Honored to direct our
@CFR_org
Task Force report on Taiwan under the leadership of Mike Mullen and Sue Gordon, with a fantastic group of Task Force members. We call for a bolder U.S. strategy to advance its important strategic interests:
The United States and Japan need to urgently craft a coordinated strategy to deter Chinese aggression in the Taiwan Strait and ensure they can respond effectively if deterrence fails. I lay out a path forward in this paper for
@CFR_org
@CFR_CPA
Proud to have co-authored this Task Force Report with
@J_A_Hillman
that looks at the risks of China's Belt and Road Initiative for the United States and how it should respond.
Piece gets a critical point wrong: US has never accepted the "one China principle," instead it maintains a "one-China policy." US has never agreed/recognized Taiwan is a part of China, instead acknowledging Chinese position.
The U.S. needs to take difficult steps and accept more risk and greater friction with China to maintain peace in the Taiwan Strait, Ivan Kanapathy and I argue for
@ForeignAffairs
Taipei will notice an interesting difference between statements on Taiwan in the San Francisco readout and the Bali one:
San Francisco: "He called for restraint in the PRC’s use of military activity in and around the Taiwan Strait."
China will learn from Russia’s failures in Ukraine and hone its operational plans. It is critical for Taiwan and the US to do the same. Whichever side adapts more deftly will do much to determine whether deterrence holds. My latest for
@ForeignAffairs
The Taliban's spokesman said Afghanistan will rely primarily on Chinese financing to rebuild the country. But Chinese investment won't be as forthcoming as he thinks, as I argued here for
@CFR_org
A transformational week for the U.S.-Japan alliance, with the 2+2 Joint Statement demonstrating Tokyo's seriousness about preparing for a regional contingency. One year ago, most of these recommendations seemed ambitious. Now they are within reach:
Excellent overview of China's flights into Taiwan's ADIZ by
@gadyepstein
in
@TheEconomist
(with a cool map of the flight paths). The article also features some of my research with Bonny Lin on this issue.
@laraseligman
@BonnieGlaser
Taiwan Relations Act is a US domestic law, not a treaty. Making available to Taiwan defense articles and defense services is very different than an obligation to come to its defense. Whether US would come to Taiwan’s defense is famously ambiguous.
Official US position is the status of Taiwan is yet to be determined. Those who write on this complex issue should keep this piece from
@RichardBushIII
on their desk:
.
@crmiller1
on the importance of semiconductors, Taiwan's outsized role in their manufacture, and U.S. efforts to lure production back, for
@CFR_org
.
Excellent piece in
@WSJ
by
@joyuwang
and
@yarotrof
that raises important issues in Taiwan's defense debate. My sense is there is more consensus on the island wrt the importance of preparing for a conflict and bolstering deterrence. 1/2
Many thanks to
@Diplomat_APAC
for letting me share thoughts on what is at stake in the Taiwan Strait and how we can prevent a conflict - a task that is now more urgent than ever
Preserving the status quo in the Taiwan Strait in the face of growing Chinese power and assertiveness is a challenge not just for the Unites States but also other nations including Japan.
How is the Biden administration navigating rising cross-Strait tensions? Did President Biden misspeak when he said he would come to Taiwan's defense? My conversation with
@JamesMLindsay
on The President's Inbox for
@CFR_org
Excellent piece on the debate over strategic ambiguity by
@michaelcrowley
in the
@nytimes
. Glad that the piece
@RichardHaass
and I wrote has helped start this important conversation.
Bonny Lin
@ChinaPowerCSIS
and I respond to
@osmastro
's essay in the upcoming issue of
@ForeignAffairs
, arguing that Xi Jinping still views using force against Taiwan as a last resort🧵1/10
“Kishi referred to...a need to study ways for the Japanese Self-Defense Forces to cooperate with U.S. forces defending Taiwan in the event of China's aggression”
Thanks to
@bt_hanson
for having me on
@ChicagoCouncil
's Deep Dish
#podcast
to discuss U.S. policy toward Taiwan and our
@CFR_org
Task Force report. This is a tough issue that merits intense debate and I was glad to share my thoughts. Listen here:
Tsai: Our position on cross-strait relations remains the same: neither our goodwill nor our commitments will change. We call for maintaining the status quo, and we will do our utmost to prevent the status quo from being unilaterally altered.
