Do you have an idea for a general readership book relating to Eastern Europe and Eurasia? If so, let me tell you about a new series from
@HurstPublishers
, for which I’m the founding series editor. 🧵 1/?
There is evidence that the elite in Russia is rallying around Putin, including those who originally expressed misgivings about the invasion of Ukraine and the ongoing war.
Is this unity durable – and how might it impact decision-making?
A thread. 1/?
Russian universities and scientific organisations to lose (legal) access to international journals and databases, as major publishers cease providing their services to those in Russia and Belarus.
Speculation about the possibility of a coup against Vladimir Putin is getting a bit out of hand. But the mere fact of this speculation tell us about the nature of Russia’s political system – and about those commenting on it.
A 🧵. 1/?
A child being detained by police at a demonstration in support of Alexei Navalny. The authorities likely want to dissuade young people from rallying behind Navalny (as they have on platforms such as TikTok), but images like this might well have the opposite effect
#Russia
FM
#Lavrov
: The goal of Russia’s special military operation is to stop any war that could take place on Ukrainian territory or that could start from there.
The “Donbas consensus” is a phrase being used to refer to the “rally ‘round the flag” effect currently seen in Russia in relation to the country’s war on Ukraine.
Is it real – and why might it collapse relatively soon?
A thread. 1/?
Can't quite believe that the book on Alexei Navalny that I've written with
@JanMattiD
and
@m_lallouet
for
@HurstPublishers
now exists. Short 🧵 on how the book came into existence. 1/?
Hearing lots of people say that Vladimir Putin doesn't have to worry about public opinion – that he's a totalitarian dictator who rules through coercion alone. But that's just plain wrong.
Vladimir Putin has just signed a decree on Russian “traditional values”. What are they?
There are 17, according to the decree:
1. Life.
2. Dignity
3. Human rights and freedoms.
4. Patriotism.
This year has been... challenging, to say the least. But I'm ending it with a small silver lining: really honoured to have been appointed an Associate Fellow of
@ChathamHouse
in the Russia and Eurasia Programme
@CHRussiaEurasia
– a stellar team led by
@jamesnixey
.
For some analysis of Russian opposition to the war in Ukraine, see this in
@ConversationUK
by me today – useful context, perhaps, for Peskov's comment:
One of Russia's richest men – head of Nornickel, Vladmir Potanin – criticises possibility of confiscating assets of foreign companies that have ceased operating in Russia due to the war in Ukraine. "This will take us back a hundred years, to 1917".
It's crazy to think that nearly half of the time I've been at
@UCLSSEES
has been disrupted by coronavirus. Although so much uncertainty remains, I'm thrilled to be promoted to Associate Professor. Very lucky to work with such great colleagues and students, online or offline
@UCL
Still can't quite believe it, but "Navalny" has been shortlisted for the
@Pushkin_House
Book Prize. It's a real honour to see the book – co-authored with
@JanMattiD
and
@m_lallouet
– placed alongside such excellent publications.
#pushkinprize2022
This excellent post by
@faridaily_
– translated by
@ichbinilya
and
@lizafokht
– shows how "Putin’s dream of a consolidation among the Russian elite has come true", as sanctions have convinced many members of the elite that the West is out to get them. 2/?
The impact of the war in Ukraine on Russia domestically will depend to a large degree on the Kremlin’s ability to control the narrative.
A 🧵 on how this fits into pre-invasion moves to cripple political opposition and independent media in Russia. 1/?
Russian army says the first stage of its military operation are "completed", and that troops will now focus on the "liberation" of Ukraine's Donbas region
And, as
@LucanWay
notes, this is a dynamic seen in regimes beyond Russia: "Sense of existential threat is a powerful source of regime durability in revolutionary regimes I have studied." 4/?
I am a strong supporter of sanctions against R. But they may be strengthening P regime by heightening siege mentality and increasing cohesion among regime elites. Sense of existential threat is a powerful source of regime durability in revolutionary regimes I have studied.
Still find it hard to believe that it was only just over a year ago – on 29 January 2021 – that I reached out to
@JanMattiD
and
@m_lallouet
to ask whether they wanted to write a book on Navalny together. There are now 10 editions of "Navalny" in nine different languages. 1/?
What language should we use regarding so-called “elections” in non-democracies?
Vladimir Putin’s announcement yesterday has made the question very relevant once again.
Quick 🧵. 1/
One plausible goal of sanctions might be to provoke splits within the elite, but it looks – for the moment, at least – that sanctions have, rather, brought elite groups closer together in their opposition to the West. 3/?
