Open access here: https://t.co/upoBy6fllS /END

🧩 Our article contributes by: 👉 Showing why “family rivals” can survive & thrive side by side. 👉 Highlighting the strategic role of non-core issues in intra-family competition. 👉 Refining the toolkit of issue competition & contagion – also at minimal ideological distance. 7/N

Case study 🇮🇹: In both 2018 & 2022, #Meloni and #Salvini converged on immigration & nationalism but clashed on the economy, decentralisation & institutional reform. Their attacks clustered on these non-core domains. 6/N

Findings: ➡️ Peripheral competition dominates, especially among radical right parties. ➡️ Differentiation shows more in positioning than in salience. ➡️ Leaders’ mutual attacks target non-core issues. 5/N

We test this framework on 29 pairs of radical right & radical left parties in 19 European countries. We also zoom in on the clash between #FdI & #Lega in the 2018 & 2022 Italian elections. 4/N

Mirror parties share an ideological core & compete for similar constituencies. We argue they mostly engage in ideologically peripheral competition: ✔️ aligned on core issues ✔️ differentiated on non-core ones 3/N

Most research on party competition looks at rivals from different families. But what about parties from the same family competing in the same system? #Lega #FdI #reconquete #RN #PVV #FVD 2/N

🔥 New article out in @SPSR_RSSP by @G_Piccolino and me (Open Access!) 🧵1/N

Final output of the @frsFNRS-funded JUSTICE project (@RamonaComan1, @IEE_Bruxelles #Cevipol). My first post-PhD project—I learnt a lot and grew as a researcher! We had fun & published on rule of law challenges in @democ_journal @EEPolitics @EurJRR @EPSJournal /END

3️⃣ Finally, existing models often classify dissent based only on how radical the means are. We argue that the principled, and collective-oriented nature of dissenters’ goals can have a deeper impact on public opinion, increasing the chances of success for acts of dissent. 9/N

2️⃣ By defining opposition, contestation, and resistance as relational concepts, our typology can also serve explanatory goals. It helps explain how choices made by governments can expand or shrink the repertoire of dissenters—raising or lowering the likelihood of resistance. 7/N

🧩 The typology offers three key contributions: 1️⃣ It links various forms of opposition, contestation, and resistance—providing a novel framework to analyse and map interactions among multiple dissenting actors. 6/N

We use "Acts of dissent" as an umbrella concept, including: • Classical/principled opposition and (principled) contestation (open patterns of contestability). • Systemic opposition, sectoral contestation, institutional & full resistance (contestability reduced or closed). 5/N

Why does this matter? As autocratization unfolds globally, dissent comes from citizens, parties, social movements, civil servants, judges, CSOs, etc. We need a framework that accounts for the agency and the goals of both dissenters and those in power—across different arenas. 4/N

Our article develops a new typology of dissentgrounded in political science, theory, and sociology. We distinguish 8 types of dissent based on: • the space of contestability • the goals of dissenting actors • the arena (institutional or extra-institutional) 3/N

Terms like opposition, contestation, and resistance are often used interchangeably—but they shouldn’t be. Not all forms of dissent are the same. Lumping them together risks missing the distinct challenges and opportunities faced by dissenting actors. 2/N

🚨 New article out in @ActaPolitica with @RamonaComan1 (Open Access!) https://t.co/af0ziwhG4x 🧵1/N

Read it now—open access! 10/END

On a personal note: I'm especially proud of this paper. We aimed to blend rigorous research with a contribution that helps decode the cultural scaffolding of illiberalism. Gramsci (and Bourdieu) remain essential—to understand and to resist this reactionary wave. 9/N

Illiberal think tanks in Poland and Hungary aren't just policy machines—they’re constructing a cultural counter-hegemony, tapping intellectual networks and academic legitimacy to reshape democratic discourse, extending beyond national borders. 8/N