 1/2
On
@MSNBC
last night,
@chrislhayes
asked me how the rest of the world heard Joe Biden's speech. I pointed out that a lot of people around the world do see the Israelis as the ones behaving like Russia in Ukraine - occupying, annexing, dropping bombs.
Chinese media not only repeating Iran's false claim to have "destroyed key military targets in Israel," but suggesting that Iran's hand was forced by "international organizations." Nonsense, but highlights how Chinese and Iranian messaging often echo one another.
Bottom line - the less we hear from Israeli and Iranian officials on this matter, the more likely this chapter is closed, though this hardly concludes the conflict between them, which will continue albeit perhaps once again in the shadows. 2/2
While a major Iranian attack on Israel is possible, it would risk a) direct confrontation in which Iran is at a disadvantage; b) taking focus off Gaza, which has so far worked to Iran’s strategic gain. More likely is…1/2
The choice before states is not between the US and China, but between Chinese hegemony in the Indo-Pacific and the free and open order that the US and its partners seek to defend. My take on US strategy in the Indo-Pacific (pp 22-23):
Scoop: Iran sent a message to the Biden administration through several Arab countries earlier this week: if the U.S. gets involved in the fighting between Israel and Iran, U.S. forces in the region will be attacked, three U.S. officials. My story on
@axios
I am in awe of the courage of Alexei Navalny and other dissidents who stand up to brutal regimes despite the danger to their lives. Let’s have at least a fraction of that courage ourselves in standing up to them from the safety and comfort of the West.
Iran has abandoned non-alignment to become a junior partner to Russia and China; it has now abandoned asymmetric power projection to go tete-a-tete w/the far stronger Israel. One wonders whether Iranian leaders have sufficiently thought through these decisions.
Taken together, what Iran has been doing - increasing the purity of its enriched uranium, accumulating enriched uranium, expanding and improving its centrifuges in operation, and decreasing cooperation w/the IAEA - suggest a pattern conducive to a future nuclear breakout. 2/2
Iran began enriching uranium to 60% in April 2021, in response to purported sabotage at Natanz. Now they have begun enriching to 84%, if the report below is correct, in response to...nothing at all, it would seem. 1/2
Such things do not happen accidentally. It takes some effort to modify a cascade to produce this level of enrichment. And it can done quickly, if someone decides to do it. We will see soon a professional report from the IAEA to explain the findings and reasons for that.
The promotional tweet below unfortunately gives a false impression of the piece's argument. Instead, the article asserts that any realistic reading of Moscow's aims demonstrates why calls for talks are not just beside the point, but beneficial to Moscow. 1/2
Most successful foreign policy includes elements of diplomacy and deterrence. Reject the former, and you will be labeled a warmonger. But that label is equally justified if you reject deterrence, whether out of pacifism or extreme risk aversion. Reject deterrence, invite war.
Make no mistake - this Nasrallah speech is a case for why Iran and Hezbollah are not responsible for 10/7 and shouldn’t be held accountable or be expected to get involved, plus the usual “resistance” filler text.
A few thoughts on Iran given the IAEA's most recent report. BLUF: What the US considers deescalation is for Iran a matter of 1) consolidating and "monetizing" its nuclear gains and 2) ensuring that there is no sense of urgency in the West about dealing w/its nuclear program. 1/
If the 87th attack succeeds, you will wish you had responded to the first attack, imposed a cost on your adversary, and established deterrence. This is demonstrated by the Tower 22 case, e.g. 4/
Disappointing and outrageous. The EU abandons all hope or pretension of playing a constructive role in the Israeli-Palestinian issue when it calls on its member states to arrest Israel’s prime minister and defense minister.
I take note of the decision of the ICC Prosecutor to apply for warrants of arrest before Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court (ICC) against Yahya Sinwar, Mohammed Deif, Ismail Haniyeh, Benjamin Netanyahu and Yoav Gallant. 1/2
Iran and other foes use our strengths and habits to their advantage. Our skill at defense and our self-restraint give rise to moral hazard for attackers, encouraging them to act recklessly knowing the likely consequences are low. 2/
Thus, we should not discourage Israel from responding in an appropriate manner - regardless of the results of Iran’s attack, and also regardless of the intent behind Iran’s attack. /End
The US should stay out of this. It is corrosive to the US-Israel relationship in the long run for either to seek to intervene in the other's domestic politics. We should have enough respect for one another as fellow democracies to refrain even when the temptation is strong.
