Ertem Nusret Tas Profile
Ertem Nusret Tas

@ErtemNusretTas

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I am an electrical engineering PhD student at Stanford. My interests include blockchains, cryptography and probability theory.

Joined November 2020
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@ErtemNusretTas
Ertem Nusret Tas
1 month
If you would like to learn more, check out the paper:
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@ErtemNusretTas
Ertem Nusret Tas
1 month
Let's consider the special case n=4, f=1, and for contradiction, suppose there is a protocol that has (f+1=2)-accountable safety under a delay-free network, but does not satisfy (f=1)-finality.
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@ErtemNusretTas
Ertem Nusret Tas
1 month
Thus, the difficulty is to show that accountability *even under synchrony* implies finality. For this, we prove that lack of f-finality implies lack of (f+1)-accountable safety in a delay-free network, which implies lack of (f+1)-accountability under synchrony.
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@ErtemNusretTas
Ertem Nusret Tas
1 month
Let's build some intuition why this result holds: If a protocol provides (f+1)-accountable-safety under partial synchrony, it trivially satisfies safety against f malicious replicas, a weaker property than accountability, under partial synchrony, i.e., f-finality.
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@ErtemNusretTas
Ertem Nusret Tas
1 month
The key Theorem 1 of our paper is then formally stated as
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@ErtemNusretTas
Ertem Nusret Tas
1 month
Now let’s dive into the technical details: Formally, f-finality means that the protocol retains safety under partial synchrony given f or less malicious validators.
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@ErtemNusretTas
Ertem Nusret Tas
1 month
... Also turn out to be implied by our result combined with impossibilities for safety and liveness under long-delay networks (formally, partial synchrony).
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@ErtemNusretTas
Ertem Nusret Tas
1 month
(ii) Impossibilities for accountable safety and liveness resiliences (Theorem B.1, "BFT Protocol Forensics" by @peiyaosheng @GaryWang523 @kartik1507 @sreeramkannan @viswanathpramod, ...
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@ErtemNusretTas
Ertem Nusret Tas
1 month
(i) Combined with the availability-finality dilemma (Theorem 3 of “Byzantine Generals in the Permissionless Setting” by @Tim_Roughgarden and @AndrewLewisPye , which rules out single-ledger protocols that satisfy both finality and dynamic availability...
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@ErtemNusretTas
Ertem Nusret Tas
1 month
Our result unifies earlier works:
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@ErtemNusretTas
Ertem Nusret Tas
1 month
What this says is that timing information does not help in accountable safety. Accountability under asynchrony is as strong as accountability under synchrony.
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@ErtemNusretTas
Ertem Nusret Tas
1 month
We show that if a blockchain provides any accountability (even in idealized delay-free networks), it also provides finality (safety under a long-delay network).
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@ErtemNusretTas
Ertem Nusret Tas
1 month
Finality means that the blockchain remains safe (no inconsistencies like double-spends) against many malicious validators, even when there are long network delays. 👇
@Tim_Roughgarden
Tim Roughgarden
1 year
Property 1: Robustness to network partitions/periods of asynchrony. I.e., consistency always, and liveness whenever there's no partition/under normal network conditions (8/20)
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