Feel deeply honoured
@ratemyskyperoom
. Yes, it’s a backpack: Swiss Army, from the 1950s. Can we submit this for the REF
@UCLSSEES
? We could say we thought the “R” stood for “Room”, not “Research”...
But how long will this last? "Rallying 'round the flag" effects aren't indefinite, even if they can be sustained by a number of factors, including media control and reshaping people's emotional connection to the state and their identities. 5/?
If you're looking for an engaging, general-readership overview of political opposition in Russia over the last 20(ish) years, then see my co-authored book with
@JanMattiD
and
@m_lallouet
, published by
@HurstPublishers
and
@OUPAcademic
.
Much like his life’s work, Alexei Navalny’s death shows the corrupt brutality of Vladimir Putin’s Russia.
In this
@ChathamHouse
piece, Nikolai Petrov and I reflect on Navalny's significance and legacy.
@CHRussiaEurasia
@UCLSSEES
By the way, the book "Putin v. the People" by
@samagreene
and
@gbrunc
does a brilliant job, among other things, of looking into the "rallying 'round the flag" effect after the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014. 6/?
It is likely, therefore, that rumours of a coup will not result in a coup, but will only lead to Putin's increased willingness to use coercion to keep elite groups in check – and to make sure his approvals stay high. 19/?
There have been more than 15,000 detentions so far at anti-war protests across Russia, according to
@OvdInfo
. The group stresses that this figure includes multiple detentions of the same people.
❗️ ОВД-Инфо насчитал уже более 15 000 задержаний* участников антивоенного протеста в России.
* 15 000 — количество задержаний, но не задержанных: одних и тех же людей могут задерживать несколько раз.
One might ask why motherhood and apple pie are missing...
More seriously, this is the broad project of which the "LGBT propaganda" bill forms a part. Putin wants to claim that Russia is defending values that the liberal "collective West" is trampling on. And...
As
@russophiliac
notes, however, there are reasons to be sceptical of polling during the war, including because of social desirability bias: the pressure people feel to say what they think they should say rather than what they really believe. 7/?
If you want to get a clear sense of quite how different the message many Russians are getting regarding events in Ukraine compared to information outside of the country, then do follow
@francska1
of
@BBCMonitoring
.
The flood of lies continues on Russian state TV today
Propagandist Olga Skabeyeva claims Russian strikes have taken out over 800 Ukrainian military sites before pointedly adding "Russian troops are taking all measures to guarantee the safety of civilians"
What do authoritarian legislatures and legislators do? For answers, see my article with Jennifer Gandhi and
@MilanSvolik
– the introduction to a Comparative Political Studies special issue co-edited by the three of us. Really pleased this is out!
@UCLSSEES
With 85% of ballots counted, this is the results map by Russian regions. Only one region – Nenets Autonomous Okrug – shows a majority of voters against the amendment package.
#Russia
For those not already doing so, really do pay attention when
@AndreiSoldatov
and
@irinaborogan
provide analysis — they know what they’re talking about.
Putin is reportedly cracking down on the FSB agency that botched Russia’s Ukraine prep. For Meduza,
@AndreiSoldatov
and
@irinaborogan
tell the story behind this bad intelligence.
But back to 2022. Elite consolidation in Russia after the 24 February invasion, and in the face of sanctions, may well both align elite preferences on certain issues *and* incentivise people not to make public their policy differences for fear of being labelled a traitor. 7/?
This is an image of recent voting results from the State Duma – the lower chamber of Russia's national legislature, the Federal Assembly.
A 🧵 on the Duma, voting, and what this might tell us about opposition to the Russian military's war on Ukraine. 1/?
... that the West is trying to interfere in Russia's affairs by promoting "non-traditional" values.
This is, then, an attempt to frame Russia's war on Ukraine as part of a broader cultural clash.
But it likely also reflects a general increase in support for state institutions – a classic “rally ‘round the flag” effect, which relates less to the particular activities of institutions/actors and more to a generalised sense of the need for unity in the face of a threat. 6/?
One indicator that it's wrong: the enormous resources ploughed into state propaganda.
@samagreene
and
@gbrunc
's concept of the "co-construction of power" is also really useful here.
The Kremlin has instructed regional authorities in Russia to organise public activities in support of the army and the "special military operation" (i.e., war) in Ukraine, according to reporting by
@ru_rbc
.
Since Russia’s 24 February invasion of Ukraine, the narrative regarding (dis)unity within the Russian elite has varied. Initially, there was talk of shock and disquiet, with focus on those voices opposing the war – even if only obliquely. 2/?
After 2 weeks of multiple health screens and asking everyone to quarantine, I surprised my closest inner circle with a trip to a private island where we could pretend things were normal just for a brief moment in time.
Irony is dead.