Our forbearance encourages further attacks, which causes two problems -first, there is a strategic, financial, and psychological cost to constant vigilance. Second, eventually an attack will succeed and people will die. 3/
Beyond simply expressing solidarity with Israel, now is the time for the US and others to warn - publicly and privately - Iran and Hezbollah that any attempts to widen the attacks on Israel will bring swift and sharp consequences.
While we’re focused on rebuilding Gaza, Iran will be trying to rebuild Hamas. Stopping Tehran is essential to avoid a repeat of the current conflict. My latest with
@Levitt_Matt
in
@latimes
Iran's attack on Israel was massive and unprecedented. However, it was also well-telegraphed, slow-moving, and played to Israeli defensive strengths. Iran likely hoped a few missiles would get through and cause damage/deaths, which they could then trumpet as a great success. 2/
One of the things I appreciate about
@WashInstitute
is that my colleagues and I are given room to disagree with one another; and in this case, I disagree with Dennis and David. I do not think the US should push Israel to unilaterally declare a ceasefire. 1/
A unilateral cease-fire in Gaza lasting four to six weeks would offer Israel many strategic benefits—including the creation of the conditions necessary for a Israeli-Saudi normalization deal, write
@AmbDennisRoss
and
@DavidMakovsky
.
On the Palestinian-Israeli issue, the US has used its veto dozens of times. Since the outbreak of the current conflict in Gaza, the US has used its veto 5 times, 4 of which to block the ceasefire in Gaza, and this time to single-handedly block Palestine’s formal admission to the
In
@ForeignAffairs
, Prof Jim Sebenius (director of the Harvard Negotiation Project) and I look at calls for Russia-Ukr negotiations and conclude that there is little such talks could achieve now, and that even calling for negotiations benefits Moscow. 1/
Russia unsurprisingly pleased with the lapse of UN restrictions on Iran's ballistic missile and drone activities, of which Moscow is currently a prime beneficiary
Still early going, but if there has been an Israeli strike in Iran as reported it appears designed to both deter and deescalate, leaving Iran room not only to refrain from responding, but even to deny that it occurred. 1/2
Saudi Arabia turns to China to broker its deal with Iran. India is helping keep Russia afloat economically. What we need to understand about how our non-allied partners are reacting to great power competition.
Do not be fooled by the fact that Iran downbleded some of its 60% enriched uranium to 20% - Tehran often does such things to stave off admonition at the IAEA Board of Governors or otherwise reduce the US/Europe's perception of the urgency of addressing its nuclear activities
For its part, however, the Biden admin would likely prefer Israel not respond. Hence the unusual step of convening G7 heads of state this morning. However, Israel is unlikely to see a diplomatic initiative as an acceptable substitute for a military response. /End
Iran's attack not only relieved, at least for now, Israel's isolation over Gaza, but exposed the cynicism of Russia and China, both of which sought to justify Iranian actions even as they called for Israel not to respond. This will diminish their prestige in the Middle East. 5/
First, I think that military pressure is essential for securing a hostage deal with Hamas, and US pressure for Israel to refrain from a Rafah op unfortunately makes such a deal less likely, and inadvertently prolongs the war by encouraging Hamas to hold out for a better deal. 2/
This is arguably the most significant Iran story right now, though perhaps the least appreciated - the transformation of society and its alienation from the regime
Both the US and Israel have heretofore linked a ceasefire with the release of hostages. The growing US/Israel gap and sense that Israel is under time pressure, however, will likely harden Hamas' negotiating stance...why make concessions when time is working in your favor? 3/
NEW: Showtime for Egypt-China militaries
1- Naval exercise near Alexandria
2- Airshow over pyramids
3- Aviation expedition next week
Yes, Egypt still much closer to US defensively but Beijing expanding footprint, sees opportunity. Newsletter ➡️
Not so fast. US enthusiasm for cooperation w/New Delhi often goes overboard due to too-superficial analyses of India, inevitably leading to disappointment and frustration. India has its own interests and so do we, but more unites than divides us. Keep strengthening relations.
89 “Shahed” drones were shot down last night, all of those used by Russian terrorists during this attack. And this is an important result. Ukrainians can fully protect their skies from Russian strikes when they have sufficient supplies.
The same level of defense is needed
But Iran failed to surmount even this low bar. The attack failed utterly, highlighted Israel's close military coordination with regional and int'l partners, and arguably undermined its own deterrence. 4/
Iran inadvertently undermined its own deterrence w/its massive but unsuccessful attack on Israel. This was precisely the sort of attack many felt Tehran would mount in response to a strike on its nuclear facilities; its failure arguably now lowers the bar for such a strike.