"The PRC is the Department’s pacing challenge and a Taiwan contingency is the pacing scenario. We are modernizing our capabilities, updating U.S. force posture, and developing new operational concepts accordingly."
There is significant downside to strategic ambiguity, which was introduced when China did not have the military capability to assault Taiwan. U.S. policy must recognize that deterrence is eroding, and it must adapt to china’s growing capabilities.
The United States is finally responding to China's Belt and Road Initiative. But it is not going far enough.
@J_A_Hillman
and I analyze the Build Back Better World (B3W🙄) announcement in
@thehill
.
The fourth time
@POTUS
has endorsed strategic clarity. This is now US policy, despite his administration’s attempt (also for the fourth time) to walk it back. Now time to fully resource this commitment and truly focus on it.
Great conversation, and glad we could get ADM Lee Hsi-min, the man behind the Overall Defense Concept, to provide an authoritative perspective from Taiwan. Thanks to
@MargaretKLewis
for presiding.
Very pleased to join
@CFR_org
to talk about the evolving military balance in the Taiwan Strait. Bottom line: It's bad and getting worse, and we are in urgent need of sharp action to avoid war - and to win it, if it breaks out.
I also read the KMT's posturing as an attempt to peel away DPP voters rather than a split over the importance of defense. I think a KMT defense policy would look very similar to the DPP's policy (growing budget, focus on asymmetric systems, reforming training). 2/2
Bali: "He raised U.S. objections to the PRC’s coercive and increasingly aggressive actions toward Taiwan, which undermine peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and in the broader region, and jeopardize global prosperity."
Useful analysis of the state of play of Taiwan's Overall Defense Concept (ODC) by
@TangAnZhu
. Especially interesting are sections on obstacles to implementation and what is missing from ODC:
Even more important is that the United States must narrow the gap between its commitments and capabilities, and should devote the resources necessary to ensure it can deny a PLA fait accompli.
Taiwan's voters head to the polls tomorrow to elect their next president. For
@ForeignAffairs
, I argue that despite the candidates framing the stakes in existential terms, there is broad continuity on the direction that Taiwan's foreign policy should take
The visit, led by one-time chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen, comes at a time when Taiwan has stepped up its alert level, wary of China taking advantage of a distracted West to move against it.
@taiwan
The Biden admin has already moved to de facto clarity through its comments regarding Taiwan - State and NSC spox emphasizing "rock-solid" commitment. US credibility is already on the line.
Something is lost here: "there would still be limits, including on displaying the Taiwanese flag at any meetings. "'Anything related to sovereignty is off-limits.'" But US Ambassador to Palau seen wearing a mask with ROC flag on it today...
@marcmakingsense
@catielila
Strategic ambiguity refers to question of whether we would come to Taiwan's defense in the face of a Chinese attack, does not touch on questions of sovereignty/independence.
Good move to have this meeting in US rather than Taiwan. Likely also allows Tsai to have a more forward leaning public posture during her transit (speech, etc.) without provoking a strong PRC reaction.
SCOOP
#SpeakerKevinMcCarthy
will meet President Tsai Ing-wen in
#California
instead of in
#Taiwan
.
Decision came after Taiwan shared intelligence about the treat from China & McCarthy accept their rationale.
As we argued, a shift to strategic clarity should also include public reassurances that the United States does not support Taiwan independence. That is a key element of our proposal that is often overlooked (as it is here).
Japan's transformation into a country willing to play a real role in reginal security could prove to be the most significant geopolitical development in the Indo-Pacific. Nowhere is this more apparent than Tokyo's growing role in the Taiwan Strait.
@catielila
@marcmakingsense
@DavidMSacks1
The US government does not take a position on the status of Taiwan. The ambiguity in the language is that the US “*acknowledges* (takes note) the *Chinese* (does not distinguish if this means ROC or PRC) position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.”
...our commitment to resist annexation or encroachment upon our sovereignty, and our commitment that the future of the Republic of China (Taiwan) must be decided in accordance with the will of the Taiwanese people.