Russia's Central Electoral Commission has released new informational posters in the run-up to elections – but based on Soviet designs.
The Russian state further embracing its return to the past...
Moreover, rumours may lead to more rumours – paranoia may encourage more paranoia – raising the risk of a self-fulfilling prophecy. And yet, I still don't think a coup is around the corner. Why? 14/?
A plan is being discussed by Russia's Presidential Administration to place a moratorium on the adoption of unpopular socially significant decisions from autumn 2023 until after the 2024 presidential election.
What does this tell us? Very short 🧵. 1/
Indeed, recent analysis provides evidence of the difference social desirability bias makes. Philipp Chapkovski and
@maxlschaub
argue that accounting for the impact of social desirability bias reduces reported support for the invasion from 68% to 53%. 9/?
Many people are talking about the rocketing approval ratings for Vladimir Putin. But let me note something else: a sharp increase in approval ratings for the Russian State Duma, the lower chamber of the national legislature (the Federal Assembly). 2/?
In fact, my own research focuses on elite factionalism in Russia and its impact on law-making. My basic point is that heated, bitter disputes between elite actors are more widespread than often appreciated – and ... 11/?
Putin’s personalist authoritarian system is based to a large degree on secrecy, coercion, and fear. The combination of warring factions and information limitations is, therefore, ripe for gossip and rumours. 13/?
A key issue here is whether all policy areas will see this increased elite homogeneity. Message discipline may well be tightest re: the ongoing war, although not perfect – see Medinsky vs. Kadyrov, as in this piece by
@Andrew__Roth
and
@PjotrSauer
. 8/?
The State Duma is often dismissed – not simply by external observers like me but also by many Russians – as irrelevant: a “rubber stamp”. But look at the approval rating shoot up in March 2022. 4/?
It might be tempting to dismiss all of this talk of a possible coup as tabloid-driven nonsense from people who don’t know much about Russia. There’s certainly a good dose of that. But rumours of a coup are made more likely in a political system like Russia’s. 12/?
This might have something to do with the chamber’s speaker, Vyacheslav Volodin, performing loyalty to Vladimir Putin – in the words of Andrei Pertsev, he is one of Putin’s “most loyal infantryman”. 5/?
In this section of a
@CHRussiaEurasia
report released today – 'Myths and Misconceptions in the Debate on Russia' –
@eschulmann
and I tackle the myth that governance in Russia is a one-man show
#Russia
@UCLSSEES
Although the article stresses that “[n]o one has directly criticized Putin” personally, the president's centrality to the invasion means that criticism of Putin may well (increasingly) be inferred by the Kremlin from criticism of the war. 7/?
And that gets to the nature of the political system and the current situation. Given that Putin has constructed a personalist authoritarian regime, given his centrality to the invasion, and given his use of venomous language regarding "scum and traitors"... 8/?
And such perceptions may well be encouraged with evidence of disquiet between members of the siloviki – those in control of the coercive power needed to challenge Putin – as discussed in this
@cepa
article by
@AndreiSoldatov
and
@irinaborogan
. 11/?
This is a bias strengthened, no doubt, by the increased costs associated with going "off message" during Russia’s current war, including the possibility of fines or imprisonment. 8/?
An article in the
@washingtonpost
by
@CatherineBelton
and
@gregpmiller
looks at growing opposition (of various forms) to the ongoing war by members of the economic elite: “oligarchs” and senior state officials. 6/?
Really exciting position at
@UCLSSEES
just announced: Lecturer (Assistant Professor) in Soviet / Post-Soviet History. Please apply and/or help spread the word! If applying, feel free to get in touch for an informal chat about SSEES / UCL.
Very brave – or foolhardy – would be members of the elite willing to try to topple Putin in a coup with his public approval ratings this high, not to mention the coup-proofing hurdles discussed by
@adam_e_casey
in this
@ForeignPolicy
article. 18/?
And yet, we should be careful with this "53%", too. For one thing, the authors note that the sample is skewed in a way that might *underplay* the level of true support. But also, as
@russophiliac
and others note, polling figures might give a false sense of certainty. 10/?
And my research on the often-dismissed State Duma – the lower chamber of the Federal Assembly – suggests that we might get clues as to the unity of the elite by looking at the law-making process. 19/?
As the economic impact of sanctions are more keenly felt – by both the elite and the Russian people – there will be fewer resources available to satisfy competing groups. And that may well begin to challenge the current unity seen within the elite. 17/?
There is evidence that the elite in Russia is rallying around Putin, including those who originally expressed misgivings about the invasion of Ukraine and the ongoing war.
Is this unity durable – and how might it impact decision-making?
A thread. 1/?