If Pres. Biden and PM Netanyahu cannot get on the same page, then there is a risk this conflict ends not only with Hamas intact, but with hostages still held - this would fall well short of Israeli aims and be touted as a victory by Hamas despite the grievous toll in Gaza. 5/
We can see this in Iran's messaging. They falsely claimed (before missiles had even arrived) to have destroyed key targets; they claimed to have fired just "tens" of missiles, to project higher success rate than actually achieved; and they immediately called for deescalation. 3/
This is especially true when the one thing that might significantly pressure Hamas - the threat of an IDF operation in Rafah - appears to be receding due to US pressure and Israel's lengthy delays and indecision. 4/
The Iran nuclear deal remains "off the table," a US State Department spox has told RFE/RL.
“The US will ensure one way or another that Iran will never have a nuclear weapon, and we are prepared to use all elements of national power to ensure that outcome.”
I'm deeply grieved by the passing today of my colleague David Pollock, a wonderful man, a generous colleague, and an influential scholar. David was a leader in the field of polling, and his influence will live on through his work. His last piece - which was widely cited - is
It is not clear precisely what changes to Israeli policy the US seeks, but one gets the impression that what the US really wants in Gaza is a ceasefire, since it is likely one would be necessarily to significantly improve humanitarian aid access. However...2/
So what’s the answer? We should take our time to ensure US targets are adequately defended. And we should ensure that our retaliation stings - no pinprick or tit-for-tat responses. /End
And choosing to normalize now - as Iran enriches to 84%, sends drones to Russia, receives advanced tech from Russia, etc. - can only embolden Iran to believe its actions are paying dividends rather than inviting penalties. 3/
The idea that pressure hinders diplomacy gets things exactly backwards. Why should Iran stop anything it is doing or compromise with the US if there is no cost for refusing?
"containing Iran’s nuclear program which is more urgent than ever." That underscores the EU's continued commitment to nuclear diplomacy when it appears pretty much dead. It also probably flicks at the revived US-Iran indirect talks in Oman aimed at containing US-Iran tensions.-5-
But Israel will feel compelled to respond - as
@dstroul
noted, it can't allow direct attacks to go unanswered or to be normalized. And it will want not just to defeat the attack physically but show Iran its claimed new strategy of responding directly against Israel is unwise. 7/
This in turn would make day-after planning and everything it entails - which turns on empowering non-Hamas Palestinians, whether the PA or others, and recruiting regional involvement - far more difficult. /End
Bottom line - the less we hear from Israeli and Iranian officials on this matter, the more likely this chapter is closed, though this hardly concludes the conflict between them, which will continue albeit perhaps once again in the shadows. 2/2
Many will read this in the context of the recent China-Iran-Saudi deal, but it has been brewing for some time. Saudi Arabia joins Egypt, Qatar, Turkey, and Iran in affiliating with the SCO, and the UAE, Kuwait, and Bahrain may be next. 1/2
Congrats to my old friends and former colleagues Yael Lempert and Eric Kneedler, just confirmed as the US ambassadors to Jordan and Rwanda, respectively.
Happy 2024 folks. Here’s what I’ve learned in a quarter-century in foreign policy:
1) We should practice aggressive deterrence and be wary of a short-term bias when weighing risk - less risk now often means more later
2) At the same time, we should be reluctant to intervene 1/
The question before Israel is whether to respond in a way that is sharp but leaves room for deescalation; or whether to use this as an opportunity to pursue wider goals such as strikes on Iran's nuclear facilities. The latter likely requires a measure of US buy-in, however. 8/
This shows first the limits of China's diplomatic influence in the Middle East. It has only criticism to offer; it is not willing to bear costs to further any particular outcome, nor does it otherwise have influence to wield (except over Iran, and even that is tenuous). 8/
More likely is a performative retaliation that Iran claims is more effective than it is, but which leaves Israel room to deescalate, followed by efforts at “real” retaliation through terrorist attacks against Israeli targets, perhaps playing out over years. 2/2
In continuation of the evacuation efforts made by the Kingdom under the directives of the Kingdoms Leadership, several evacuees arrived from the Republic of
#Sudan
to the city of Jeddah today by a Kingdoms ship, which included 20 Saudi citizens and approximately 1866 individuals.