Enjoyed the chance to join
@nktpnd
and discuss the latest developments in the Taiwan Strait during a "Reddit Talk" for r/WorldNews. You can listen to our conversation:
China’s actions in Hong Kong - and elsewhere - show that Western criticism and sanctions are not enough to shape its behavior. Strategic clarity would convey to China the seriousness with which we take the question of Taiwan’s future.
This is because the path that China has laid out offers neither a free and democratic way of life for Taiwan, nor sovereignty for our 23 million people.
War games also purposely tilt the fight in favor of China, to help identify steps that the United States and Taiwan could take to ensure that even a large-scale and determined Chinese invasion of Taiwan would fail. Their goal is not to model a realistic scenario. 6/10
👌👏"Japanese and U.S. personnel concluded a two-day exercise on Wednesday that was designed as training for a rapid response to an amphibious invasion of a remote island."
We hope for an easing of cross-strait relations and will not act rashly, but there should be absolutely no illusions that the Taiwanese people will bow to pressure.
@marcmakingsense
@catielila
In 1979, US recognized PRC as the sole legal government of China, but has never stated Taiwan is part of China. It has only "acknowledged" the Chinese position that Taiwan is part of China. In 1982, Reagan admin stated to Congress that US took no position on Taiwan’s sovereignty.
Great summary of the G7 dynamics re responding to China's Belt and Road Initiative in the
@nytimes
. Proud to see the
@CFR_org
Task Force Report that I co-authored quoted
Important response from ADM Davidson. As
@RichardHaass
and I argued in
@ForeignAffairs
, the risks of continued strategic ambiguity outweigh the benefits. Time for strategic clarity
US commander in
#IndoPacific
says China eroding US military edge in the region & open to reevaluating whether should change
#StrategicAmbiguity
towards Taiwan. Also, head of intelligence
@IndoPacom
expects China to deploy fighter jets in South China Sea
While some overstate China’s eagerness to invade Taiwan, the US still needs to redouble its efforts to ensure that Xi is not tempted to do so, investing in capabilities that are either long range or difficult for PLA missiles to target—and signal its willingness to use them. 9/10
Great to travel back to Taiwan and hear how officials are grappling with the war in Ukraine and interpreting the CCP congress. Taiwan is taking important steps to improve its defenses and resilience but much more needs to be done, with far greater urgency
The US and China are barreling toward a Taiwan Strait Crisis. Pelosi's travel plans could ignite such a crisis, but even if one is averted this time around we have entered a new, more dangerous era of cross-Strait relations. My latest for
@ForeignAffairs
Washington should also continue to press Taiwan to increase its defense spending and invest in asymmetric capabilities, work with Taiwan to improve its defense, and help Taiwan secure its critical infrastructure, harden its cyberdefenses, and improve its maritime ISR. 10/10
Multiple issues here: US is not treaty-bound to defend Taiwan, article totally misstates US one-China policy, and overstates risk of Taiwan declaring independence
Enjoyed the opportunity to speak with
@osmastro
and
@fhtsai
about China's Belt and Road Initiative and our CFR Task Force Report. Thanks to
@Ali_Wyne
for moderating!
Nearly 75 years ago, China supported the Soviet Union when it encouraged North Korea to invade South Korea. That ended up putting Taiwan out of Mao's reach. Today, China's support for Putin will similarly harm its interests in the Taiwan Strait.
It is far from clear that China could defeat Taiwan’s military, subdue its population, and occupy and control its territory. Nor is it clear that the PLA could hold off any U.S. forces that came to Taiwan’s aid. 7/10
@ewong
@CFR_org
I wrote this piece - it was intended to be a corrective to calls from O’Brien, Moulton, and others to make plans to destroy TSMC during a conflict.
I'm a huge Max Hastings fan so ☹️ to see this. A number of points I have w his piece but the bottom line is this: The *WORST* US policy is half-pregnancy, which keeps our cred attach to Taiwan but doesn't resource ability to defend it. This is most dangerous & damaging if war. 1/
U.S. & AU "re-emphasized Taiwan’s important role in the Indo-Pacific region...stated their intent to strengthen ties with Taiwan" and "reiterated continued support for a peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues without resorting to threats or coercion."
"There will be no cheap way to meet this challenge — so hard choices in other theaters and for other requirements will be obligatory. But failing to do so will be the most expensive mistake of all."
Fully agree, why I wrote: U.S. can reinforce deterrence by developing a credible denial strategy for Taiwan, shifting additional mil assets to Asia and dispersing them, procuring long-range munitions and stationing them in the region, and coord with JPN on contingency planning.
I agree that China won’t use force against Taiwan this year. But the likelihood increases each year the US does not make substantial changes to its regional force posture,
@DavidMSacks1
,
@CFR_org
This response to a question on the merits of strategic clarity by the incoming INDOPACOM commander is significant: "I would be open to conversations with the Secretary of Defense to understand the risks and rewards of a potential policy change"
China's investments in Pakistan were intended to demonstrate the Belt and Road Initiative's transformational potential. Instead, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor reveals the limits of BRI.
#beltandroadresponse
We will continue to bolster our national defense and demonstrate our determination to defend ourselves in order to ensure that nobody can force Taiwan to take the path China has laid out for us.
.
@JoshKurlantzick
examines the implications of China's growing unpopularity for its foreign policy goals and the opportunities this presents for the United States:
With talk of countries switching diplomatic relations from Taipei to Beijing, resurfacing this piece I wrote where I argue poaching Taiwan's diplo allies is not in China's long-term interest:
FT SCOOP Honduras warns may switch diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing to get Chinese Covid vaccines.
Last month China offered to give vaccines to Paraguay in exchange for abandoning Taiwan.
Vaccine diplomacy/wars have real consequences
5) In addition, Taiwan and China can seek to cooperate on practical matters, working to establish an exchange of medical information to ease travel during the pandemic and looking to resume scholarly exchanges.
Excellent idea from
@ryanl_hass
. Ideally, U.S. would also join CP-TPP and bring Taiwan in during a future round. It is clear, though, that restarting TIFA talks (while welcome) is not ambitious enough. Lots of room for a bolder trade agenda with Taiwan.
A more ambitious step would be for US to coordinate w/other market economies to negotiate in parallel with Taiwan. With CAI frozen and RCEP done, there could be an opening to explore. Moving down this path would embed Taiwan's security & prosperity as issues of intl concern.
2) China is looking to reset relations with the U.S., focus on econ recovery, and maintain a positive atmosphere throughout the year, which marks the 100th anniversary of the CCP. A confrontation over Taiwan would complicate China’s ability to accomplish these tasks.
The IMF and World Bank should use the Spring Meetings to address China’s problematic lending practices and its inadequate response to rising debt across Belt and Road nations.
#beltandroadresponse
I guess Chas Freeman forgot about the Six Assurances, part of the U.S. one-China policy: "The United States will not exert pressure on Taiwan to enter into negotiations with the PRC."
Really good overview of how U.S. policies are crippling Huawei. Cites our
@CFR_org
research on how countries around the world are approaching Huawei 5G. Can see the global map here:
4) To bolster cross-Strait stability, U.S. should publicly and privately urge both sides to resume official communications, highlight its commitment to Taiwan, and allocate additional resources to back up that rhetoric.
@DavidMSacks1
@CFR_org
Thanks David. I've been reading all your writings. My post is not a criticism of your piece or of the CFR newsletter. It's to point out the fact you had to write that at all given where the "conversation" on US-China is (including remarks from the figures you mention and others).
Taiwan will continue to draw closer to the West as a consensus has emerged among the populace following Hong Kong and Ukraine. The question, then, is how Xi responds to such a development.
👏"I do think that maintenance of that status quo and of that security is a dynamic situation. As the threat from (China) grows, as Beijing's aggressive and bullying behavior vis-a-vis Taiwan grows, I think that our response has to be calibrated as well."
"...the President was very clear in reaffirming very longstanding U.S. policy and raising very clear concerns. But the idea of establishing specific guardrails with respect to Taiwan was not part of the conversation tonight."
Good news that Taiwan will pass a $8.7 billion special budget - and even better news that it looks as though this money will be spent on the *right* things like missiles, drones, and air-defense systems.
Let us here renew with one another our enduring commitment to a free and democratic constitutional system, our commitment that the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China should not be subordinate to each other,...